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Executive summary 
Background 
The concept of microcredit was first introduced in Bangladesh by Nobel Peace 
Prize winner Muhammad Yunus. Professor Yunus started Grameen Bank (GB) 
more than 30 years ago with the aim of reducing poverty by providing small 
loans to the country’s rural poor (Yunus 1999). Microcredit has evolved over the 
years and does not only provide credit to the poor, but also now spans a myriad 
of other services including savings, insurance, remittances and non-financial 
services such as financial literacy training and skills development programmes; 
microcredit is now referred to as microfinance (Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch 2005, 2010). A key feature of microfinance has been the targeting of 
women on the grounds that, compared to men, they perform better as clients of 
microfinance institutions and that their participation has more desirable 
development outcomes (Pitt and Khandker 1998).  
Despite the apparent success and popularity of microfinance, no clear evidence 
yet exists that microfinance programmes have positive impacts (Armendáriz de 
Aghion and Morduch 2005, 2010; and many others). There have been four major 
reviews examining impacts of microfinance (Sebstad and Chen, 1996; Gaile and 
Foster 1996, Goldberg 2005, Odell 2010, see also Orso 2011). These reviews 
concluded that, while anecdotes and other inspiring stories (such as Todd 1996) 
purported to show that microfinance can make a real difference in the lives of 
those served, rigorous quantitative evidence on the nature, magnitude and 
balance of microfinance impact is still scarce and inconclusive (Armendáriz de 
Aghion and Morduch 2005, 2010). Overall, it is widely acknowledged that no 
well-known study robustly shows any strong impacts of microfinance (Armendáriz 
de Aghion and Morduch 2005, p199-230). 
Because of the growth of the microfinance industry and the attention the sector 
has received from policy makers, donors and private investors in recent years, 
existing microfinance impact evaluations need to be re-investigated; the 
robustness of claims that microfinance successfully alleviates poverty and 
empowers women must be scrutinised more carefully. Hence, this review re-
visits the evidence of microfinance evaluations focusing on the technical 
challenges of conducting rigorous microfinance impact evaluations. 
Methodology 
Following the established medical and educational experience embodied in 
Cochrane and Campbell Collaborations, we assess the validity of available 
evaluations. Initially we focus on the intervention (e.g. provision of microcredit), 
the measurement of outcomes (e.g. income, expenditure, assets, health and 
education, empowerment, and so on) and contextual factors likely to affect 
differences in outcomes in different contexts, including other microfinance 
services. In addition, we consider different categories of persons (impact 
heterogeneity), and the potential existence, as well as the likely significance of 
factors which might confound observed relationships to undermine claims of a 
causal relationship with microfinance. 
We search eleven academic databases, four microfinance aggregator and eight 
non-governmental (NGO) or aid organisation websites. We also consult 
bibliographies of reviewed books, journal articles, PhDs, and grey literature, 
using search terms given in section 2.1.2. We screen articles in two further 
stages, reducing 2,643 items to 58 which we examine in detail. In addition, we 
classify the research designs used in microfinance impact evaluations into five 
Evidence of the impact of microfinance: a systematic review  
3 
 
broad categories; in descending order of internal validity – randomised control 
trials (RCTs), pipeline designs, with/without comparisons (in panel or cross-
section form), natural experiments and general purpose surveys. These five 
categories are cross-classified with three categories of statistical methods of 
analysis, which in descending order of internal validity are two-stage 
instrumental variables methods (IV) and propensity score matching (PSM), 
multivariate (control function) and tabulation methods.  
As very few RCTs were available, we include in our review many studies with 
weak designs that have been analysed with sophisticated methods; however, we 
note that in general weak design cannot be fully compensated by sophisticated 
analysis (Meyer and Fienberg 1992, Rosenbaum 2002). Some articles used more 
than one method of analysis; actual designs, data production processes and 
analyses cannot be fully accommodated in such a basic two-way classification 
with limited numbers of categories. Nevertheless, we adopt a heuristic scoring 
of research designs and methods of analysis, combining these scores into a single 
value and defining a cut-off exclusion value.  A few articles which we marginally 
exclude by this approach were included based on our judgement, resulting in a 
final count of 58 papers.  
Our overall judgement draws mainly on RCTs and pipelines. However, we also 
devote considerable attention to the most prominent with/without studies which 
have been highly influential in validating orthodox favourable views of 
microfinance impacts. These earlier studies have turned out to have low validity 
with replicated analysis and critical assessment. 
Results 
There are only two RCTs of relevance to our objectives; neither has appeared in 
peer review form. In our judgement, one has low-moderate and the other high 
risk of bias; neither finds convincing impacts on well-being. We found nine 
pipeline studies reported in ten papers, all based on non-random selection of 
location and clients; most have only ex-post cross-sectional data, some with 
retrospective panel data, allowing only low validity impact estimates of change 
in outcome variables.  
We find no robust evidence of positive impacts on women’s status, or girl’s 
enrolments - this may be partly due to these topics not being addressed in valid 
studies (RCTs and pipelines). Well-known studies which claim to have found 
positive impacts on females are based on weak research designs and problematic 
IV analyses which may not have survived replication or re-analysis using other 
methods, i.e. PSM.  
Given their importance in validating perceptions of the beneficence of 
microfinance interventions, we devote considerable effort to the assessment of 
with/without studies which have low inherent internal validity notwithstanding 
analysis with sophisticated methods. In particular, we discuss the two 
historically most significant studies (Pitt and Khandker 1998 and USAID funded 
studies in India, Zimbabwe and Peru – see sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, which, partly 
as a result of their prominence, have been replicated. The replications fail to 
confirm the original beneficent findings, and conclude that there is no 
statistically convincing evidence in these studies to either support or contradict 
the main claims of beneficence of microfinance. This is partly because of their 
weak research design. 
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Conclusions 
Thus, our report shows that almost all impact evaluations of microfinance suffer 
from weak methodologies and inadequate data (as already argued by Adams and 
von Pischke 1992), thus the reliability of impact estimates are adversely 
affected. This can lead to misconceptions about the actual effects of a 
microfinance programme, thereby diverting attention from the search for 
perhaps more pro-poor interventions. Therefore, it is of interest to the 
development community to engage with evaluation techniques and to 
understand their limitations, so that more reliable evidence of impact can be 
provided in order to lead to better outcomes for the poor. 
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1 Background 
1.1  Aims and rationale for current review 
While systems of credit provision for poor people have a long history (Shah et al. 
2007), a new wave of microcredit provision has emerged in the past thirty years, 
inspired by pioneering innovations in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Indonesia and 
elsewhere.  Microcredit has subsequently innovated in many ways, and is now 
more commonly viewed as one component of microfinance, along with savings, 
insurance and payment services for poor people. Microfinance institutions (MFI) 
have become important in the fight against poverty, growing worldwide in 
number of organisations and clients, and amount of donor funding 
[www.mixmarket.org/]. The sector continues to develop and innovate (Collins et 
al. 2009). A common feature of microcredit has been the targeting of women on 
the grounds that, compared to men, women both perform better as MFI clients 
and that their participation can have more desirable development outcomes 
(e.g. Pitt and Khandker 1998, Garikipati 2008).  
At the time of writing only one systematic review (SR) on the impact of 
microcredit has been completed (Stewart et al. 2010), who focus on the impact 
of microcredit and/or microsavings on the poor in Africa. Another review focuses 
on the impact of microcredit on women’s empowerment ((Vaessen et al. 
pending, personal correspondence with the authors) but apart from the protocol, 
no details are available yet.  
The original objective of this SR was to assess the impact of microcredit. 
However, our study reviews not only ‘credit’, but also ‘credit plus’ and ‘credit 
plus plus’ interventions as set out in 1.3 and 2.1.1 on the social and economic 
well-being of people living in developing countries who are poor, excluded or 
marginalised within their own society. We exclude studies that solely look at 
microsavings and have no geographical focus although we use only works 
reported in English. 
As set out in the protocol, we suggest adjusting the original review question 
from 
‘What is the evidence of the impact of micro-credit on the incomes of poor 
people?’, to  
‘What is the evidence of the impact of microfinance on the well-being of poor 
people?’ 
We include the following sub-questions:  
1) What is the evidence of the impact of microfinance on other money 
metric indicators such as microenterprise profits and revenues, 
expenditure (food and non-food), assets (agricultural, non-agricultural, 
transport and other assets) and housing improvements? 
2) What is the evidence of the impact of microfinance on other human 
development indicators such as education (enrolment and achievements 
for adults and children), health and health behaviour as well as nutrition? 
3) What is the evidence of the impact of microfinance on women’s 
empowerment?  
As a secondary objective, investigating each of these questions requires us to 
examine, where the evidence allows, whether the impact of microfinance on any 
of these outcomes is modified by a) gender of borrower, b) poverty status of 
household, c) rural/urban setting, d) geographical location, e) presence of 
second income earner in the household, and f) type of product. 
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1.1.1 Research designs and analytical methods 
The major problem identified in the review is that few, if any, studies provide 
reliable evidence of impact using the criteria normally adopted in systematic 
reviews1; we found only two randomised controlled trials (RCTs) and could not 
conduct a meta-analysis.  In this section we look at randomised versus non-
randomised research designs and briefly discuss the need for better designs and 
better quality data (research designs and analytical methods are discussed 
further in Section 3 and Appendix 7, section 6.7) to frame the substance of the 
review. 
There are several studies comparing randomised controlled studies with other 
methodologies, and systematic reviews of such studies.  The basic assumption 
underlying these comparisons is that the RCT will produce the ‘correct’ estimate 
of effect; the assessment is whether the non-randomised studies reproduce this 
RCT estimate satisfactorily. Cook et al. (2008) non-systematically summarised 
several recent social and educational studies that compared causal estimates 
from a high quality randomised experiment with those from high quality non-
randomised intervention or observational data. In three cases that used 
regression-discontinuity analysis, they found comparable causal estimates to the 
RCTs, and in five cases with carefully matched comparison groups in quasi-
experimental studies, and clear selection criteria and processes, they 
reproduced experimental estimates.  In four remaining cases, the non-
randomised data reproduced the RCT data in two studies only, but the non-
randomised studies were declared of poor design. They concluded that the 
results of some non-RCTs can be trusted provided they meet specific quality 
criteria in terms of comparison groups and data quality. However, it is not clear 
how they searched for or chose the included ‘cases’, so this may be a biased 
sample.  
A systematic review by Deeks et al. (2003) found eight health-based studies that 
compared randomised and non-randomised studies across multiple interventions. 
Additionally they conducted empirical work generating non-randomised studies 
from the datasets of two large multi-centre RCTs. They found that the results of 
non-randomised studies sometimes differ from the results of corresponding RCTs 
of the same intervention. As such, non-randomised studies may give seriously 
misleading results even when key prognostic factors in non-randomised groups 
appear similar to those in RCTs. They also found that in some cases results 
adjusted for case mix factors can be more misleading than non-adjusted results. 
They suggest only relying on non-RCT data when RCTs are not ethical or 
infeasible.  
A more recent Cochrane systematic review (see Kunz et al. 2007) found that in 
15 of 22 identified studies, important differences were found between estimates 
of effect from randomised and non-randomised studies. It also found that 
allocation concealment appears to be a crucial component of validity in RCTs. 
Generally, randomised studies with adequate allocation concealment tend to 
provide smaller estimates of effect than non-randomised studies, or randomised 
trials without adequate allocation concealment.   
 
 
                                                 
1 For example, somewhat convincing evidence would have a score above 2+ (a C Grade of Evidence) in the 
Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN, n.d.) levels of evidence ranking (SIGN, n.d.), or a ranking of 
above ‘Possible Evidence’ in the World Cancer Research Fund scale (WCRF 1997); see footnote 52 for further 
discussion. 
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1.2  Definitional and conceptual issues 
This discussion of randomised versus non-randomised approaches suggests that 
evaluation problems persist and cannot easily be resolved. We find, however, 
that the majority of the studies which applied econometric techniques to data 
from non-RCT designs fail to provide adequate evidence that they control 
appropriately for placement and selection biases. Nevertheless, a wealth of 
evaluation studies continue to claim that their impact estimates are robust and 
provide definite answers to the evaluation problem (e.g. Pitt and Khandker 
1998, Pitt 1999, 2011). This can be misleading. Heckman et al. (1999) argued 
that the results of an impact evaluation heavily depend on the quality of the 
underlying data. In other words, advanced econometric techniques will not be 
able to control for poor quality data2. Meyer and Fienberg (1992) stated that:  
Care in design and implementation will be rewarded with useful and 
clear study conclusions… Elaborate analytical methods will not salvage 
poor design or implementation of a study. (Meyer and Fineberg 1992, 
p106) 
This point is reiterated by Caliendo and Hujer (2005, p1) who stated that many 
evaluations in the past did not provide particularly meaningful results because of 
the non-availability of rich and high quality data sets due to poor designs. This 
makes it important, we suggest, that those who are to analyse the data, or who 
properly understand the analytical techniques and their data dependence, 
should be involved in the design of the impact evaluation early on to ensure the 
collection of rich data; this is one way to avoid pitfalls in the subsequent 
analytical process (Rosenbaum 2002). Rosenbaum and Silber (2001), for example, 
suggested using ethnographic or other qualitative tools with the objective of 
improving data collection procedures and the overall design of an evaluation. 
Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999), Rosenbaum (2002), Rosenbaum and Silber 
(2001) and Caliendo and Hujer (2005) suggested that it is not necessary to 
introduce ever more sophisticated econometric techniques, but instead a focus 
on collecting better quality data can be part of the solution to the evaluation 
problem. Therefore, not only do the econometric techniques employed require 
scrutiny when assessing the quality of an impact evaluation in which they have 
been applied, but so also do the underlying data. 
In this study, we do indeed find that the evidence adduced in support of 
microfinance lacks robustness; a number of studies appear to have failed to 
replicate crucial findings of microfinance evaluations. The literature is not 
conducive to SRs in being characterised by high heterogeneity, with little 
consistency, or indeed precision, in the interventions implemented, high 
diversity of contexts, designs of evaluation, the covariate and outcome variables 
used, and so on.  
We continue this review in the next section with a description of the key 
features of microfinance interventions and then outline the challenges of 
measuring microfinance impact. 
In order to conduct a SR it is important to have clear and precise definitions of 
the interventions being evaluated and the outcomes assessed. In both 
interventions and outcomes explored here there is much diversity in practice. 
Thus, although there are many cases of ‘Grameen replications’3 among MFIs 
                                                 
2 See also Rosenbaum 2002, p334. 
3 Grameen Bank MFIs employ joint liability group lending with small groups formed into a centre and regular 
equal weekly repayments, following the original classic model (Grameen 1) set by the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh (Yunus 1999). In the late 1990s, the Grameen Bank adopted a second model (Grameen 2) which 
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there is little uniformity in the interventions (see below), even for those which 
classify themselves as Grameen type. Nor is there much uniformity in the 
outcome variables (see below) even when nominally the same – for example 
income or consumption4, business profits, assets, and so on. This is even more 
the case with social outcome variables especially empowerment. Even 
educational enrolment or achievements can be defined in various ways, as can 
health outcomes apart perhaps from anthropometric measures. Since most 
studies use several, sometimes numerous, outcome variables, with various 
definitions, in diverse contexts, we do not attempt, in this report, to produce 
standardised tables of estimated impacts and their variability, or to undertake 
statistical meta-analysis.  
1.2.1 Theory of microfinance 
Microfinance has spawned a large theoretical literature, which can be divided 
into two. The first addresses the specific problems that poor people have in 
gaining access to financial services at an affordable cost, particularly as a result 
of their lack of collateral. Would-be lenders are also deterred by high costs of 
collecting reliable information about the actual, or projected, incomes that 
borrowers might be able to lend against, particularly for potential clients with 
low overall ‘debt capacity’ (von Pischke 1991). Section 1.2.2 elaborates on this 
literature with particular reference to the potential for reducing loan 
monitoring, screening and enforcement costs through group lending. The second 
strand of literature explores impact pathways of microfinance on enterprises, 
households, and individuals. We take account of the ways communities assign 
access to livelihood opportunities, and how problems of access to credit, other 
income and consumption smoothing opportunities can at least partially be 
overcome by engagements with MFIs. Section 1.2.3 elaborates on this literature.  
1.2.2 Microfinance and imperfect financial markets 
The concept of group lending is commonly heralded as the main innovation of 
microfinance and claims to provide an answer to the shortcomings of imperfect 
credit markets, in particular to the challenge of overcoming information 
asymmetries (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005, 2010). Information 
asymmetries may lead to the distinct phenomena of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. In the case of adverse selection, the lender lacks information on the 
riskiness of its borrowers. Riskier borrowers are more likely to default than safer 
borrowers, and thus should be charged higher interest rates to compensate for 
the increased risk of default. Accordingly, safer borrowers should be charged 
less provided each type can be accurately identified. Since the lender has 
incomplete information about the risk profile of its borrowers, higher average 
interest rates are passed on to all borrowers irrespective of their risk profile 
(Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005, 2010). In ‘moral hazard’ generally 
refers to the loan utilisation by the borrower, i.e. the lender cannot be certain a 
loan, once disbursed, is used for its intended purpose, or that the borrower 
applies the expected amounts of complementary inputs, especially effort and 
entrepreneurial skill, that are the basis for the agreement to provide the loan. If 
these inputs are less than expected then the borrower may be less able to repay 
it (Ghatak and Guinnane 1999). In addition to adverse selection and moral 
                                                                                                                                       
allowed more flexibility in terms of the repayment schedule and higher loan amounts. Grameen 1 also involved 
regular weekly meetings at which there were physical exercises and reiteration of commitment to the 16 
decisions about behaviour.  
4 For example, Deininger and Liu (2009) point out that income is constructed from 116 variables in their raw 
data; see Grosh and Glewwe (2000), for issues in measurement of most relevant variables produced in social 
surveys in low income countries. 
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hazard, high transactions costs, the provision of incentives to borrowers for 
timely repayment as well as the design and enforcement of adequate loan 
contracts are further challenges that play a role in explaining the failure of rural 
credit markets. In this context microfinance and its group lending approach 
steps in. Microfinance advocates claim that the formation of joint liability groups 
(JLGs) with its focus on peer pressure and monitoring responds to these 
challenges. As a result, the theoretical microfinance literature has focused on 
developing models that explain the workings of the JLG concept and its success, 
in particular, in overcoming information asymmetries.  
The standard model of lending commonly contains two mechanisms which 
address the issue of information asymmetries: assortative matching5 or screening 
to deal with adverse selection, and peer monitoring to overcome moral hazard 
(Ghatak and Guinnane 1999). In this widely cited paper, Ghatak and Guinnane 
(1999) reviewed how the principle of group lending facilitates assortative 
matching or screening and peer monitoring. Early models were developed by 
Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990) and Banerjee et al. (1994). These models 
examined how group liability schemes resolve moral hazard and monitoring 
problems. Other models developed by Ghatak (1999 and 2000), Gangopadhyay et 
al. (2005) and Armendáriz de Aghion and Gollier (2000) were inspired by Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) and focused on adverse selection and screening mechanisms. 
Moreover, social ties among group members, i.e. social connections in the 
language of Karlan (2007), also referred to as social capital, appear to play an 
important role in the context of group liability schemes in terms of enhancing 
repayment behaviour, as theorised by Besley and Coate (1995) and Wydick 
(2001).  
The overall thrust of the literature is that the concept of JLGs does indeed 
overcome adverse selection by introducing better screening mechanisms. In 
addition, peer monitoring helps to overcome moral hazard and provides group 
members with incentives to repay loans resulting in high repayment rates 
(Ghatak and Guinnane 1999). In spite of that, Hermes and Lensink (2007) argued 
that MFIs are gradually abandoning the group liability scheme in favour of 
individual liability schemes; however, the literature on theorising individual 
liability schemes is surprisingly scant. Thus it seems that theory has lagged 
behind recent developments in the sector and requires some attention.  
Banerjee and Duflo (2010) and Fischer (2010) have made recent contributions to 
the theoretical literature on microfinance but it is beyond the scope of this SR to 
contribute to the theoretical discussion since the focus is on the evidence of 
impact of microfinance.  
1.2.3 Pathways of impact of microfinance  
The simplest theories of microfinance impact assume the borrower is the sole 
operator of a single income generating activity, the output of which is 
constrained either by lack of capital or by the high marginal cost of credit 
relative to its marginal returns. Easing the capital constraint permits the 
operator to increase output, net income, profits, and hence their own welfare 
(de Mel et al. 2008). Ability to borrow, or debt capacity, depends on the 
capacity of actual or potential income from the business to meet borrowing 
costs. More realistic theories take into account that debt capacity is also bound 
up with business vulnerability, risk and uncertainty. In the absence of insurance 
                                                 
5 In the event of joint liability group lending where individuals are faced with endogenously forming their own 
groups (Chowdhury 2010), safer borrowers commonly form groups with safer borrowers rather than with riskier 
ones, while riskier borrowers have no choice but to form groups with riskier ones. This is referred to as 
‘positive assortative matching’ (Ghatak 1999).  
Evidence of the impact of microfinance: a systematic review  
10 
 
services, credit not only eases the capital constraints but can also serve as a 
mechanism for spreading risks. For example, access to credit (even if not 
actually taken up) can raise income by reducing the management of risk through 
livelihood diversification (Zeller et al. 2001). Borrowers’ imperfect knowledge 
and limited computational capacity means that new forms of credit may have an 
important impact on the mental models that guide their business decisions 
(Nino-Zarazua and Copestake 2009). More generally, research into the 
psychology of credit among poor people has undermined the view that credit is 
generally unlikely to have an adverse impact on borrowers. This argument is 
based on the assumption that if credit did make them worse off, they would not 
have borrowed in the first place (Rosenberg 2010). However, possibilities for 
negative impacts of microfinance were early and clearly recognised in the 
framework developed in Sebstad et al. (1995). 
A further complication arises because poor people’s management of livelihood 
related resource allocation, risk and uncertainty cannot be separated from 
decisions about household reproduction (e.g. Gertler et al. 2009). As a factor in 
the management of diversified and seasonally volatile ‘household economic 
portfolios’ (Sebstad et al. 1995), the impact of credit on the cost of consumption 
smoothing may be as important as its impact on enterprise promotion (Morduch 
1995, Rutherford 2001, Collins et al. 2009). Because portfolios are co-produced 
by household members both credit transactions costs and the potential benefits 
of credit can also profoundly affect intra-household relationships, including the 
gender division of labour, income and power. Induced changes in social relations 
inside and beyond the household are also associated with important changes in 
individuals’ aspirations and understanding (e.g. Mayoux 2001, Johnson 2005, 
Hoelvet 2005).  
Since changes in credit relations have direct effects on all aspects of poor 
people’s households (and indeed wider kinship and neighbourhood networks) 
theoretical pathways can readily be traced, at least in theory, from credit to 
almost any indicator of individual socio-economic status or human well-being 
with positive or negative outcomes (e.g. Kabeer 2005a). For example, improved 
access to credit for cash crop production controlled by men may result in 
reallocation of resources away from food crop production controlled by women, 
with adverse effects on their children's nutrition. Likewise, improved access to 
credit for women’s trading activities raises the opportunity cost of women’s time 
with possible adverse impact on child care. Empirical testing of multiple 
pathways (e.g. using structural equation modelling) is relatively rare, perhaps 
because the lines of causation are so complex, with many relevant variables 
having both intrinsic and instrumental value (Sen 1999). It cannot be assumed, 
for example, that credit impact is only mediated via its effect on business 
income: direct relational, attitudinal and cognitive effects on individuals can be 
equally profound (Chen and Mahmud 1995). One potential response to this 
suggested by Scheffer (2009) is to regard the household economy as a complex 
dynamic system and credit as a variable capable of triggering critical system 
transitions.  
Despite these complications, most research into the impact of credit on poverty 
continues to be framed by relatively simplistic causal models that link credit as 
an exogenous ‘treatment’ on individual borrowers to one, or more, indicators of 
well-being mediated via induced effects on household livelihoods and inter-
personal relations. An alternative approach (not covered by this review) is to 
explore the effect of aggregate changes in financial systems on higher units of 
social organisation, from villages to national states. For example, credit supply 
may be treated as a resource constraint on a multi-sector input-output model, 
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with distributional effects on poor people identified through use of a social 
accounting matrix (e.g. Subramanian and Sadoulet 1990) Alternatively, 
simulation models or cross-country multiple regression analysis can be used to 
explore the link between credit and indicators of national performance such as 
gross domestic product (GDP), which have testable relationships with poverty 
(e.g. Honohan 2004). An important example of this approach established positive 
links between rural credit expansion in India, district level growth performance 
and associated changes in poverty incidence (Binswanger and Khandker 1995, 
Burgess and Pande 2005). 
In summary, the theoretical case for microfinance rests on the potential for joint 
liability and other innovations by MFIs, including individual liability with joint 
monitoring, to resolve issues such as adverse selection and moral hazard and to 
reduce MFI transaction costs. Mitigating financial intermediation constraints 
could lead to expansion of economic activities, higher net returns to household 
assets, and higher income. Furthermore, subsequent theory could be expanded 
on positive and negative potential relational, cognitive and attitudinal impact of 
access to credit.  
1.2.4 Gender empowerment 
Higher net returns to household assets may, of course, be goods in themselves, 
and may also lead to human developments which are income elastic. Insofar as 
credit is successfully targeted to women, it may benefit women specifically by 
enhancing their status and empowering them; it may also beneficially affect the 
pattern of household resource allocation, particularly benefitting children, 
especially females, at least in some patriarchal societies (Hashemi et al. 1996). 
These assumptions can be contested on the grounds that improved returns to 
assets, especially labour, power and entrepreneurship, are neither necessary nor 
sufficient grounds for improvements in health and education developments, may 
not exist, or may anyway be captured by males (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996, 
Kabeer 2001, 2005b). 
 
1.3 Interventions 
Building on sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 it is important to bear in mind the diversity 
of actual interventions, and the extensive manifest and hidden subsidies that 
have typically been involved in microfinance (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 
2005, 2010). A simple classification of microfinance interventions as ‘credit’, 
‘credit plus’ and ‘credit plus plus’ fails to capture the complex ways in which 
interventions are initiated with perhaps a given model in mind. Microfinance 
interventions do not, indeed cannot, exactly replicate given models, and 
subsequently evolve along their own context-specific path, resulting a unique 
intervention. Nevertheless, we classify the interventions studied into categories 
according to the credit product and credit type. The credit product refers to a 
credit only product or whether it involves additional services such as savings, 
other financial products, training and or inputs, conscientisation, and so on. 
Credit type refers to whether the intervention provides credit to individuals, 
groups (self-help group, Grameen style and so forth), or both individuals and 
groups – see section 3 details. For those familiar with the realities of MFIs, it will 
be clear that this is a very crude classification and many cases will not fit well in 
these boxes. Nevertheless, in order to report on the impact of microfinance in 
the format recommended for this report – to compare like with like - this 
classification seems appropriate. However, we have severe doubts as to whether 
we are really comparing like with like.  
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1.4 Outcomes 
As noted above, there are many and varied pathways through which 
microfinance has been seen to have impacts, similarly diverse impacts that have 
been assessed. Figure 1 illustrates some of the more common positive and 
negative pathways and outcomes, but is far from exhaustively. Starting in the 
top left corner, we model the effect of access to microfinance; one route leads 
to increased borrowing, or reduced costs of borrowing if other more expensive 
loans are repayed. Through this route, or directly, access to loans provides 
insurance – enabling use of cash balances to increase business resources, and 
hence to increase output, sales and turnover. This, if the enterprise succeeds, in 
turn leads to increased profits, incomes and higher consumption. However, if the 
business fails, or cash has to be taken out of the business to meet emergencies, 
access to credit can lead to reduced enterprise activity, production, turnover, or 
sales, and ultimately in some cases, to business failure and increased 
indebtedness. The diagramme does not depict the fungibility of finance (Hulme 
2000). Under this scenario increased borrowing substitutes other sources of cash. 
Borrowing may also be undertaken without adequate thought by the borrower, 
or under coercion from relatives, neighbours, or the microfinance organisers 
(Fernando 1997, Bateman 2010). 
Because there are so many outcome variables tested in the papers we reviewed 
here, it is necessary to organise them into fewer groups. Some outcomes reflect 
direct effects of access to microfinance – particularly borrowing from 
microfinance. Therefore some outcomes have few specific implications for the 
value of microfinance, unless borrowing leads to outcomes which are more 
plausible indicators of welfare. Thus borrowing, increase in business assets, 
employment, sales or turnover means little unless they are positively associated 
with increased profits, household income, expenditure, and/or other indicators 
of welfare (housing or other consumer asset accumulation, education, nutritional 
or health status, and so on)6. Consequently, we can classify variables in these 
pathways according to a rough hierarchy of closeness to well-being. Borrowing 
and business assets are the indicators of effect and inputs of microfinance that 
are most distant from well-being. Business sales and turnover, profits, 
employment, agricultural, livestock or other production, are indicators of effect 
intermediate between inputs and well-being impacts. Income and expenditure, 
especially on food, education or health care (assuming the cause of ill-health is 
not related to the activity induced by microfinance), and indicators of 
education, nutritional status, and health, are subjective well-being indicators. 
We therefore classify outcomes both by category (economic, social and 
empowerment, and by position in the pathways between microfinance and well-
being. 
                                                 
6 Assets, sales and turnover may indicate increased business resilience, but this is only linked to well-being 
through other intermediate variables. Increased employment may indicate benefits for employees, but is not a 
direct indicator of well-being. 
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Figure 1: Pathways and outcomes of microfinance 
 
 
Outcomes can be classified into three groups which we term economic7, social8 
and empowerment9.  The studies which report outcome variables that fall into 
these categories are given in section 3, Table 5 to 7, categorised by credit type 
and product. Table 8 and Table 9, section 3, report the number of tests reported 
by category of outcome variable, credit product and type.  
It is important also to understand that different methods of analysis (and indeed 
research designs) have an influence on estimated impacts, as well as on the 
confidence one can have in impacts. Designs which do not accommodate 
selection and placement biases when analysed with naive methods are likely to 
overstate (positive or negative) impacts – this is discussed in detail further 
below. 
 
1.5 Research background 
1.5.1 Measuring impacts 
The evaluation of social and economic programmes using experimental and 
observational methods has a long tradition. Interest in this area of work 
intensified in the early 1970s, and the evaluation of education and labour 
market programmes became popular (Imbens and Wooldridge 2008). The main 
concern of evaluations is to understand how programme participation affects the 
outcomes of individuals. Evaluators are trying to understand how outcomes 
                                                 
7 Credit received from microfinance, business inputs and fixed and variable costs, production, sales, profits, 
expenditures by category of expenditure (excluding health and ducation), including food, non-food, total, 
housing, durables, and assets. These are sometimes nominal or deflated, and sometimes in logs.   
8 These are mainly health and education expenditures and outcomes; indicators of subjective well-being. 
9 Indicators of empowerment (exclusively of women). 
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differ when an individual participates in a programme compared with non-
participation (Caliendo 2006, Caliendo and Hujer 2005). In other words, 
individuals can either participate or not in a given intervention, but they cannot 
do both at the same time. Constructing a counterfactual that would allow 
observing the potential outcomes of programme participants had they not 
participated is the main challenge of every evaluation study (Blundell and Costa 
Dias 2008, Heckman and Vytlacil 2007). Such comparison requires finding an 
adequate control group which would allow a comparison of programme 
participants with non-participants. However, this is a major challenge because 
programme participants commonly differ from non-participants in many ways, 
not just in terms of programme participation status. A simple comparison 
between participants and non-participants, i.e. analysing the mean differences 
of their outcomes after treatment, could highlight selection bias and therefore 
not provide any convincing impact estimates (Caliendo 2006, Caliendo and Hujer 
2005). Selection bias occurs when individuals in a programme select themselves, 
or are selected by some criteria that make them differ from the general 
population with whom they are to be compared. Participants may self-select (or 
be selected) into a programme based on observable and/or unobservable 
characteristics; e.g. observable characteristics can be employment status, age, 
sex, educational attainment, and so on, while unobservable characteristics can 
be motivation, entrepreneurial ability, business skills, etc. (Armendáriz de 
Aghion and Morduch 2005). 
The occurrence of selection bias can lead to errors in measurement of 
participation impact which, it is argued, can be dealt with by a wide range of 
experimental and observational methods10. However, many methods have 
drawbacks of one sort or another, and many fail to control for selection bias due 
to unobservable characteristics, thus potentially adversely affecting the 
accuracy of impact evaluation results. These shortcomings have been recognised 
by numerous government authorities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
and academics. Therefore there has been a recent drive towards encouraging 
better impact evaluations, e.g. organisations such as 3ie 
(http://www.3ieimpact.org/) or the World Bank’s Development Impact 
Evaluation (DIME) (http://go.worldbank.org/1F1W42VYV0) initiative encourage 
more rigorous approaches.  
1.5.2 Challenges of measuring microfinance impact 
The evaluation problem is pervasive, in particular in the context of 
microfinance. Despite the popularity of microfinance there is evidence that 
these programmes do not have uniformly positive impacts. Case studies and 
ethnographic evidence demonstrate that microfinance can have both positive 
and negative effects on the lives of the poor, but rigorous quantitative evidence 
on the nature, magnitude and balance of effects is scarce and inconclusive. 
There have been three major unsystematic reviews of microfinance impact, two 
of which are outdated (Sebstad and Chen 1996, Gaile and Foster 1996, Goldberg 
2005). A very recent review has been published by Odell (2010), which is 
essentially a follow-up of Goldberg (2005). The first systematic review was 
                                                 
10 Experimental data are produced when units of observation – usually individuals – are randomly allocated by 
the experimenter to treatment or to control groups (untreated, or placebo treatment). Observational data are 
produced when some attempt is made to find a comparable group, but without random allocation by the 
treater. Given the pervasive presence of placebo effects (Goldacre 2008, Imbens and Wooldridge 2008), a 
further level of complication arises with the issue of blinding, i.e. does the treated individual and/or treater 
know who is receiving the treatment and who is placebo treated. Observational data are not single or double-
blinded, while experimental data may be, although this is generally very uncommon if not impossible in social 
experiments (compared say to pharmaceutical treatments) (Scriven 2008). 
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conducted by Stewart et al. (2010) to investigate microfinance impact 
evaluations in sub-Saharan Africa. There are several books reviewing 
microfinance (Hulme and Mosley 1996, Khandker 1998, Ledgerwood 1999, 
Robinson 2001, Johnson and Rogaly 1997, Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 
2005 (A&M), Ledgerwood et al. 2006, Dichter and Harper 2007, Bateman 2010, 
Roy 2010). Numerous studies have assessed the impact of microfinance in 
different countries (e.g. Copestake et al. 2005, Copestake 2002). However, none 
of these constitute systematic reviews because they do not set out protocols for 
search, quality assessment, or analytical synthesis – the study by Stewart et al. 
(2010) is an exception in this regard. We know of one additional SR currently 
underway, but it does not attempt to assess impacts on a wide range of 
outcomes, which we consider likely to be interlinked in complex and context-
specific ways in all major developing regions.  
There have been a number of widely quoted studies that suggest positive social 
and economic impacts of microcredit (e.g. Pitt and Khandker 1998, Matin and 
Hulme 2003 on Bangladesh, Patten and Rosengard 1991, Robinson 2002 on 
Indonesia); others report that microfinance is not always beneficial (Adams and 
von Pischke 1992, Rogaly 1996). Hulme and Mosley (1996) imply that 
microfinance does on average have positive impacts but does not always reach 
the poorest; other studies claim that microfinance often can have positive 
impacts on the poorest (e.g. among others Rutherford 2001, Khandker 1998). 
There is no well known study that robustly shows any strong impacts (A&M p199-
230); some recent RCTs (Banerjee et al. 2009, Karlan and Zinman 2009) may 
prove more convincing, although their restricted provenance limits external 
validity.  
Most useful literature acknowledges two major problems with assessing 
microfinance impact using observational data – programme placement bias and 
self, peer, and lender selection of participants. Probably the most authoritative 
studies are by Pitt and Khandker (1998) (PnK), and Khandker (1998 and 2005) 
(see also related papers Pitt et al. 2006, 2003, 1999) These authors argue that 
microfinance has significant benefits for the poor, especially when targeted on 
women; ‘PnK and Khandker (2005) thus remain the only high-profile economic 
papers asserting large, sustained impacts of microcredit’, Roodman and Morduch 
(2009 p40-41) (RnM). The reliability of the PnK results has been contested 
(Morduch 1998), Pitt (1999) vigorously rebutted these criticisms, but neither 
paper was published, and although Goldberg (2005) clearly views PnK as 
unreliable (p17-20), he writes that Khandker (2005) is ‘much less controversial’ 
(p19). The matter rested until RnM replicated these four papers. RnM found that 
‘decisive statistical evidence in favor of [the idea that microcredit helps families 
smooth their expenditures, lessening the pinch of hunger and need in lean times 
… especially so when women do the borrowing] is absent’ (RnM, p39; emphasis in 
original).  
Another approach has been to exploit ‘pipeline’ quasi-experiments, in which 
control groups are constructed from randomly chosen people with apparently 
similar characteristics who have not yet participated in the MFI, but will join 
later (Coleman 1999, 2006). However, these designs may be vitiated if the 
persons joining later have different characteristics compared to the earlier 
participants (Karlan 2001), as is often the case (Goldberg 2005). 
Partly in response to critical reviews of evaluations using observational 
(qualitative and quantitative) data there has been a trend towards conducting 
RCTs of many development interventions including MFIs (Karlan and Zinman 
2009, Banerjee et al 2009, Banerjee et al. 2007). However, microfinance RCT 
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interventions often lack some crucial characteristics of valid RCTs, particularly 
proper randomisation of microfinance allocation and/or double blinding. This has 
given rise to criticisms as there are possible effects of perceiving one is part of 
an experiment, or at least unusual set of circumstances, including Hawthorne 
and John Henry effects11, so there is a continuing role for observational methods 
(Deaton 2009, 2010). The limited circumstances in which RCTs have been 
conducted affect their external validity.  
The various research designs and analytical methods are discussed in more depth 
in Appendix 7, section 6.7 we provide a brief summary of the various approaches 
and methods of impact evaluation (IE) in the next section.   
1.5.3 Research designs: RCTs, pipelines, with/without, panels, and natural 
experiments 
This section discusses the characterisicts of the major research designs 
encountered in the microfinance IE studies encountered in this review. Readers 
with a good understanding of research designs and statistical/econometric 
analyses may proceed directly to section 2. 
1.5.3.1 Randomised control trials 
At the heart of every experimental design lies a natural, or artificially 
formulated, experiment which attempts to attribute the effects of an 
intervention to its causes (Hulme 2000). Evaluations applying a randomised 
design are generally believed to provide the most robust results. There is a long 
tradition of experimental methods in the natural sciences. Fisher (1935), 
Neyman (1923) and Cox (1958) were early proponents of randomised 
experiments.  
Applying a randomised study design requires random assignment of potential 
clients to so-called treatment and control group; both groups must be drawn 
from potential clients whom the programme has yet to serve so that the impact 
of an entire programme can be evaluated (Karlan and Goldberg 2006). This 
random assignment to either treatment or control group ensures that potential 
outcomes are not contaminated by self-selection into treatment (Blundell and 
Costa Dias 2008). In other words, the potential outcomes or effects of the 
treatment are independent from treatment assignment. Proper randomisation 
ensures those individuals in treatment and control groups are equivalent in 
terms of observable and unobservable characteristics with the exception of the 
treatment status, assuming that no spill-over effects exist (Blundell and Costa 
Dias 2000, 2002, 2008). Hence, the mean differences in the outcomes of these 
individuals are understood to be effects of the treatment (Caliendo and Hujer 
2005). 
However, limitations exist in the case of randomised experiments, i.e. double-
blinding, ethical issues, pseudo-random methods, attrition and the fact that 
behavioural changes caused by the experiment itself such as Hawthorne and 
John Henry effects cannot be ruled out. Also, spill-over effects cannot be 
eliminated (more details in Appendix 10, section 6.10) (Blundell and Costa Dias 
2000, 2002). 
RnM argue that the present drive towards encouraging RCTs also renews calls for 
taking a closer look at the value of observational studies which collect data 
through non-random processes. Like RCTs, observational studies are not 
uncontested as there are threats to both internal and external validity arising 
                                                 
11 These are some of the more obvious biases that can arise in experiments with human subjects; see Miettinen 
and Cook (1981). 
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from observational data. There is a risk of confounding, i.e. confounding 
variables are both related to the outcome that is being measured and the 
exposure. Typically, observational data require the application of more complex 
econometric techniques, i.e. PSM, IV and DID estimations. However, many of 
these econometric techniques cannot deal adequately with selection bias due to 
unobservable characteristics as later sections argue. 
1.5.3.2 Pipelines 
Pipeline designs have become fashionable and are widely used in IEs (see 
Coleman 1999; Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad 2010), primarily for two reasons - 
they provide a convincing control group, and it is possible for them to be 
combined with randomised allocation; however, these are not universal 
characteristics of implementations. 
The basic idea of the pipeline design is that it compares a representative sample 
drawn from the population which has had, or will have, access to the treatment 
together with a sample drawn from an equivalent population that is about to 
receive the treatment for the first time (the pipeline group). This is depicted in 
Figure 2; in this figure there are two periods, period 0 before there has been any 
intervention, and period 1 when interventions have been implemented in 
treatment locations only, while equivalent potential participants, yet to receive 
treatment, have also been identified in comparable locations. Ideally, the MFI 
enters both (sets of) locations, which are equivalent, preferably randomly 
chosen and sufficiently separated to minimise interactions, at the same time 
using the same recruitment procedures. The same prospective information is 
provided to potential recruits, although this will mean that one group – the 
pipeline – will be ‘surprised’ when their access is delayed. Nevertheless, this 
surprise is necessary if the groups recruited are to be equivalent, since if the 
pipeline group is aware when it is recruited that it will not have access for some 
Figure 2: Set-up of pipeline design 
Members ( )1tT & non-members ( )1cT  with access to 
MFI services for one or more years: purposively, 
accidentally, or randomly chosen from existing 
purposively, accidentally or randomly chosen locations 
Prospective members who have been (or could be) 
selected for MFI participation but who have not yet 
received any services ( 1
tP ) & non-members ( 1
cP ) from 
purposively, accidentally or randomly chosen locations 
Treatment 
T00 
Member 
Non-member 
Pipeline P00 
Period 0  Period 1  
Graduates0 & 
Drop-outs 
New members  
Out migrants 
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time some who would otherwise have been recruited may decline12. If the 
control is recruited later, then the circumstances may have changed, meaning 
those who are recruited may not be all those who would have been recruited at 
the same time as the treatment group. 
However, simultaneous recruitment did not happen in any of the pipelines. 
Treatment areas were mostly entered before the study was designed or 
implemented; control pipeline areas were selected and recruitment took place 
with some delay, and with the expectation of further delay in access to MFI 
resources. This means that in treatment areas not only was the selection process 
at a different time to that at which recruitment occurred in the control – 
pipeline – areas, allowing changed economic and social circumstances to 
potentially affect recruitment, but also opportunities would have existed for 
those originally selected in the treatment area to respond to their experiences, 
some either dropping out or graduating, meaning they were no longer 
equivalent, as a population, to those in the control areas. Of course, this may be 
addressed on an ‘intention-to-treat’ (ITT) basis, but it may no longer be possible 
to trace and interview these people. If this behaviour is based on unobservables, 
it will not possible in the control areas to identify those who would have also 
behaved in this way, leading to biased results13.  
In theory, pipeline designs allow a comparison of randomly assigned members 
and non-members versus randomly assigned future members and non-members, 
while controlling for selection and attrition (graduation and drop-out) bias in the 
process (see more on pipeline designs in Appendix 11, section 6.11). Members 
may be communities, if spill-overs are likely, in which case analysis will be made 
on the ‘intention-to-treat’ basis. In this case, randomly chosen communities are 
the units of study.  
However, in many cases the ideal design is not implemented. Depending on the 
survey data available, impact in a pipeline design can be estimated from various 
formulae:  
Where superscripts are time periods (0, 1)  
Subscripts i, k = unit; j, l = location;  
T is treatment 
P is pipeline 
X is covariates 
V is village, ward, M is member, T is borrower (Treated) 
Barred symbols are means 
Simple ex-post difference: 
1.1    1 1 1ij klY T P= −  
In this case (1.1) we have data collected at the time point 1 when the treatment 
and pipeline groups are sampled; the treatment effect is the simple difference 
in means between these two groups. If the sample is of current borrowers, then 
the treatment group is net of graduates and drop-outs, and the control – pipeline 
– group is chosen at a different time to that at which the treatment group were 
                                                 
12 The ethics of this ‘deception’ are of course debatable. One rationalisation that makes this design attractive 
is that if implementation capacity of the MFI is limited, then it becomes inevitable that some will only get 
access later. If those who get delayed access, and may be consequently somewhat disadvantaged, are 
randomly chosen in a greater public purpose, then this maybe considered ‘ethical’. 
13 This problem is similar to that in the PnK studies where in the control villages it was not possible to identify 
those ‘eligible’ households who had more than 0.5 acres but whose ‘value of land’ was less than the normal 
value of 0.5 acres; see 0below and Morduch (1998), Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011). 
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recruited, with inevitable differences in the context of recruitment, and in all 
likelihood the recruitment process. The control – pipeline – group may also be 
selected for a different geographical location.  A control function approach can 
be used if covariates are measured. 
Ex-post Double Difference: 
1.2   ( ) ( )2 .1 ,1 ,1 ,1a t c t cij ij kl klY T T P P= − − −  
In this case (1.2) the difference between existing members and non-members in 
treatment communities is compared to the difference between pre-selected 
members and non-members in pipeline villages.  
As in any DID estimation, it only modifies the simple difference estimate to the 
extent that there are differences in the non-members’ metrics in the two 
locations. 
Panel Double Difference: 
1.3   ( ) ( )2 .1 ,0 ,1 ,0b t t t cij ij kl klY T T P P= − − −  
In this case the change in outcome variable in the treatment locations is 
compared with the change in locations in the control locations. Ideally, as noted 
above, selection of members in both types of location, and sampling should be 
before loans are available in the treatment areas. If organisation, meetings and 
mobilisation among MFI clients are part of the intervention then it is moot 
whether this should be conducted also in the pipeline areas, since it is likely to 
affect the behaviour of the pipeline group and may affect dropout among them.  
This estimation may be liable to attrition (dropping of cases from the baseline 
sample); also, of itself it does not address the issues of graduates or drop outs 
unless these are explicitly and successfully traced and the estimation is on an 
‘intention-to-treat’ basis. In some cases the ‘baseline’ data are obtained by 
recall. 
Control Function: 
1.4  3 1 2 3 4Yij ij j i j ijX V M Tβ β β β ε= + + + +  
In this case the coefficient β4 is the impact (since M=1 for all members, both 
existing and prospective, and 0 otherwise). Of course, since individuals select 
into membership this approach fails to address unobservable variables which are 
correlated with both membership and its impact. Also, since the data are ex-
post there can be attrition bias unless there it is estimated on an ITT basis (with 
little attrition).  
Panel: 
1.5  Yijt i t it it j ijtM X Vα δ β θ ε= + + + + +  
In this case unobservable characteristics are supposed to be swept out of the 
estimation by fixed effects estimation. This may not occur if ex-ante 
equivalence of treatments and controls is conducted (and this can be 
demonstrated), or if the data are not a true panel with the baseline taking place 
after selection into treatment has already occurred - as is often the case with 
pipeline studies. In this case ex-ante equivalence cannot be demonstrated, 
graduation/dropout may already have occurred, and selection of the pipeline 
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groups will have taken place under different circumstances to those of the 
treatment recruitment.  
1.5.3.3 With/without (cross section) 
With/without designs are the bases of most impact evaluations of microfinance. 
They involve the comparison of treated groups with comparable untreated 
groups and in the absence of randomisation are vulnerable to placement and 
selection biases. These may be mitigated by features of the data design, and by 
methods of analysis, which are discussed below. Key problems in these designs 
are that treatment groups may not include dropouts or graduates, and control 
groups may not come from the same population and sampling frame as the 
treatment group. Drawing the control group from the same community is risky 
since in most cases those who have chosen not to become members will clearly 
be different to those who have chosen to become members, generally as a result 
of an optimisation process (de Janvry et al., 2010). Also, since microfinance is 
likely to have spill-over effects to neighbours and to the local economy through 
general equilibrium effects, the comparison of MFI members and similar non-
members from their own communities will be biased if it fails to account for 
these spill-overs.  
Taking control groups from other communities risks placement bias unless the 
communities are demonstrably comparable (ex-ante). This can be achieved to 
some extent by matching the communities; it may not be achieved by random 
choice of control groups or communities from which to draw them unless the 
treatment communities were themselves randomly chosen from the same 
domain.  
Often control groups are drawn from geographically separated areas because 
MFIs enter areas sequentially for administrative reasons. Thus several papers 
using data from with/without designs draw their control groups from different 
geographical domains; some provide descriptive statistics on observable 
characteristics, often with statistical tests of differences between treatment and 
control sub-samples, but this approach can not demonstrate equivalence on 
unobservables or variables for which there are no data.  
Common analytical methods to mitigate biases due to non-comparable treatment 
and control groups include PSM, IV, fixed and random effect estimation, and 
control functions using community level variables.  
1.5.3.4 Natural experiments 
Natural experiments have been much sought after since the study by Duflo 
(1999) of a schooling programme introduced at different times in different 
geographical locations  (see also Osili and Long 2008, for a very similar design 
based on the introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE) in Nigeria).  
Natural experiments exploit some difference between treatment and control 
groups to identify impact of a programme on the assumption that the difference 
is between statistically equivalent domains. Thus, for natural experiments to 
appropriately identify impacts the assumption is that the different domains are 
functionally equivalent – that is that there is no systematic difference between 
the treatment and control groups that interacts with the treatment which could 
account in part for the impacts.  
1.5.3.5 Sample survey 
In some cases, it is possible to make use of existing surveys which provide data 
that can be analysed to provide estimates of impact. Existing data sources have 
been used in the analysis of natural experiments (Demographic and Health 
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Surveys (DHS), Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), Living Standards 
Measurement Surveys (LSMS), etc.14). In principle, general surveys can be used 
wherever there are sufficient numbers of ‘treated’ and ‘non-treated’ units in 
the survey; since treatment may be fairly rare sufficient numbers will not occur 
in general surveys. However, in this case there may be sufficient comparable 
non-treated units to provide controls as in the classic LaLonde (1986) paper.  
1.5.4 Analytical methods - PSM, IV, etc. 
A number of econometric methods for overcoming, mitigating, or at least 
documenting the existence and consequences of selection bias have been 
developed. However, these econometric techniques have limitations and are 
often poorly executed or simply misunderstood as a review of the studies we 
included in this SR shows. A critique of econometric techniques is not new; in a 
landmark paper Leamer (1983) criticised the key assumptions many econometric 
methods are built on, however, despite his pessimistic view on the usefulness of 
econometric methods, there has been a trend towards ever more sophisticated 
techniques which has not necessarily provided the solution to the selection bias 
challenge. For recent expression of this debate see the symposium ‘Con out of 
Economics’ in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2010, 24 (2) (JEP 2010). 
Apart from the technical challenges that impact evaluations have to grapple 
with, they are further hampered by the conflicting agendas of the various 
players involved. These agendas influence the design, execution and the results 
of an impact evaluation. Hence, Pritchett (2002) argues that it is not surprising 
that there are so few rigorous impact studies. Not only is that a phenomenon in 
the area of microfinance, but also health and education interventions are met 
with the same fate. Pritchett (2002) concluded that programmes usually have 
few incentives to be assessed seriously, and those that do are unusual. 
1.5.4.1 Propensity score matching 
We begin by explaining PSM, IV and DID to outline the best case scenario that 
studies should aspire to, and then discuss whether the included studies here 
have met these best case scenarios. We start with a brief introduction to PSM 
(more details in Appendix 6.7.2.1). 
Matching has become a very popular technique in the area of development 
economics in recent years and has its roots in the experimental literature 
beginning with Neyman (1923). Rubin (1973a, 1973b, 1974, 1977, 1978) 
expanded on this literature and essentially laid the conceptual foundations of 
matching. The technique was further refined in particular by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983, 1984). Econometricians got involved in advancing matching 
techniques in the mid-1990s; see studies by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998), 
Heckman et al. (1998) and Heckman et al. (1999). 
The basic idea of matching is to compare a participant with one or more non-
participants who are similar in terms of a set of observed covariates X (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig 2005, 2008, Rosenbaum and Silber 2001). In a next step, the 
differences in the outcome variables for participants and their matched non-
participants are calculated, i.e. the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT) is the mean difference between participants and matched non-participants 
(Morgan and Harding 2006). The objective of this technique is to account for 
selection on observables. The drawback is that selection on unobservables 
remains unaccounted for. 
                                                 
14 Osili and Long (2008) use DHS data sets to estimate a DID model of the effects of Universal Primary Education 
in Nigeria. See also Duflo (2001). 
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Despite this drawback, Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) concluded that PSM 
results are a good approximation to those obtained under an experimental 
approach. They re-analysed the study of LaLonde (1986) and employed PSM to 
illustrate that PSM can in fact approximate the results obtained from an 
experimental setting.  
However, Smith and Todd (2005) argued that the PSM estimates calculated by 
Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) are sensitive to their choice of a particular sub-
sample of LaLonde’s (1986) data. They found evidence that a DID approach is in 
fact more appropriate as an evaluation strategy in this context than PSM as 
proposed by Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002). Overall, the outcome of this 
debate remains inconclusive with strong evidence provided by all parties 
involved. 
The fact is that matching estimators are commonly not robust enough to deal 
with selection on unobservables. Hence, to test the likelihood that one or more 
unobservables could play a role in selection, which would explain unobserved 
differences, sensitivity analysis has become increasingly important. Sensitivity 
analysis attempts to gauge the vulnerability of the assignment process into 
treatment to unobservables (Becker and Caliendo 2007). In other words, the 
objective of sensitivity analysis is to explore whether the matching estimates are 
robust to selection on unobservables (Rosenbaum 2002). 
Matching is a good choice when high quality data sets are available, but might 
not be an appropriate evaluation strategy if that is not the case (Smith and Todd 
2005). Dehejia (2005) concluded that PSM is indeed not the panacea for solving 
the evaluation problem and pointed out that the correct specification of the 
propensity score is crucial, i.e. the balancing properties of the propensity score 
should be satisfied (see Appendix 0) – as emphasized by Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2005, 2008) and Smith and Todd (2005) – and that the sensitivity of the results 
require testing – as advocated by Rosenbaum (2002), Becker and Caliendo 
(2007), Ichino et al. (2006) and Nannicini (2007). 
1.5.4.2 Instrumental variables 
The IV approach is widely used in the evaluation arena and claims to control for 
selection on observables as well as unobservables (Heckman and Vytlacil 2007b, 
Basu et al. 2007) which is in contrast to PSM which tries to construct an 
appropriate set of counterfactual cases to counteract selection on observables 
only. The main goal of the IV method is to identify a variable, or a set of 
variables, known as instruments, that influence the decision to participate in a 
programme, but at the same time do not have an effect on the outcome 
equation. Only when there are adequate instruments can the IV approach be an 
effective strategy for estimating causal effects (Morgan and Winship 2007).  
In detail, a regressor qualifies as an instrument for Z*, which represents 
programme participation, when it is uncorrelated with the error terms and is not 
entirely influenced by X, the other right hand side variables which influence the 
outcome;  i.e. the instrument has to be exogenous to be valid (Caliendo 2006, 
Caliendo and Hujer 2005). The main challenge of the IV method is to identify an 
adequate instrument which influences programme participation but at the same 
time does not directly influence the outcome equation.  
Tests for instruments can be made, e.g. overidentification tests with the 
objective to assess the exogeneity of instruments. The Hansen-Sargan test for 
example is rather popular; it tests for overidentifying restrictions in a model. 
The main assumption is that the instruments are exogenous when the error 
terms are uncorrelated with a set of exogenous covariates X. If the null 
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hypothesis is rejected then the instruments are considered to be weak, i.e. they 
are endogenous (Cameron and Trivedi 2005).   
Deaton (2010) was cautious about the role of these tests and their ability to 
validate instruments; overidentification tests can be helpful but  
acceptance is consistent with all of the instruments being invalid, while 
failure is consistent with a subset being correct (Deaton 2010, p431).  
He further argued that  
passing an overidentification test does not validate instrumentation (ibid 
p431).  
Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) argued that two-stage estimates are not 
necessarily better than simple ordinary least square (OLS) estimates. Studies 
using IV often fail to convincingly validate their instruments; weak instruments 
in turn can have adverse effects on the reliability of the two-stage estimates 
(Caliendo 2006, Caliendo and Hujer 2005). Instruments are often based on a 
priori arguments but these can be challenged. 
1.5.4.3 Other methods (multivariate, control function and t-tests) 
Because most studies included in this review are based on observational data 
they address identification problems associated with selection bias and require 
the use of advanced econometric methods, particularly the IV approach 
discussed above. However, many rejected and a few included papers use 
ordinary multivariate or bivariate statistics. These of course do attempt to deal 
with the identification problem, but as noted above this may not be done very 
well with more sophisticated methods, and, indeed may not be necessary if well-
conducted surveys with carefully selected control groups have been employed. 
There can then be something to learn from studies using these designs and 
methods, although we have to bear in mind their vulnerability to selection bias. 
Well-conducted observational studies undermine a rigid hierarchy of methods 
approach to assessing the validity of studies (Pettigrew and Roberts 2006). 
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2 Methods used in the review 
We based our methods on the Centre for Evidence Based Conservation and EPPI-
centre guidelines as these are suited to the quantitative and mixed methods 
used in microfinance evaluations. In order to conduct an unbiased stakeholder 
relevant review, we set up an (unpaid) advisory group to support the SR and 
contacted a balanced team of reviewers by approaching representatives of 
major stakeholders and microfinance adepts. The main objective for this 
advisory group was to comment on the final outcome of our searches and to 
evaluate whether the relevant microfinance impact evaluation studies are 
included.  
However, we received a response from only one member of the advisory group 
and proceeded with the SR without this potentially valuable feedback. 
 
2.1 Identifying studies 
2.1.1 Defining relevant studies: inclusion criteria 
The included studies have the following characteristics: 
Participants: Individuals living in poor, lower and upper-middle income countries 
(see appendix 2) with very few assets that could be used as collateral (Fernando 
2006). Participants need to be classifiable as poor, excluded or marginalised 
within their society. The target group may include individuals, households or 
microenterprises. 
Exposure or intervention: As mentioned in 0microfinance interventions are 
complex and diverse, we include microcredit and/or ‘credit plus’ programmes, 
including provision of credit of any sort to relevant participants plus savings; 
and/or ‘credit plus plus’ that includes savings, insurance and other financial 
services and that also combine financial services with complementary non-
financial services such as business advice. Such services or programmes may be 
provided by basic, transformed or commercial MFIs, NGO-type MFIs (including 
those supporting informal or user-controlled financial services such as village 
banks), commercial banks, credit cooperatives and other public sector providers 
of financial services. Purely informal credit and savings associations such as 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) are excluded since they are 
not classic microfinance providers. The duration of any microcredit program is at 
least three years. 
Comparison groups: All included studies need to make use of some form of 
comparison or control group where microfinance has not been formally 
introduced. This may be a historic control (before/after comparison) or a 
concurrent control group where microfinance has not yet been introduced (by 
the assessed institution).    
Outcomes: Primary outcomes include income, health and education.  Secondary 
outcomes include microenterprise profits and/or revenues, expenditure (food 
and/or non-food), labour supply, employment, assets (agricultural, non-
agricultural, transport and/or other assets), housing improvements, education 
(enrolment and/or achievements for adults and children), health and health 
behaviour, nutrition, women’s empowerment.   
Cut-off point: Studies published since 1970 are considered for review. 
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Methodologies: Controlled trials, before/after studies, action and observational 
studies and impact evaluations, and social survey datasets with pertinent 
indicators. Qualitative studies are assessed for inclusion but set aside and used 
to scope the literature in this area.  Minimum sample sizes (subject to search 
outcomes) >100 (treatment and control combined) for quantitative and >10 for 
qualitative studies – these cut-off points have been set arbitrarily on the advice 
of our SR specialist. 
Intervention studies including randomised controlled trials, controlled trials, 
before/after studies and action research assesses the impact of introduction of 
microfinance to some participants compared to the lack of such introduction in 
other participants (or at an earlier time). 
Observational studies assess outcomes in populations served by microfinance and 
compare them to outcomes in areas not served by microfinance (or an earlier 
time before microfinance was introduced). 
Qualitative research asks participants what they feel were the impacts of the 
introduction of microfinance to themselves and/or their family and/or 
community (compared to before such introduction or compared to nearby areas 
without such access to microfinance).  It is beyond the scope of this SR to 
include qualitative studies and we merely collected them in a database for 
future research.  
Publication status: Studies may be formally published or available in abstract, 
web-based, PhD thesis or organisational report form.   
2.1.2 Identification of potential studies: search strategy 
The electronic search strategy searched major on-line academic databases, 
systematic review databases, websites of relevant NGOs and funders as well as 
search for PhD thesis abstracts (see Table 1). The search included text and 
indexing terms, and Boolean operators in the format '[microfinance OR 
microcredit] AND [outcomes]'.   
We experimented with these and other search terms until we obtained optimal 
results; then we saved these searches. Those saved searches at the same time 
left a documentation trail which allows others to reconstruct and validate our 
searches. Titles and abstracts were screened during these searches. 
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Table 1: Selected databases and websites that were searched: 
Academic External NGO/Funder websites 
EconLit (EBSCO) British library of 
development studies 
(BLDS) 
African development 
bank (AfDB), Asian 
development bank (ADB), 
Inter-American 
development bank (IDB) 
informaworld Eldis 
Consultative group to 
assist the poor 
(CGAP) 
ISI Web of Knowledge Joint bank fund library 
network (JOLIS) 
UK Department for 
international 
development (DFID) 
Journal storage (JSTOR) Google Scholar 
Microfinance Gateway 
AMED  MicroBanking Bulletin 
SCOPUS (Elsevier)  Microfinance Network 
Zetoc  United States Agency for 
international 
development (USAID) 
The Cochrane Library  World Bank 
Medline   
Embase   
PsychInfo   
 
We ran a draft search in ISI Web of Knowledge using the following search terms 
to assess the viability of our search strategy: 
#1 Topic=(evaluat* OR impact* OR benefit* OR poverty* OR empower* OR 
income* OR profit* OR revenue* OR employ* OR ‘labour supply’ OR job* 
OR expenditure* OR consume OR consumes OR consumed OR consumption 
OR asset* OR housing OR education* OR health* OR nutrition*) OR 
Title=(evaluat* OR impact* OR benefit* OR poverty* OR empower* OR 
income* OR profit* OR revenue* OR employ* OR ‘labour supply’ OR job* 
OR expenditure* OR consume OR consumes OR consumed OR consumption 
OR asset* OR housing OR education* OR health* OR nutrition*) 
 
#2 Topic=(microfinanc* OR microcredit* OR micro-credit* OR micro-
financ* OR 
microenterprise* OR micro-enterprise* OR ‘group lending’ OR ‘credit 
program*’ OR ‘credit plus*’ OR credit-plus*) OR Title=(microfinanc* OR 
microcredit* OR micro-credit* OR micro-financ* OR microenterprise* OR 
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micro-enterprise* OR ‘group lending’ OR ‘credit program*’ OR ‘credit 
plus*’ OR credit-plus*) 
#3 #1 AND #2 
The draft search for Medline, EMBASE, AMED and Psychinfo (all on OvidSP) and 
the Cochrane Library (without the ‘mp’ at the end) was:  
(microfinanc* or microcredit* or micro-credit* or micro-financ* or 
microenterprise* or micro-enterprise* or ‘group lending’ or ‘credit 
program*’ or ‘credit plus* or credit-plus*’).mp.   
This did not need limiting by outcome as few studies were located.  
The reference lists of included quantitative studies and relevant reviews were 
checked for further relevant studies. Appendix 4 in section 6.4 has more details 
of our search strategy15. 
 
2.1.3 Screening studies: applying inclusion criteria 
The searches were initially screened by MD who retrieved full text publications, 
reports or web-sites with potentially relevant text and data, which were then 
assessed independently in duplicate by the two lead reviewers (JGC & RPJ) using 
inclusion forms (see Appendix 2, section 6.2) developed for the review.  
Quantitative studies: Data extraction and validity assessment of included 
quantitative studies (including all publications/reports etc. of a single dataset) 
were carried out by MD on forms developed for this review (see Appendix 2, 
section 6.2 and Appendix 5, section 6.5), then checked by either JGC or RPJ to 
create a final study dataset.   
Data extracted and tabulated includes study characteristics: target group, 
exposure, comparison group and study relevance (distinguishing between those 
with different degrees of focus on our questions), validity criteria (developed to 
be relevant to each study's methodology and the review question), and outcome 
data (including sample sizes, data processing and analysis methods, values of 
categorical and ordinal impact variables, and parametric descriptive statistics of 
continuous data). 
Qualitative studies: These are formally included in our database for a future 
systematic review, but are not included in the current review.   
The remaining steps in the methodology and analysis refer solely to quantitative 
studies. It is beyond the scope of this SR to discuss the qualitative studies in 
depth. 
2.1.4 Problems in searching and screening 
We would like to draw attention to some differences between SRs in health and 
in development studies since our review team consists of researchers with 
backgrounds in natural as well as social sciences. Our colleagues from the School 
of Medicine have experience with reviews of RCTs, non-randomised studies and 
qualitative research and note that there were some major surprises in 
conducting a SR in the social sciences. The most immediate difference was the 
difficulty in searching incurred because abstracts are not structured, and do not 
always (or even often) address the question being addressed or the methodology 
employed. It was not possible to tell from most abstracts whether an article was 
                                                 
15 The search records were managed in an Endnote library and the data extraction was later handled in Excel, 
Open database connectivity (ODBC), and Stata.  
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an informative narrative, a review article, or primary research. This lack of 
clarity in abstracts (along with a lack of methodological indexing terms) meant 
that it was difficult to run specific and sensitive searches, and also that assessing 
whether titles and abstracts may relate to relevant studies was extremely 
difficult. For these reasons, running the searches and assessing titles and 
abstracts for collection of full text articles was much more time-consuming than 
it otherwise would have been. 
 
2.2 Assessing the validity and quality of studies 
Criteria for judging validity used in this review are adapted from the Cochrane 
Handbook16 and EPPI-Centre17,18. The Cochrane Collaboration suggests that the 
key components of bias (and therefore in assessment of validity) in any study 
are:  
A. selection bias (systematic differences between baseline characteristics of 
the groups);  
B. performance bias (systematic difference between care or support 
provided to the groups);   
C. attrition bias (systematic differences between the arms in withdrawals 
from the study);  
D. detection bias (systematic differences between groups in how outcomes 
are determined); and  
E. reporting bias (systematic differences between reported and unreported 
findings).   
EPPI-Centre formulates the risk of bias as being composed of the  
F. trustworthiness of results (methodological quality, as discussed by 
Cochrane, including transparency, accuracy, accessibility and specificity 
of the methods);  
G. appropriateness of the use of study design to address the review question 
(methodological relevance, including purposivity);  
H. appropriateness of focus for answering the review question (topic 
relevance, including relevant answers and legal and ethical propriety); 
and  
I. overall weight of evidence (a summary of the above). 
See Appendix 6, section 6.6 for the full set of criteria which we attempted to 
use in this review. Following the established medical and educational experience 
embodied in Cochrane and Campbell Collaborations our assessment of validity 
initially focused on checking the delivery and adequacy of the intervention (e.g. 
provision of microfinance), reliability of the outcome measures (e.g. income, 
expenditure, assets, and so on), contextual factors affecting heterogeneity of 
outcomes (including other microfinance services), and potential existence and 
likely significance of confounding factors.  
                                                 
16 Higgins JPT and Green S (2008) (eds) Cochrane handbook for systematic reviews of interventions version 
5.0.0 [updated February 2008]. Available at: www.cochrane-handbook.org  
17 Gough D (2007) Weight of evidence: a framework for the appraisal of the quality and relevance of evidence. 
In Furlong J and Oancea A (eds) Applied and Practice-based Research. Special Edition of Research Papers in 
Education, 22, (2): 213-228. 
18 EPPI-Centre website: ‘Quality and relevance appraisal’, http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/Default.aspx?tabid=177 
(accessed July 2010). 
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However, we found that in the context of microfinance evaluations there were 
few, if any, studies which met the rigorous standards of research design that this 
approach is based on. Hence, much of our work involved trying to assess validity 
of analyses of observational data which had further problems in their design. 
Many of these problems emerged during the review of papers, which, as noted 
above, generally did not have well-structured and methodologically informative 
abstracts; nor, on closer examination of the text was it easy to extract 
important details of the methodology (combination of design and analysis). Our 
initial selection criteria evolved during the course of the study, based on further 
consideration of validity of different designs and analyses, and their 
combinations as discussed next. However, in many cases the only way to be 
clear about the validity of results would have been to replicate19 the studies in 
order to get a clearer understanding of the ways in which variables had been 
constructed and analyses undertaken; we illustrate this by reporting replications 
of two iconic MF evaluations (3.4.1 and 3.4.2). We elaborate these points in the 
next section. 
2.2.1 Design and analysis - validity 
As discussed above, where we discuss research designs and methods of analysis 
(sections 1.5.3 and 1.5.4), most microfinance IEs are based on with/without 
research designs which are of low inherent validity because it is difficult to 
control for selection and placement biases. Much of the earlier literature based 
on with/without designs, which purported support for beneficent development 
impacts of microfinance using sophisticated econometrics (PnK, USAID), have 
recently been shown to be questionable (Morduch 1998, RnM, Duvendack and 
Palmer-Jones 2011). We discuss these two examples in some detail to emphasise 
this point.  
It has been argued that some recent microfinance IEs were based on appropriate 
designs (pipelines and RCTs), and well-considered with/without studies (see 
discussion below). While several of these studies have been published in peer 
reviewed journals, they have not been subject to rigorous criticism, (for 
example by thorough replication), or have evident deficiencies in 
implementation (for example, not reporting sensitivity analyses of PSM impact 
estimates20, or tests of IV methods21). Others have only appeared quite recently 
as working papers. We discuss included RCTs and pipeline studies further below 
because their designs have generally accepted claims to validity, although their 
exclusive claims to validity are contested (e.g. Hausman and Wiese 1985, 
Heckman 1991, Scrivens 2008; Donaldson et al. 2009, Deaton 2010). For the 
studies based on with/without designs we discuss a sample, due mainly to 
limitations of time and resources, but also because of their lower inherent 
validity; we include the iconic PnK and USAID studies and a selection of others 
which seem to have higher validity among these designs. Brief summaries of 
individual papers using with/without designs, as well as RCT and pipeline designs 
are available in Appendix 15, section 6.15. 
 
2.2.1.1 From a medical perspective 
During the data extraction exercise, there were important and difficult issues in 
interpreting methodological descriptions to allow useful assessment of validity. 
There do not appear to be standard ways of describing methodology or laying out 
                                                 
19 Replication is mentioned in 1.1.1 and discussed further in 2.2.3. 
20 See for example, Abera (2010), Imai et al. (2010), Takahashi et al. (2010). 
21 See for example, Diagne and Zeller (2001), Shimamura and Lastarria-Cornhiel (2010). 
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data in these studies; this differs from studies in the area of health, for 
example. Much work, in particular in the area of economics, takes previously 
generated data (that does not appear to be well described or considered very 
important) and carries out complicated and poorly described analytical 
techniques, making it difficult to reproduce findings. Within these analytical and 
statistical processes the information required to address validity issues - of pre-
stating methodology, using sensitivity analyses to ensure robust results and 
reporting all analyses carried out (Higgins and Greene, 2008) - are not clearly 
present. Thus, reported data may well provide a biased set of analyses, and P-
values may lose meaning if many analyses are ‘tried out’ before a subset is 
reported.  Any one dataset may have several published analyses, so sets of 
reported results could represent de-facto sensitivity analyses. However, if many 
analyses are carried out using the same, possibly flawed methodology, or 
different analyses are made of a given dataset but only those supporting a 
particular position are reported (while others suggesting different 
interpretations are not reported), thenthis can result in serious bias. This is 
particularly likely when analyses, possibly of the same dataset, are carried out 
by the same group of researchers, and/or their students or researchers in 
personal, academic, consultancy or other relationship with institutions with 
interests in the work22. 
2.2.2 Summary of discussion of validity 
Drawing on our discussion above, Table 2 summarises the threats to validity of 
varied research designs, and Table 3 summarises the threats to validity of varied 
analytical methods. 
To summarise our arguments so far, it can be inferred from Table 2 and Table 3 
that obtaining bias-free impact estimates for social experiments is a challenging 
task, mainly because of the limitations of the evaluation strategies available. 
Where possible, we checked the data to determine suitability for further 
evaluation by meta-analysis and/or meta-regression techniques to highlight 
outcome and contextual variability, and to appraise its usefulness for subsequent 
work, i.e. replications (see below). In some key cases, unit level data was 
accessed for data and data processing reliability but not to undertake replication 
(or re-analysis) of the study, because of resource constraints. Candidates for 
replication/reanalysis are merely identified, but not further discussed here. In 
fact, some replication exercises of studies which we include in this review are 
already underway. For example, Duvendack (2010a) replicated the IE conducted 
by USAID on SEWA Bank in India; further to this Duvendack (2010b) and 
Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011) replicated the IE conducted by PnK and 
related papers. 
                                                 
22 These concerns parallel, but are more broad ranging than those leading to recent calls for a code of ethical 
conduct for economists (e.g. The Economist 2011).  
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Table 2: Threats to validity: research design 
Research 
design 
Score Validity and threats Comments 
RCT 1 Blinding; failure to achieve 
random allocation, meaning 
(placebo) effects; adherence 
to treatment, 
randomisation/experiment 
effects; spill-overs 
Much long standing 
discussion about validity 
of social intervention 
RCTs. In practice, 
surprisingly numerous 
threats to validity given 
cursory attention, or 
not reported in papers. 
Pipeline 2 Random or non-random 
allocation; comparability of 
control groups; drop-outs & 
attrition 
Relatively new design is 
simply a variant of 
with/without designs in 
which practice often 
falls short of precept. 
Panel or 
before/after 
& 
with/without 
3 Mostly non-random allocation, 
risk of confounding, selection 
& programme placement bias, 
panels no ‘true’ baseline 
Many threats to validity, 
which cannot be fully 
compensated by 
‘elaborate analytic 
methods’ (Meyer and 
Fienberg 1992, p106) 
Either 
before/after 
or 
with/without 
4 Mostly non-random allocation, 
risk of confounding, selection 
& programme placement bias 
As above 
 
Table 3: Threats to validity: methods of analysis 
Methods of 
analysis 
Score Threat to validity Comments 
IV,PSM, 
2SLS/LIML, 
DID 
1 Weak instruments, 
poor/too few matches 
(limited common 
support); unbalanced 
covariates; small 
control groups, flawed 
data 
Conduct simulation &/or 
sensitivity analysis to 
establish robustness; need 
good quality rich data sets; 
need clear account of data 
cleaning & variable 
construction 
Multivariate 2 Control of endogenous 
variables 
Use more 
advanced/sophisticated 
analytical methods; requires 
high quality dataset with 
many appropriate control 
variables. 
Tabulation 3 Control of endogenous 
& exogenous variables 
Use more 
advanced/sophisticated 
methods 
See further Appendix 7 in section 6.7. 
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2.2.3 Evidence for replication or reinterpretation 
Taken together, arguments so far (see statements by RnM, which are extended 
and supported by explorations of use of PSM by Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 
2011), undoubtedly pose challenges to IE using observational and randomised 
controlled data, and draw attention to the need for replication (Hamermesh 
2007). They also have implications for this SR. Firstly, results from papers 
published even in top rank peer-reviewed journals may not be reliable; secondly, 
replication is often highly advisable and requires access at least to original data. 
This suggests further criteria for quality assessment, preferably, the existence of 
supportive replications, or the availability of raw data to enable replication; 
repetition and replication in other locations are also desirable. This argument 
equally applies to qualitative data, where evidence (as opposed to assurances) 
of proper and ethical conduct of research (unbiased sampling, avoidance of 
leading questions, and so on) is not easy to provide. Qualitative study replication 
is substituted by reinterpretation, based on fully documented methods and texts 
giving assurance of ethical and professional conduct with regard to the 
production and interpretation of qualitative information (see 
http://www.timescapes.leeds.ac.uk/the-archive/ for UK best practice).  
 
2.3 Process of synthesis and selection of studies 
We have argued that evaluation of the impacts of microfinance is complex 
because of the difficulties of establishing causal relations in the presence of the 
challenges posed by the factors listed previously. These are particularly 
challenging for social science knowledge because of the impossibility of blinding 
in social experiments (compared to laboratory or field experiments conducted 
with inert subjects), and due to selection and placement biases. The criteria for 
selection and evaluation in SRs are demanding. 
These challenges are addressed in social research by combinations of research 
design and analytical methods. To recap, by research design we mean the 
treatment allocation and sampling structure of data production; by analysis we 
mean the statistical (econometric) procedures used to interpret the data 
produced in the research design.  
We refine our selection in three stages (see Figure 3); the first stage consists of 
searches of the databases listed in Table 1 that produced a list with 3,735 
publications. 1,092 duplicates were found and removed leaving a final list of 
2,643 publications. In the second stage we screen titles and abstracts of 2,643 
publications, applying our inclusion criteria we shortlist 201 publications for 
which we obtain the full text to decide on inclusion or exclusion. In a third 
stage, we carefully screen shortlisted publications; this includes 74 papers which 
we analyse in depth.  
The third stage requires more detailed explaination. This stage arises as the 
second stage resulted in very few papers that met rigorous selection criteria 
(this is discussed below). However, primarily there are only two RCT 
microfinance IEs, while all papers based on observational data have research 
design and analytical problems (more generally explored in Appendix 7, section 
6.7). Consequently, we allowed inclusion of many papers based on observational 
data since they represent the bulk of the microfinance IE literature to date. In 
selecting among these papers, our logic is to score research design and data 
analysis approaches used in the papers, attaching weight to the quality of 
research design and statistical methods of analysis. These scores are then 
weighted and aggregated and a cut-off value specified to include papers judged 
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to warrant further investigation. Scoring, weighting and aggregation were 
performed using Excel. The spreadsheet is available from the authors.  
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Figure 3: PRISMA flow diagram 
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*Including only those papers with low and medium scores, see Table 4 for a breakdown. We 
excluded papers with high scores listed in the yellow fields in Table 4. For details of papers, 
see Appendix 8 and 9, section 6. 
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2.3.1 Process used to synthesise data  
Our original plan was to scan papers by validity criteria as described in Appendix 
5, section 6.5. This proved burdensome, if not impossible, in the absence of 
replication (as explained in section 2.2.3). Too many papers failed to provide 
sufficiently precise information to answer the questions in Appendix 5, section 
6.5, such that some subjective judgements were required to complete these 
forms. We could not be confident about some assignments, as it was clear that 
few papers could achieve a ‘low threat to validity’ status.  
Hence we adopt a slightly different approach to that originally intended, roughly 
scoring papers by their self-proclaimed research design, and by the analytical 
procedures. We combine scores into an index to which we apply a fuzzy cut-off 
to reduce the number of largely ‘high threat to validity’ papers to a manageable 
number. 
The general principle we adopt is that weak research design requires more 
sophisticated methods of analysis in order to reach similar levels of validity. 
However, while this may in principle be true, it is also the case that more 
sophisticated analytical methods may not (fully) compensate for weak research 
design. Although individual studies can be roughly classified and ordered by 
research design and method of analysis (some papers use more than one of 
each), there is much further variation in the actual designs and analyses than 
can be accommodated in a simple two-way classification with limited numbers 
of categories. The final paper selection was based on a simplified ranking 
compiled from scores for design and analysis into a single index which varied 
from 0.0 (low threat to validity) to 2.78 (high threat to validity)23; we used a 
cut-off at 2 which excluded a significant number of studies with scores clustered 
just above 2 (see Figure 4). A few papers which were marginally excluded by this 
approach were included based on our judgement, resulting in a final count of 58 
papers (see Figure 3 and Table 4). 
                                                 
23 Score = ln(design) + ln(method), where design = 1 (RCT) to 5 (Observational), and method = 1 (IV etc.) to 3 
(tabulation) 
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Figure 4: Distribution of ‘validity scores’ 
 
Table 4 provides a summary of included studies by scores. The red fields signify 
low scores and indicate that studies falling into this category are most certainly 
included in the SR. Studies in the yellow/orange field have a medium score 
which is still below 2, hence these studies are also included. Studies that fall 
within the bright yellow fields are excluded since their scores are high, i.e. 
above 2. 
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Table 4: Summary of included studies by scores; number of papers in each 
category* 
  
Statistical Methods of Analysis 
Research Design 
 
 
IV,PSM,2SLS
/LIML,DID Multivariate Tabulation 
Scores 1 2 3 
RCT 1  2 1 
Pipeline 2 9 0 0 
Panel or 
before/after & 
with/without 
3 14 6 0 
Either 
before/after or 
with/without 
4 22 13 3 
Natural 
Experiment 
5 2 0 0 
Observation/ 
survey 
6 0 0 0 
Legend 
 Low score 50 High score 16 
 Medium score 6 Excluded  
* 2 papers (Chen and Snodgrass 1999, Dunn 1999) are included in our analysis but are 
missing from this table since they had a high score (2 and above). We include them in 
our synthesis because they were part of a group of papers that used the same dataset, 
i.e. the USAID data on India and Peru.  
The majority of papers are from Bangladesh (31), including 21 from one dataset, 
and India (10), with a few from Thailand and Peru (4), Ethiopia and Pakistan (3) 
and several countries with two papers (e.g. Malawi) and many with just one. 
Appendix 15, section 6.15 and Appendix 16, section 6.16 provide further details 
of the studies included in this review. 
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3. Synthesis and discussion of results 
In this section we frame and present summary evidence from the studies and 
papers selected, and draw together our findings in relation to the interventions 
with which they may be associated. In doing this, we frame the discussion in 
terms of a simplified representation of hypothesised pathways between 
microfinance and well-being outcomes, which puts the various ‘outcome’ 
variables in perspective.  
We first list the included studies by intervention (credit type and product) and 
outcome, as explained in section 3.1 (Tables 5, 6 and 7). We then report, in 
Table 8 and Table 9, the numbers of results estimated, and the proportion that 
are statistically significant; a high proportion (more than half) of all the 
estimates of microfinance impact made - more than 2,800 in 58 papers (or 29 
studies) - are not statistically significant. Even within the same study/paper 
estimates for a given impact can be significant or not depending on the sample, 
the estimation model, and the analytical technique. Replication, where done, 
does not always confirm the significance of the original results. 
After this we discuss the included studies organised by research design and 
method of analysis. This does not mean that we adhere to a strict ‘hierarchy of 
methods’ (Guyatt et al. 1995, 2000), since low design validity can be partly, but 
not necessarily entirely, compensated by analytical sophistication, if well 
conducted. Not all included studies have received the same attention, 
notwithstanding meeting the inclusion criteria, since closer examination 
revealed some to be more valid than others. For reasons explained elsewhere we 
focus on the paradigmatic and highly influential PnK and USAID studies. These 
two studies generate a large proportion of the included papers, and they 
exemplify the theoretically powerful IV and panel methods of analysis. We also 
emphasise critical discussion of the emerging fashionable use of RCT, pipeline 
and PSM methods in microfinance IE.  
We start the discussion with those research designs thought to provide most 
valid impact assessment, and those methods that are thought most convincing, 
proceeding to designs and methods of analysis that are less well regarded. 
Further details of these designs and methods are reported in Appendix 7, section 
6.7. 
 
3.1 The studies 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 list the studies by outcome type, credit product and credit 
type, as set out in section 1.3. The majority of studies are on group lending with 
credit only products; however, few MFIs are really credit only since even the GB 
type institutions undertake other activities – recitation of the 16 principles, 
exercises, group meetings which provide motivation, advice, mutual solidarity, 
and so24. These nonfinancial aspects of microfinance can directly affect 
participants as well as, and beyond, income and consumption patterns, which 
are outcomes that most earlier microfinance IEs examined (Armendáriz de 
                                                 
24 Also, note that we have classified the PnK studies as ‘credit only’ although they include BRAC and BRDB 
which encouraged savings, and GB (model 1) which has a compulsory savings element. It might have been 
better to classify PnK as ‘credit plus’ but this would create further presentation complications. GB type MFIs 
offer mainly credit only. Nevertheless, this highlights difficulties of classifying interventions into a small set of 
categories. 
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Aghion and Morduch 2010). The scores for all included studies are reported in 
Appendix 825. 
3.1.1 Economic outcomes 
Table 5 indicates that 26 out of 29 microfinance impact studies investigated 
economic outcome indicators. Within these 26 studies 18 are group lending 
programmes out of which nine provided credit only26.  
Table 5: Impacts of microfinance on economic outcome indicators by product 
and type of lending 
 
Type of lending 
Product Individual Group & 
individual 
Group 
Credit only Abou-Ali et al. 
(2009) 
Cotler & Woodruff 
(2008) 
Banerjee et al.  
(2009/10) 
USAID (Peru) 
(Year) 
PnK  (1998) 
Coleman  (1999, 2002, 
2006) 
Copestake (2001)   
Copestake (2002)   
Cuong (2008)   
Kondo (2008)  
Shimamura and Lastarria-
Cornhiel (2010) 
Shirazi and Khan (2009) 
Tesfay (2009)
Credit plus 
(i.e. credit & 
savings) 
Karlan and Zinman 
(2010) 
USAID (India)   
 
Abera (2010)   
Diagne and Zeller 
(2001) 
Takahashi et al. (2010) 
Zaman (1999)   
Zeller et al (2001) 
Credit plus 
plus 
 Imai et al. (2010) 
USAID (Zimbabwe) 
 
Copestake (2005) 
Deininger and Liu (2009) 
Imai and Azam (2010) 
Montgomery/Setboonsarng 
(2005/2008) 
Economic outcome indicators include: business profits and revenues, sales, income p.c., 
consumption/expenditure, assets, employment, savings, debts, poverty indices, and 
other. 
                                                 
25 The database deriving these scores is available upon request from the authors. 
26 As noted, many studies do not describe the interventions in detail. Other sources can provide in-depth and 
sometimes contradictory information on the intervention. Searching for this additional information significantly 
increases the time needed for the review. Note that we classify GB type interventions as ‘credit only’. When 
there are multiple interventions some of which may be interventions different to the main intervention 
studied, we make arbitrary judgments as to the category to place this study in. Thus we classify the PnK study 
as ‘credit only’ although it includes BRAC and BRDB, which both have savings provision as well credit. In-depth 
information about interventions for the time and place of some studies is sometimes available to supplement 
what is provided in reviewed papers.  
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3.1.2 Social outcomes 
As argued by Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2010) and outlined in Figure 1, 
section 1.4, microfinance affects households beyond economic outcomes. We 
classify these as social and empowerment outcomes; these are more clearly 
outcomes of intrinsic as well as instrumental value, of which economic outcomes 
are better seen as instrumental (to achieving social and empowerment) 
outcomes (Sen, 1999). 19 out of the 29 studies assess the impact of microfinance 
on social outcomes. The majority of studies which include economic outcomes 
involve MFIs with a group lending approach and credit only products (see Table 6 
for details). 
This clustering of intervention types means that at least in principle, the 
information and understanding of the most frequently represented types should 
be better than for other types. However, this may not be the case because there 
are associations between outcome variables, intervention types studied and the 
period at which they were introduced, and the time and locations where they 
were studied. Thus early studies, which may have been methodologically weaker 
(smaller, less well-designed samples with reliance on complex analytical 
methods) were conducted in Bangladesh in the early 1990s. In contrast, at least 
some later studies were conducted in other countries (such as the Philippines, 
and Indonesia) with the benefit of understanding derived from earlier studies. 
We are also dealing with a small number of cases of many intervention types. 
Table 6: Impacts of microfinance on social outcome indicators by product and 
type of lending 
 
Type of lending 
Product Individual Group & 
individual 
Group 
Credit only Abou-Ali et al. 
(2009) 
Banerjee et al.  
(2009/10) 
USAID (Peru) 
PnK (1998)  
Coleman (1999, 2002, 2006)   
Copestake (2001)   
Copestake (2002)   
Shimamura and Lastarria-
Cornhiel (2010) 
Credit plus 
(i.e. credit & 
savings) 
Karlan and Zinman 
(2010) 
USAID (India)   
 
Diagne and Zeller 
(2001) 
 
Steele et al (2001) 
Zaman (1999) 
Zeller et al (2001) 
Credit plus 
plus 
 Imai et al. (2010) 
USAID 
(Zimbabwe) 
 
Bhuiya and Chowdhury 
(2002) 
Deininger and Liu (2009) 
Montgomery/Setboonsarng 
(2005/2008)  
Social outcome indicators include: children’s school enrolment, school 
attendance, nutritional status, vulnerability to shocks, social capital, 
contraceptive use, and other. 
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3.1.3 Empowerment outcomes 
It is often argued that microfinance empowers women (Armendáriz de Aghion 
and Morduch 2010), thus it is surprising that very few studies included in this 
review (merely 5 out of 29 studies) rigorously investigated the impact of 
microfinance on empowerment outcomes (see Table 7).  
Table 7: Impacts of microfinance on empowerment outcome indicators by 
product and type of lending 
 
Type of lending 
Product Individual Group & 
individual 
Group 
Credit only  Banerjee et al.  
(2009/10) 
USAID (Peru) 
PnK (1998) 
Credit plus 
(i.e. credit & 
savings) 
USAID (India)   
 
 Swain and Wallentin (2009) 
Zaman (1999) 
Credit plus 
plus 
 USAID 
(Zimbabwe) 
 
Deininger and Liu (2009) 
Montgomery/Setboonssarng 
(2005/2008) 
Political outcome indicators include: empowerment. 
Appendix 8 and 9, sections 6.8 and 6.9 have further details on the list of 
included and excluded studies. Appendix 16, section 6.16 details on the 
outcomes assessed listed by study. 
3.1.4 Multiple outcome testing 
As mentioned earlier, many studies have multiple impact estimates on the same 
dataset (see Table 8) using different sub-samples, estimation designs and 
methods. In many studies, estimates of impacts are made at several stages in 
the putative pathways between access and well-being impacts – as discussed 
further below. Many studies focus on the initial steps (or effects using the term 
used in Figure 1) – borrowing, business investments, activities and outputs, 
which are means to welfare improvement, before moving, if at all to impacts 
such as profits, household incomes, expenditure, which may be at least partly 
ends in themselves as well as means to further ends, or to health, nutrition and 
other indicators including subjective assessments of well-being or 
empowerment.  
That many studies involve multiple tests is nowhere, as far as we can see, noted 
in relation to the dangers of multiple testing (Ioannidis 2005). Some studies test 
more than 100 outcome variables from various steps in the causal chain (see for 
example Coleman 1999, PnK). It is important to realise that a methodologically 
unsound study is liable to bias, and does not become any less liable as the tested 
number of outcome variables increases.  
Evidence of the impact of microfinance: a systematic review  
42 
 
Table 8: Numbers of outcome variables tested  
  
Type of lending 
Outcome 
variable  Product Individual 
Group & 
individual Group 
Economic 
Credit only 87 79 1114 
Credit plus (i.e. credit & 
savings) 396 143 63 
Credit plus plus 24 85 187 
Social 
Credit only 5 15 279 
Credit plus (i.e. credit & 
savings) 73 31 9 
Credit plus plus 0 0 26 
Empowerment 
Credit only 0 11 138 
Credit plus (i.e. credit & 
savings) 20 0 64 
Credit plus plus 0 0 20 
Total number of impact estimates reported is 2,866.  
In line with Tables 5, 6 and 7, we can see in Table 8 that most impact estimates 
involve group lending and credit only interventions; the focus is on economic 
outcomes rather than social and empowerment outcomes. 
In section 1 we suggest examining whether the impact of microfinance on any of 
these economic, social and empowerment outcomes is modified by a) gender of 
borrower, b) poverty status of household, c) rural/urban setting, d) geographical 
location, e) presence of second income earner in the household, and f) type of 
product. This is not possible given the nature of the available evidence which is 
limited and rather diverse. 
As in Table 8 and previous tables, the bulk of impact estimates in Table 9 listed 
are for group-lending and credit only studies with a focus on economic 
outcomes. Within this set of studies, most estimates are not significant 
indicating no impact of microcredit group lending on economic outcomes. It is 
puzzling how the view that microfinance is pro-poor and pro-women became so 
widespread given the evidence we have presented here so far. It appears that 
the microfinance hype has been shaped by very few influential studies that did 
not account for the diversity of the sector and the variety of the products. This 
is not the only problem as discussed further below. The majority of microfinance 
IEs discussed in this review suffer from shortcomings in research design and 
analytical method which casts further doubts on the credibility of the evidence 
they put forward. 
Hence, having examined the included studies by intervention and outcomes, we 
now move on to discuss results by research design and analytical method; this is 
more meaningful given the diversity in types of interventions and outcomes. 
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Table 9: Significance of estimates of outcome variables by outcome, credit 
type and credit product  
Outcome variable Product 
Individual Group & individual Group 
sig ns sig Ns sig ns 
Economic 
Credit only 61 26 28 48 471 641 
Credit plus 
(i.e. credit & 
savings) 
129 267 91 52 14 46 
Credit plus plus 16 8 65 19 71 105 
Total  206 301 184 119 556 792 
Social 
Credit only 3 2 3 11 57 229 
Credit plus 
(i.e. credit & 
savings) 
37 36 3 22 4 4 
Credit plus plus 0 0 0 0 3 23 
Total  40 38 6 33 64 256 
Empowerment 
Credit only 0 0 2 9 74 64 
Credit plus 
(i.e. credit & 
savings) 
4 16 0 0 24 39 
Credit plus plus 0 0 0 0 0 13 
Total  4 16 2 9 98 116 
Total  significant = 1160; not significant = 1680. Most studies do not report significance 
levels, only whether significant or not based usually on t-values of regression 
coefficients. 
 
3.2 Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) 
RCTs are considered the ‘gold standard’ for impact evaluations, they are widely 
and enthusiastically promoted in the development industry (Duflo et al. 2007, 
Banerjee and Duflo 2009), including for microfinance evaluations (Armendáriz & 
Morduch 2010)27. However, the advantages of RCTs for this purpose are moot, 
and to date very few have been conducted on microfinance interventions. We 
find eight studies which meet our selection criteria in stage 2, of which only two 
meet the higher hurdle in stage 3. One excluded study involved capital grants 
rather than microfinance and is not addressed in detail, although it aims to 
understand relaxation of credit constraints28. Two other studies are randomised 
comparisons of terms and conditions of microfinance (Giné and Karlan 2006, 
2009, Field and Pande 2008), and another focused on South Africa (Karlan and 
Zinman 2005) and did not concern poor people as identified in this review. We 
do in fact discuss this paper as it accompanies another paper by authors included 
in this section. Duflo et al.’s (2008) study in Morocco concerned access to credit 
                                                 
27 ‘it [to answer the question how would borrowers have done without microfinance programmes] is a 
surprisingly difficult question to answer cleanly in studies that do not involve randomised research designs’ 
(Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, p269). 
28 de Mel et al. (2008) assessed the impacts of capital grants rather than credit.  
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rather than the impact of credit; although the project research questions are 
given as: ‘What is the impact of microcredit on individuals and their 
communities?  What are the rates of returns of investments undertaken with 
microfinance loans? Does access to microcredit have a significant impact on 
household expenditures and activities?’ Results for these questions do not seem 
to have been reported yet29. We note that there may have been many other 
RCTs in related areas, but since no register of such trials is kept, it is impossible 
to say whether such trials have been completed, or what results they have 
yielded. In the medical and related fields the failure to report on trials which 
yield insignificant or adverse outcomes is a major distortion limiting the 
usefulness of the RCT approach3031. 
Of the eight studies we find that used RCT designs on microfinance 
interventions, only two were about impact of access to MFIs relative to no access 
and applied to relevant social domains32. The two RCT studies which meet the 
selection criteria are discussed in some detail in Appendix 15, section 6.15.1 
because of the status ascribed to the RCT methodology in both the professional 
(Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, p293-308) and popular literature (The Economist 
2009, Hartford 2009). 
The validity and usefulness of RCTs has been extensively debated in many places 
as described above (see also example Donaldson 2009). While for policy purposes 
it has been argued that they ‘did not yield credible evidence in a timely and 
useful manner’ (ibid p3, paraphrasing Shadish et al. 1991), there continues to be 
widespread belief in their internal validity and the credibility of their findings. 
In general the main threats to internal validity pertain to (1) randomisation 
procedures; (2) adherence to treatment; (3) attrition (drop-outs and graduates); 
(3) behavioural responses of participants to randomisation, and in treatment and 
control contexts to masking/blinding or their absence; and (4) spill-overs and 
spill-ins.  
We explain our understandings of these characteristics in the two included RCTs 
which lead to our overall judgement of their validity and what can be 
understood from them. 
3.2.1 Randomisation 
Failure to achieve randomisation are a common problem in RCTs, unless the 
randomisation is masked in the recruitment process leading to, preferably, 
double blinding – neither the treater (the MFI agents selecting and interacting 
with clients), nor the treatee (the clients) know they are treating, or being 
treated differently to some others in an experimental situation. This is not easy 
to achieve as the situation of being offered a loan is hard to disguise from that 
of not being offered a loan. 
                                                 
29 At least not in a reviewable form; in addition to the report references, this study is reported in an 
unpublished Powerpoint presentation and a short www page presents some conclusions but without sufficient 
detail: 
www.philanthropyaction.com/nc/microfinance_impact_and_innovation_microfinance_impacts/ 
30 See Song et al. (2010), ‘Dissemination and publication of research findings: an updated review of related 
biases’, available at: (www.hta.ac.uk/fullmono/mon1408.pdf) 
31 See also Petryna (2009), for a critical discussion of RCTs which indicates clearly how far below a gold 
standard they can fall. It is also insightful to refer to the talk presented by Kremer on ‘Conducting Field 
Research in Developing Countries’, in which he responds to the rhetorical question as to why one should 
conduct RCTs in developing countries with the comment ‘because one can’: 
www.streamingmeeting.com/webmeeting/matrixvideo/nber/20090724_1030_f/index.htm   
32 This excluded the Karlan and Zinman study in urban South Africa, although some details of this paper are 
discussed as they provide insight into the sister-study by these authors in the Philippines. 
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Banerjee et al. (2009) use ‘slums’ as units of study, and randomly chose one of a 
pair of slums that had been matched by minimum distance on a set of 
characteristics; the MFI entered the chosen slums but not the controls, but other 
MFIs could and did enter either during the course of the experiment. It appears 
that the randomised allocations were adhered to although the exact process of 
choosing one of each pair is not described. It is not clear how or whether 
selection of survey participants occurred prior to or subsequent to 
randomisation, (although it was almost certainly subsequent for the control 
survey sample). 
Karlan and Zinman (2008) assigned randomly allocated applicants for consumer 
credit whose credit rating was ‘marginally’ below the normal cut-off. Loan 
officers were purportedly unaware of the credit ratings, although they 
conducted the survey on which the credit rating was determined. Furthermore, 
there were two groups among the marginal with different probabilities of being 
assigned to be offered a loan – those marginally below the cut-off and those 
somewhat further below. It appears that loan officers, whose remuneration 
depended on loan performance, did not always make the offers as instructed. 
This may well not have achieved randomisation since the loan officers would not 
have been blind to characteristics of the applicants and may well have selected 
on unobservables. While analysis was on an intention-to-treat basis using the 
original allocations, it seems likely that the sample of marginally creditworthy 
people actually being offered and taking up loans (which they did not all do even 
when offered), would have been biased by selection by loan officers and by self-
selection. It is surprising that this design and its sibling in South Africa have been 
considered internally valid. 
3.2.2 Adherence to treatment  
This pertains to possible (unintended) dissimilarities of treatment between 
treated groups. There is no obvious issue in the Banerjee study in this regard, 
but doubts must exist about whether this could have been present in the Karlan 
and Zinman study - between those who surpassed the usual credit rating hurdle 
and those marginally and further below it. As argued above, loan officers would 
have been aware in at least some cases of the likely creditworthiness of those in 
different categories (as evidenced by their not offering loans to all those below 
the cut-off as instructed, and perhaps among those who declined to take up 
offers). As such, loan officers may well have acted differentially towards those 
to whom they were offered and who accepted loans. Loan officers may, for 
example, have visited them more frequently to raise the likelihood of 
repayments. 
3.2.3 Attrition and response bias 
The data analysed in Banerjee et al. (2009) was based on a random sample 
survey sampled from a population frame constructed by a census some time 
after the intervention started; an earlier base-line survey was not representative 
of the population. There is consequently some possibility that the population 
and sample miss some households who were present initially, and therefore 
would have had access but were unavailable during sample frame construction. 
There was no report of sample substitutions, but the impression is given that 
response rate were very high.  
Karlan and Zinman (2008), on the other hand, achieved only a 70% response rate 
which is tantamount to a 30% attrition rate. Although attrition rate was not 
correlated with treatment there is no evidence about how characteristics 
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affected attrition and whether this differed between treatments. Again this 
raises questions as to the validity of these studies. 
3.2.4 Behavioural responses 
These effects derive from participants knowing they are participating in an 
experiment. Details of the protocols used in the research to recruit participants 
are not explained, and there is no follow-up ethnographic or other evidence of 
perceptions of the participants (de-briefing). It the case of Banerjee et al. 
(2009) it is not clear why the presence or absence of the MFI in a slum would 
make much difference, since other MFIs were free to enter. However, it is shown 
that borrowing was greater in the treatment slums. Nevertheless, the 
cooperating MFI which did not enter control slums is one of the largest in India 
and is well known even among slum dwellers, there may well have been 
speculation in the control slums as to its absence. Indeed the authors of the 
study speculate that delayed entry may have affected business decisions, 
perhaps because of expectations about lower cost loans being available in the 
near future leading to some postponing taking loans for business expansion. 
Karlan and Zinman (2008) explained that the ‘stated purpose of the survey was 
to collect information on the financial condition and well-being of 
microentrepreneurs and their households. .... In order to avoid potential 
response bias in the treatment relative to control groups, neither the survey firm 
nor the respondents [were] informed about the experiment or any association 
with the Lender’ (p9-10) It can be imagined, however, that speculation as to the 
meaning of being interviewed, and indeed thoughts that a less creditworthy 
person might have on being ‘surprisingly’ offered a loan in combination with 
being surveyed, can well have induced behavioural changes which would not be 
expected in a non-experimental context. Furthermore, there are ethical 
concerns about whether fully informed consent could have been obtained given 
the failure to inform participants of the nature of the study. Also, those with 
marginal credit scores who were not offered loans were discriminated against, 
raising further ethical concerns.  
3.2.5 Spill-overs and spill-ins 
In these studies there are no obvious problems in this regard Banerjee et al. 
(2009), explicitly acknowledge the effects of entrance of other MFIs in both 
treatment and control slums. Less clear is whether it is valid to assume that in 
control slums there was no ‘surprise’ that the MFI, which was well known, had 
not entered, not withstanding that surveys had been conducted in all slums but 
entrance had only occurred in one. This is to assume that information (about 
patterns of presence and absence of MFIs in particular locations) does not flow 
between slums, an assumption which is not in our view likely. Karlan and Zinman 
(2008) showed that there was not compensatory borrowing by rejected 
marginally creditworthy borrowers, but they did not discuss behaviour by other 
institutions which offer consumption credit in the locales. 
3.2.6 Outcomes 
Notwithstanding the randomised design of these two studies, very few significant 
impacts were found apart from borrowing amounts and sources – i.e. on the 
direct and intended effects of the intervention. But little can be learnt from 
increased MFI borrowing itself on well-being outcomes. A few coefficients 
implying impacts on business activities (inventories, profits, etc.), were also 
discernable, but these too have only indirect effects on well-being, even if some 
may consider increased business activity is (or portends) a good itself. Very few 
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significant impacts on direct (health, education, subjective well-being) or 
indirect (income or consumption expenditures) indicators of well-being were 
found. Thus, while it may be the case, as Karlan and Zinman (2010, p19), argue, 
‘that it is important to measure impacts on a broad set of behaviours, 
opportunity sets, and outcomes’, there is little evidence that RCTs have been 
able to deliver conclusive evidence of impacts on well-being.  
More to the point is whether these studies deliver strong evidence that (short-
term) impacts on well-being of MFIs are not present, as has been the popular 
interpretation of these studies – such as in the Economist Magazine33 which 
considers whether based on these results, we can accept the null hypothesis of 
no impact with a high level of confidence. As noted elsewhere, some prominent 
academics involved in microfinance seem34 to have preferred to not reject the 
alternate hypothesis. As such they imply that studies do not provide evidence 
leading to rejection of the hypothesis that MFIs have beneficent impacts. 
Given the limitations on RCTs in this area by ethical considerations35, avoidance 
of spill-overs, and intention to treat basis of evaluation, the potential 
contribution of RCTs at this stage may be very limited. One solution would be to 
find early indicators of later well-being, but this will often mean assuming what 
has yet to be proven (i.e. there are problems with finding convincing early 
indicators of later well-being).   
 
                                                 
33 ‘By being willing to take a risk on entrepreneurial sorts who lack any other way to start a business, 
microcredit may help reduce poverty in the long run, even if its short-run effects are negligible’ (The 
Economist 16 July 2009). 
34 E.g. ‘The study’s relatively short time frame, however, limits the scope of the results and their implications 
for the short-term. Social outcomes, for example, may take longer to emerge. In the short-run, at least nothing 
big and positive leaps out from the evaluation’ (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2010, p299). This response 
seems to echo that given by Roodman and Morduch (2009) to their replication of the PnK study, and in 
Roodman’s interchange with Bateman in the former’s blog (http://blogs.cgdev.org/open_book/2010/08/why-
doesnt-milford-batemans-book-work.php) which echoes our private exchanges with Roodman about his 
interpretation of their replication. 
35 Undesirability of denying control groups access to a service that apparently has a high demand means that it 
is difficult to conduct long term trials in which control groups are denied access, and yet the impacts are likely 
to be long-term. 
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Notes: Columns are as follows: 
                                                 
36 Endline survey has 500 households who already had loans retained from (non-random) baseline included to assess effect on 
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Banerjee et al. 
2009 
Random 
choice of 
one of 
each pair 
of slums 
Y36(rando
m 
allocatio
n of 
areas to 
treatmen
t) 
Y ‘Not 
by 
Span
dana
’ 
Y Intention-
to-treat; ex-
post survey 
will miss 
out-migrants 
who did not 
have access 
Y Y Y1 Y N Y Y Y N 
Selected 
hh knew 
of 
Spandana 
N 
Control 
areas 
knew of 
Spandana 
but future 
access not 
clear? 
Y 
Karlan and Zinman 
2008 
Random 
allocatio
n of 
marginall
y 
creditwo
rthy 
Y (but 
imperfec
t 
adherenc
e to 
treatmen
t) 
Y Y N Intention-
to-treat 
analysis But 
many not 
found 
(figure 1? 
@600? 
 Y Y Y Y N Y  Claims ‘double blind’ 
but low compliance 
suggests this is unlikely 
 
de Mel et al. 2009 Excluded because treatment is grants  
Duflo et al.  2008 Excluded because does not have impact – only access outcome variables  
Karlan and Zinman 
2010 
Similar to Philippines study, but excluded because of the context – urban SA is not a relevant domain.  
Gine and Karlan ? 
2008 or 2009 
Treatments are different contractual forms – ‘Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group 
liability from pre-existing groups & the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans.’ 
 
Field and Pande 
2008 
Ditto – ‘randomised client assignment to a weekly or monthly repayment schedule & find no significant effect of type of repayment schedule on client 
delinquency or default’ 
 
Dupas and 
Robinson 2009 
Random allocation of negative interest bank account – no impacts on well-being – assess impact on savings   
Table 10: Some Characteristics of RCT studies 
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Random selection:   are units of analysis (villages, enterprises, households, persons) randomly assigned to treatment/control 
Self-selection:  are units chosen by MFI or do they ‘volunteer’ or self-select? 
MFI selection:   does the MFI screen members or loans? 
Peer selection:   is the credit distributed with group liability or other group selection process? 
Drop-outs:   does the sample include drop-outs? (drop-outs are those who find microfinance is not for them or who fail in some way; they generally have not prospered) 
Graduates:   does the sample include members who have graduated? Graduates are usually successful clients who have repaid loans and prospered. 
Same population: is the control group chosen by the same process from the same population as the treatment group? In other words, is the sampling frame the 
same? 
Non-membership:  includes those who borrow and those who do not in the treatment group (equivalent to ‘intention-to-treat’. 
Same time:   are the control group selected into microfinance/chosen at the same time as the treatment group? Selection at a different time can lead to different people/units  
  being selected compared to those who would have been selected had the selection been at the same time as the treatment units were selected.  
Same recruitment process:  are the same procedures and conditions (and persons) used in the selection of control as treatment groups. Any deviation from the selection 
   practices applied to the treatment units lead to differences among the control group. 
Different area:   are control units from the same locations as treatment units?  
Matching of units:  treatment and control slums are matched on minimum distance by a set of variables or characteristics reported. 
Hawthorne:  are Hawthorne effects discussed? N means no discussion in paper. What about likelihood of these effects? One can speculate that news of impending 
   Spandana arrival spreads 
John Henry:       are John Henry effects discussed? 
Evidence of the impact of microfinance: a systematic review  
50 
 
Both RCTs test many outcome variables using more or less complex statistical 
approaches. We do not report the results in detail, but Table 11 indicates that 
most ‘impacts’ (positive or negative) are early on in the causal chain, i.e. in 
inputs or effects (as outlined in Figure 1). The effects are mainly in the first 
stage of the causal chain, i.e. inputs, and the estimates are mostly insignificant 
and if significant, frequently negative37 as well as positive. This is a different 
conclusion to that reached in, for example, The Economist Magazine (16 July 
2009), where it was suggested that these results indicate ‘overcoming the 
barriers posed by start up costs’ of small businesses, and that ‘there may well be 
some [beneficent effects on poverty] over a longer time-frame’. However, as 
also noted in Figure 1 businesses can make losses. For economic outcomes, there 
seem to be no impacts whatsoever. For social and empowerment outcomes, 
effects at the impact level are both positive and negative38, and almost evenly 
split between significant (up to 10% level) and non-significant. 
Table 11: Significance and sign of estimates by study, outcome variable and its 
location in causal chain (RCTs) 
Study 
Outcome 
category 
Location 
in causal 
chain 
Significance and sign 
Ns sig 
+ - total + - total 
Banerjee 
et al. 
(2009) 
Economic 
inputs  17 19 36 8 3 11 
effects 5 7 12 10 8 18 
impacts       
total 22 26 48 18 11 29 
Social 
inputs        
effects       
impacts 4 7 11 2 1 3 
total 4 7 11 2 1 3 
Empowerment 
inputs        
effects       
impacts 7 2 9 2  2 
total 7 2 9 2  2 
Karlan 
and 
Zinman 
(2010) 
Economic 
inputs  43 71 114 28 7 35 
effects 33 46 79 5 6 11 
impacts - - - - - - 
total 76 117 193 33 13 46 
Social 
inputs        
effects       
impacts 6 1 7 8  8 
total 6 1 7 8  8 
Empowerment 
inputs        
effects       
impacts 7 9 16 4 4  
total 7 9 16 4 4  
 
                                                 
37 Some of the negative coefficients are on consumption of the presumptively bad ‘temptation’ goods – 
tobacco, for example – and could be presumed ‘good’. However, if increased tobacco consumption reflects 
increased stress this might not be the case. 
38  For impacts on poverty the sign has been reversed so that reducing poverty is counted as a positive impact, 
while an increase in poverty is counted as a negative impact.  
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3.3 Pipelines 
A number of papers (see Table 12 and Appendix 11, section 6.11 for further 
details and summaries of key papers Appendix 15, sections 6.15.2 and 6.15.3) 
included in the stage 3 selection use a pipeline design without random allocation 
of units of study (individuals, households, or communities), and there are no 
such studies, although Banerjee et al. (2009) could have achieved this had their 
baseline survey been satisfactory. Hence, treatments are confounded with 
locations, and they face problems in dealing with differences in characteristics 
or experiences of different locations during the study period (as argued in the 
discussion of individual papers in Appendix 15 sections 6.15.2 and 6.15.3. It 
should be noted that although most studies report making considerable efforts to 
match treatment and control locations, by definition, it is not possible to match 
on unobservables. The very fact that treatment areas were chosen first means 
that they are likely to have different characteristics to locations chosen later 
(closer to (further from) metropolitan areas, and, or good communications; more 
(or less) commercialised; with/without existing MF interventions; and so on). 
Other inevitable differences include delay in treatment and information in 
control areas.  
Theoretically, more satisfactory studies include both treated and untreated units 
within both treatment and control areas, and have data in panel form from 
before any intervention and before the pipeline sample received any 
intervention; recruitment would take place at the same time and in identical 
ways. None of the pipeline studies achieved this design. Also, unfortunately, 
such a design is impossible because by its nature the pipeline sample will always 
have different interactions with researchers as they know that access to loans is 
delayed while the treated get earlier access. This may lead to behaviour by the 
pipeline sample which anticipates their future loan in some way, in ways that 
makes them different to the ideal counterfactual that would not have had 
reason to anticipate future loans from this source.  
None of the included studies can claim to approximate even the ideal of 
recruitment at the same time, in locations appropriately similar initially, with 
similar shocks over the research period, and have true panel data. Whether using 
control functions (which without the use of IV must be considered not to have 
addressed endogeneity issues), panel methods (with the possible exception of 
Steele et al. (2001), who apply the recommended Hausman type tests), or PSM 
with sensitivity analysis, the analytical methods used fall short of best practices. 
As a consequence, whatever significant impacts are found in these pipeline 
studies must be held to be vulnerable to unobservables.  
This is somewhat ironic as at least some pipeline studies have provided evidence 
that earlier microfinance evaluation impacts made by other methods have 
generally been overoptimistic about these impacts (Coleman 1999, 2005, 
Copestake 2001, 2002, 2005 and others). 
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Table 12: Pipeline studies without random allocation 
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Coleman1
999, 
2002, 
2006 
Classic pipeline 
with non-
participants in 
both 
N Y Y Y? N N Y Y? N N N N Y Y N  Y 
Loan size, 
wealth, assets, 
business , 
employment, 
expenditures  
Y Moder
ate 
Copestak
e  2001 
Pipeline & DID 
on growth of 
outcomes N Y Y Y N N  N N N 
Y – 
putati
vely? 
Not 
clear 
N – 
multivar
iate 
analysis 
 N  N 
Outreach & 
growth rates, & 
diversification, & 
household 
income growth 
N Moder
ate 
Copestak
e 2002 
Pipeline & DID 
N Y Y 
Y Village 
banking 
model 
N high 
replace
ment 
rate 
among 
survey 
respond
ents 
N N 
N since 
not 
same 
area– 
small 
business
es 
Y – but had 
high 
number of 
replaceme
nts 
 Y Y 
N 
multivar
iate 
analysis 
N N   
Household 
income & 
wellbeing 
 
Y Moder
ate 
Copestak
e et al. 
2005 
Non-clients & 
DID control 
function N Y Y 
N? 
‘Village 
banking’ 
N N Y Y? N N Y? Y? N Y N  Y 
Changes in sales, 
profits, family 
income & 
monthly per 
capita monthly 
income 
Y Moder
ate 
Cotler 
and 
Woodruff 
2008 
Pipeline, panel 
with non-
comparable 
control 
N Y Y N ? ? N   
No 
(83
8) 
- 
Y/N 
(838) Y Y N N  N 
Profits, 
revenues, 
inventories, 
assets 
Y Moder
ate 
Deininger 
and Liu 
2009 
Pipeline & PSM 
N Y Y Y N N  Y? N N Y? Y Y  Y N  
Empowerment 
variables, 
nutritional 
intake, income & 
N High 
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Treatment Pipeline    
expenditure, 
assets 
Kondo et 
al.– 
Philippin
es 2008 
Pipeline 
with/without; 
matched 
baranguays; 
control function 
DID 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y 
Y - 
see 
Cole
man 
Y but 
does not 
test 
between 
areas 
Y N  
 Income, 
expenditure, 
assets, health, 
education 
Y Moder
ate 
Montgom
ery – 
Pakistan 
2005 
Pipeline DID 
N Y Y  N N Y N N N ? Y ?    
 Consumption-
expenditure, 
health and 
education, 
agriculture & 
enterprises 
Y Moder
ate-
high 
Setboons
arng and 
Parpiev – 
Pakistan 
2008 
Pipeline with 
PSM & DID 
N Y Y  N N Y N N N Y N Y Y Y N 
 Outreach and 
many 
agriculture, 
enterprise, 
employment, 
income, 
expenditure & 
human capital 
Y Moder
ate 
Steele et 
al. 2001 
Pipeline panel  
fixed/random N Y Y Y N N N/Y39 Y N 
N 
 
Y? 
eligibi
lity 
Y Y Y N N/Y 
 Modern 
contraception 
Y 
(women’
s status) 
moder
ate 
Notes: Columns are as follows: 
Random selection:  Are units of analysis (villages, enterprises, households, persons) randomly assigned to treatment/control 
Random selection: are treated randomly allocated – not in these pipelines – only in potential case of  
Self-selection:  are units chosen by MFI or do they ‘volunteer’ or self-select? 
MFI selection:  Does the MFI screen members or loans? 
Peer selection:  is the credit distributed with group liability or other group selection process? 
Drop-outs:  does the sample include drop-outs? (drop-outs are those who find microfinance is not for them or who fail in some way; they generally have not prospered) 
Graduates: does the sample include members who have graduated? Graduates are usually successful clients who have repaid loans and prospered. 
Non-participants: does the sample (treatment or controls) include non-participants? 
Same population:  is the control group chosen by the same process from the same population as the treatment group? In other words, is the sampling frame the same? 
Same time: are the control group selected into microfinance/chosen at the same time as the treatment group?  
Same recruitment process:  are the same procedures and conditions (and persons) used in the selection of control as treatment groups. 
Different area:   are treatment and control groups are chosen from different sets of geographical units of the same overall population domains and if so are they 
  random?  
                                                 
39 See Appendix 12.15.3.1: there were three areas – old, new (expansion) and control. There were no non-participants in the ‘old’ area, but there are eligible non-members in the new and control areas. 
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Matching information: is there information about the similarity of treatment and control samples? 
PSM:  is propensity score matching conducted? 
Sensitivity analysis: is sensitivity analysis conducted? 
Ex-post comparison:  evaluation when project is mature 
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Table 13: Significance and sign of estimates by outcome variable and its 
location in causal chain (pipelines) 
Outcome 
category 
Location in 
causal chain 
Sign & significance 
ns sig 
+ - total + - total 
Economic 
inputs 70 41 112 20 13 33 
effects 143 94 238 77 38 115 
impacts 8 2 10 27  27 
total 221 137 360 124 51 175 
Social 
inputs 12 7 19 5  5 
effects       
impacts 57 65 122 10 6 16 
total 69 72 141 15 6 21 
Empowerment 
inputs       
effects       
impacts 8 11 20 11 1 12 
total 8 11 20 11 1 12 
 
As in the case of RCTs, in Table 13 most effects occur in the early stages of the 
causal chain (as outlined in Figure 1) and not when significant estimates 
predominate. There are quite a number of impact estimates on outcomes more 
representative of welfare itself rather than putative means to welfare, however, 
the vast majority are not statistically significant. This supports arguments 
presented in this review so far, and further questions the apparent reasons for 
widespread perceptions of the success of microfinance. 
Apart from Deininger and Liu’s (2009) study, few of the pipeline studies have 
suggested strong positive impacts of microfinance, despite the large number of 
outcome variables tested, and different econometric specifications used (giving 
rise to a very large number of estimated impacts for assessment). Notably, the 
Deininger and Liu (2009) study has the highest vulnerability to bias, in large part 
because of the manifest difference in treatment and control locations; this 
repeats earlier findings from the medical literature that it is the studies with the 
weakest designs that tend to give the largest impacts. We would have preferred 
not to have included this study; it is included because there are unclear criteria 
in its research design or analytical procedures to distinguishing it from other 
pipeline studies40. Most of the negative and significant variables relate to inputs 
or effects of loans rather than well-being outcomes. Since no necessary 
connection can be claimed between business activities and well-being outcomes, 
and there are considerable difficulties in establishing business profits as opposed 
to business activities (de Mel et al. 2009), little could be inferred from these 
results. 
                                                 
40 Within the health field many systematic reviewers and practitioners have accepted the hierarchy of 
evidence, and as a result accept that it makes sense to base clinical and policy decisions on the highest level of 
evidence available (Higgins and Greene 2008). In the area of development research it appears that this 
hierarchy of evidence is less discussed, less explored and less agreed.  In the absence of this clear model of 
validity of different study methodologies, and with a paucity of evidence from the highest levels of evidence, 
it feels very difficult for new systematic reviewers to exclude studies from lower down the evidence hierarchy, 
especially when these are some of the very studies valued by the scientific community, regularly discussed and 
quoted as addressing important issues. This can lead to new reviewers wanting to include a wider selection of 
studies than they are capable of fully data-extracting, assessing for validity and reporting (given the time and 
funding provided for their review), making systematic reviewing a much bigger and more complicated job and 
making the conclusions harder to identify (Hooper, personal communication, 23 January 2011). 
Evidence of the impact of microfinance: a systematic review  
56 
 
3.3.1 Conclusion of pipeline studies  
Coleman’s (1999) influential study has been followed by a number of studies 
employing pipeline designs. Colman’s study has been noted in the literature as 
failing to provide strong evidence in support of the beneficence of microfinance 
for the poorer members of society; it found that benefits from microfinance 
were low and not much different to those from other borrowing sources, and to 
the extent that there were positive outcomes they were among the better off.  
Coleman warned that the area of Thailand in which the study was conducted 
might not be considered representative of the purported targets of microfinance 
in poorer countries; Thailand is a relatively high-income developing country and 
not particularly credit constrained. Coleman’s study is notable for the very large 
number of variables assessed, and the relatively unsophisticated econometric 
analyses conducted. The latter characteristic is repeated in many of the 
subsequent pipeline designs, using basic DID estimations without many control 
variables or two-stage estimations, even thought a prior study using a very 
similar design by Steele et al (2001) (originally 1998), used more sophisticated 
methods. In the case of the latter study, with the exception of one area which 
was likely highly untypical, the results were also not significantly positive for the 
impact of microfinance on modern contraceptive adoption.  
PSM has been applied by one recent study (Setboonsarng and Parpiev 2008) to 
pipeline data in the expectation that this would provide robustness to DID 
estimates; this somewhat illusory since in this case, all that occurs is a sub-
setting of the control and treatment cases to the common support region. That 
is, with existing survey data produced from specific sampling of treatment and 
control groups, some cases, especially of controls, are dropped because they 
appear quite dissimilar to treatment cases. This may increase statistical 
precision, but at the cost of the variability that may be the loss of an important 
part of the data. No sensitivity analysis of the PSM result is conducted, further 
reducing the merits of this approach. PSM may be better used when there are 
other sources of data which may yield plausible control cases, as in Dehejia and 
Wahba (1999). 
As our data extraction shows, pipeline studies have on the whole come to similar 
conclusions to Coleman, namely that microfinance has little or no statistically 
significant effect on well-being outcomes measured, even when there are 
positive and significant effects on variables such as borrowing and business 
activities. Several of these studies confirm that participants in microfinance are 
not among the poorest, and indeed some of the studies should perhaps have 
been excluded on these grounds. As an oeuvre these studies therefore fail to 
lend support to claims of beneficence of microfinance. The findings of the 
Deininger and Liu (2009) study are insufficiently reliable to warrant further 
examination. 
The question arises, however, whether this finding reflects issues in the 
implementation of the studies – their geographical location and sampling units 
(for example micro-enterprises, or not the poorest households) – or their 
research design and its implantation, i.e. raising issues about the pipeline design 
itself. This design is attractive if only for ethical reasons that it does not entail 
denying poor people potential access to what might be a beneficial resource, 
that is discriminating against some. However, by its nature, and because of 
graduation, drop-outs, and spill-overs, the design has limitations to the gap in 
time between treatment in treatment areas then in pipeline areas means that 
there is only a small window of time within which the two groups can be 
considered differently treated. This will limit impacts to the relatively short 
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term, and as noted above, it is likely that many social impacts may only be 
manifest in the longer term. 
Identifying early indicators of later success41 could be suggested, but is a 
problematic area; structural modelling approaches may prove useful - but the 
assessment of these is outside the purview of this report.  
The majority of included studies in this SR apply a basic with/without design 
(see papers referred to in Table 14). This design itself is problematic as 
discussed elsewhere (see section 2.2.2, Table 2 and Appendix 7, section 6.7.1.3) 
mainly due to selection and programme placement bias. Various econometric 
techniques are available to deal with these biases but have shortcomings in one 
way or another. 
Table 14 (with more details in Appendix 12 and 13, sections 6.12 and 6.13) 
provides a summary of the key characteristics of the with/without, before/after 
and non-pipeline panel studies included in this SR which made the cut-off point 
of the final (stage 3) scoring scheme, i.e. they have a score of < 2. It can be 
seen from the table that selection bias prevails in most studies, and hence 
advanced econometric techniques are often employed to control for selection 
bias, but with limited success as discussed further below. 
 
3.4 With/without, before/after and panel 
This section is organised as follows, we first discuss two iconic studies in depth: 
PnK and USAID, since these two studies have not only generated more than half 
of all microfinance IEs which survived to stage 3 (29 out of 58), but are also 
considered to be particularly influential evaluations in the context of 
microfinance and are widely quoted in support of the presumptive beneficence 
of microfinance. We closely examine these studies to illustrate the problems of 
with/without studies using advanced econometric methods (IV and panel 
techniques). We show that the more recently popular PSM method applied to 
these data does not overcome these limitations. To some extent limitations 
derive from the designs actually used in these studies. We then discuss the 
remaining with/without studies and focus on those that applied two-stage 
methods (including most significantly IV) and PSM. 
                                                 
41 For example, the attempt to draw ‘Late lessons from early warnings’ as advocates of the precautionary 
principle suggest (Harremoës et al. 2001), as well as other searches for early signs of later values.  
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Table 14: Summary of studies using with/without, before/after and panel design 
Study Treatment Control 
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Abera 2010 with/without within 
community - panel 
PSM, panel data 
analysis 
Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear N N Y Y Unclear 
Abou-Ali et al. 
2010 
with/without PSM Y Unclear Unclear Unclear N Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear 
Bhuiya and 
Chowdhury 2002 
with/without – 
before/after 
Multivariate N Y Y Y N N Unclear Unclear Unclear 
Cuong 2008 panel IV, panel data 
analysis 
Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Unclear 
Diagne and Zeller 
2001 
with/without Two-stage LIML Random within stratum Y Unclear Y Unclear Random within 
stratum 
Y Unclear Unclear 
Imai et al. 2010 with/without PSM Random within stratum Y Unclear Y Y, sampled but 
unclear how that 
sample was used 
Random within 
stratum 
Y N N 
Imai and Azam 
2010 
panel PSM, panel data 
analysis 
Random within stratum 
on village level 
Y Unclear Unclear Unclear Random within 
stratum on village 
level 
Y Y N 
PnK1 with/without - panel ML-IV, PSM, cmp, 
panel data analysis 
Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N 
Shimamura and 
Lastarria-Cornhiel 
2010 
with/without IV Paired-site sampling Y Unclear Y N Paired-site sampling Y Y N 
Shirazi and Khan 
2009 
with/without – 
before/after 
DID Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear N Unclear Y Unclear Unclear 
Swain and 
Wallentin 2009 
with/without – panel 
by recall 
RML (robust 
maximum likelihood) 
method 
Y Y Unclear Y N Unclear Y Unclear N 
Takahashi et al. 
2010 
b/a PSM, DID N Y Y Y Y N on village level but 
Y within villages 
Y Y Y 
Tesfay 2009 panel Panel data analysis Y Y Unclear Y N Y Y Y N 
USAID2 w/wo - panel ANOVA, ANCOVA, Y Y Y N Y – by some papers Y Y N N 
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PSM, panel data 
analysis 
Zaman 1999 w/wo Two-stage Heckman Unclear Y Y Y N Unclear Y N N 
Zeller et al. 2001 w/wo IV Y at village level and 
within stratum at 
household level 
Y Unclear Y Y, briefly discussed Y at village level & 
within stratum at 
household level 
Y N N 
Notes: 
1. Papers dealing with PnK data include: Chemin (2008), Duvendack (2010b), Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011), Khandker (1996, 2000, 2005), Khandker and Latif (1996), Khandker et al. (1998), Latif (1994), 
McKernan (2002), Menon (2006), Morduch (1998), Nanda (1999), Pitt (1999, 2000), Pitt et al (1999, 2003), Pitt and Khandker (1998), Pitt et al. (2006), Roodman and Morduch (2009). 
2. Papers dealing with USAID data include: Augsburg (2006), Barnes (2001), Chen and Snodgrass (1999 and 2001), Dunn (1999), Dunn and Arbuckle (2001), Duvendack (2010a and 2010b), Tedeschi (2008), 
Tedeschi and Karlan (2010). 
Explanation of column headings: 
Design:   what research design 
Method:   what statistical/econometric method 
Random selection sample: are units randomly sampled  
Self-selection:   have individuals/households self-selected into microfinance 
MFI selection:   does the MFI exercise control over selection of treated units (i.e. into treatment – not into sample) 
Peer selection:   do peers play role in selection of treated units 
Drop-out and/or graduate:  are dropouts and graduates included in treatment sample 
Random selection:  are controls randomly allocated to control – i.e. self selected not to be treated 
Same time:   are controls selected at same time as treatment 
Different area:   do the controls come from the same geographical domain as treatment.  
Control larger than treatment:  adequate sample size for matching 
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Table 15: Significance and sign of estimates of with/without papers by 
outcome variable and its location in causal chain using IV methods 
Outcome 
category 
Location 
in causal 
chain 
Sign & significance 
ns sig 
+ - total + - total 
Economic 
inputs       
effect  17 16 33 31 10 41 
impacts 13 13 26 46 35 81 
total 30 29 59 77 45 122 
Social 
inputs       
effects       
impacts 9 5 14  6 6 
total 9 5 14  6 6 
Empowerment 
inputs       
effects       
impacts 13 1 14  8 8 
total 13 1 14  8 8 
 
As opposed to the results presented in Tables 11 and Table 13, Table 15, which 
summarises the IV studies (excluding PnK and the remaining with/without 
studies), assesses a higher proportion of effects that occur later in the causal 
chain, i.e. at the impact stage, and few at the imput stage. Economic outcomes 
are frequently estimated to be statistically significant by the IV method, but 
rather more likely to be negative than positive. The ‘impacts’ on social and 
empowerment outcomes are less likely to be significant and as if not more likely 
to be negative as the economic impacts (recall that we have reversed the sign of 
impacts on poverty indicators so that an estimated fall in poverty appears as a 
positive sign in this table).  
3.4.1 PnK studies (Bangladesh) 
The study conducted by PnK uses cross-sectional data from a World Bank funded 
study which conducted a survey in 1991-2 on three leading microfinance group-
lending programmes in Bangladesh, namely GB, BRAC and BRDB (PnK p959). 
According to Morduch, at the time these three programmes catered to more 
than four million microfinance clients in Bangladesh (p2). A quasi-experimental 
design was used which sampled target (having a choice to participate/eligible) 
and non-target households (having no choice to participate/not eligible) from 
villages with microfinance programme (treatment villages) and non-programme 
villages (control villages).  
The survey was conducted in 87 villages in rural Bangladesh; 1,798 households 
were selected out of which 1,538 were target households (eligible42) and 260 
were non-target households (not eligible). According to PnK, out of those 1,538 
households, 905 effectively participated in microfinance (59%). Data were 
collected three times in the 1991-2 period in order to account for seasonal 
variations, i.e. various rice harvest seasons exist, namely Aman (November - 
February) which is the peak season, Boro (March - June) and Aus (July - October) 
which is the lean season (Khandker 2005 – henceforth Khandker p271). The study 
focuses on measuring the impact of microfinance participation by gender on 
                                                 
42 Eligibility criteria are subject to debate. PnK deem any household with landholdings of less than 0.5 acres 
eligible. 
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indicators such as labour supply, school enrolment, expenditure per capita and 
non-land assets. PnK find that microcredit has significant positive impacts on 
many of those indicators and find larger positive impacts when women are 
involved in borrowing.  
Further to this, Khandker investigated the long-term impact of microcredit and 
re-surveyed the same households as in the original PnK study in 1998-9. In 
addition, the follow-up survey  
also added new households from the original villages, new villages in the 
original thanas, and three new thanas, raising the number of sample 
households to 2,599 (Khandker p271).  
Khandker argued that cross-sectional data only allows the measurement of short-
term impacts of microcredit and that this is short-lived. Hence, he further 
argued that a panel data set is needed to gauge long-term impacts of 
microcredit programmes, because it allows control of unobservables. Based on 
the panel data analysis Khandker found that microfinance benefits the poorest 
and has sustainable impacts on poverty reduction among programme 
participants. In addition, positive spill-over effects were observed such as a 
reduction in poverty at the village level.  
A number of studies, e.g. Morduch ((1998), henceforth Morduch) and RnM, have 
made an attempt to replicate the findings of the original PnK study, and Chemin 
((2008), henceforth Chemin) has applied PSM, but with rather contradictory 
results. Morduch found hardly any impact, Pitt ((1999), henceforth Pitt) 
defended the original claims, but Chemin and RnM found rather negligible 
impacts of microcredit. Duvendack (2010b) and Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 
(2011) replicated the key studies related to PnK and applied PSM as well as 
sensitivity analysis concluding that PnK’s original findings cannot be confirmed. 
It is beyond the scope of this report to discuss the drawbacks of the main studies 
involved in the re-examination of PnK in depth and the interested reader is 
referred to Duvendack (2010b) for a detailed discussion of this topic.  
To conclude, the replication of PnK and associated studies posed a challenge due 
to the complex research design and poor documentation. All studies that dealt 
with the PnK data, i.e. Morduch, Chemin, RnM, Duvendack (2010b) and 
Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011), agree that PnK overstate the impacts of 
microcredit. PnK estimated positive and significant impacts for literally all of 
the six outcome variables with stronger impacts when women were involved in 
microcredit (PnK p987-988). Morduch argues that PnK overestimated the impact 
of microcredit because the eligibility criteria were not strictly enforced, i.e. he 
cannot support PnK’s claims that microcredit increases per capita expenditure, 
school enrolment for children (Morduch p30) or labour supply. Chemin finds 
lower impact estimates than PnK, though for half of the outcome variables, such 
as male labour supply and children’s school enrolment, he finds a significantly 
positive impact which contradicts Morduch’s findings. Doubts about both 
Morduch and Chemin arise because of problems in replicating their data 
constructions. RnM’s and Duvendack’s (2010b) findings are mixed and mostly 
insignificant. The reasons for these discrepancies across studies can be explained 
by shortcomings in the empirical strategy that PnK put forward, e.g. the 
application of eligibility criteria was not strictly enforced, hence, a problem 
with mistargeting occurred. 
Moreover, the studies by PnK, Morduch, Chemin and RnM neglect the role of 
multiple sources of borrowing which has implications for the nature of the 
control group (i.e. whether it is appropriate), the accuracy of the impact 
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estimates as well as the appropriate definition of the counterfactual. As a 
result, Duvendack (2010b) and Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011) proposed 
novel treatment group comparisons to examine the impacts found using these 
more appropriate, and homogeneous, control groups. This strategy found mixed 
results when comparing microcredit participation with participation in other 
non-microcredit schemes, and so there is no clear evidence for or against 
microcredit as such. However, it appears that the utilisation of finance in 
general has significantly positive impacts across all outcome variables and 
indicates that other sources of finance can be as effective as microcredit. Many 
practitioners agree that individuals essentially need to borrow from multiple 
sources to obtain sufficient funds that would allow them to engage in more 
productive activities. Many microcredit loans are often too small to meet the 
needs of microentrepreneurs (Venkata and Yamini 2010). In addition, multiple 
sources of borrowing are often required to smooth income and consumption 
patterns as well as to cope with emergencies (Venkata and Yamini 2010). 
Moreover, Coleman (1999), Fernando (1997) and Venkata and Yamini (2010) find 
that it is common for individuals to use borrowing from one source to pay off the 
loans of another on time. Overall, criticisms of the more strident and unqualified 
claims about microfinance are becoming more common and further 
investigations as to the impact of microcredit versus other financial tools should 
be encouraged, i.e. using RCTs or carefully designed observational studies that 
allow the collection of rich and high quality datasets. 
According to Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2010), Morduch and RnM, PnK’s 
‘econometric set-up [here] is not up to the task. We need to look elsewhere for 
reliable evidence’ (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2010, p290). 
Furthermore, the re-analysis of PnK using PSM has raised doubts about the 
appropriateness of PSM in the context of PnK (see Chemin; Duvendack 2010b; 
Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 2011). There are often too few matches of low 
quality due to a small control group sample size; this adversely affects the 
reliability of the matching estimates. Rich, high quality and large data sets are 
needed which ideally contain more control than treatment observations (Smith 
and Todd 2005). Moreover, Duvendack (2010b) and Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 
(2011) apply sensitivity analysis which indicates that it is not unlikely that 
unobservables could result in over- or underestimating the impact of 
microcredit.  
As to the panel data analysis, Khandker and RnM argued that longitudinal studies 
remedy the shortcomings of cross-sectional studies but this appears not always 
to be the case. The panel data results of the random effects model did not 
provide any new insights and generally confirmed the findings of the cross-
section data analysis (Duvendack 2010b). Khandker, Koolwal and Samad (2010) 
among others, claim that the combination of PSM and DID is the way forward 
since it allows controlling for observable as well as unobservable characteristics 
assuming that the latter remain constant over time (as mentioned above). 
However, the results of the PSM/DID model did not offer anything different to 
what was found by the random effects model. As in the case of the USAID studies 
(discussed below), doubts are raised about the ability of techniques such as PSM 
and DID to account for selection on unobservables with the PnK data perhaps 
because it is not a ‘true’ panel which would allow a before/after comparison 
with a more demonstrably appropriate control group. What is compared is the 
change in outcomes between a group that was already participating in 
microfinance during the baseline and a control group surveyed at the same time, 
with both groups at a later date. This comparison is not adequate for reliably 
assessing the impact of microcredit and controlling for unobservables because 
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any differences between the treatment and control groups before microfinance 
cannot be empirically observed in these data.  
Overall, what can be learnt? The results provided by the numerous studies 
dealing with the PnK data are rather mixed ranging from significantly positive 
impacts to significantly negative ones depending on the econometric techniques 
applied. However, Morduch, Chemin, RnM, Duvendack (2010b) and Duvendack 
and Palmer-Jones (2011) agree that PnK and Khandker most likely overstated 
their impact estimates and the replication of their original findings is 
challenging43. Thus, methodological problems still remain particularly selection 
bias due to unobservable characteristics, inappropriate counterfactuals, and 
poor data quality as well as control groups that are contaminated and limited in 
size. In particular the control group is far too small to provide convincing 
matches, which hampers the usefulness of PSM in the context of PnK.  
To sum up, poor quality data, poor research design and possibly inappropriately 
implemented econometric techniques fail to illuminate the role of the 
unobservables. Sensitivity analysis of the matching results indicated that the 
unobservables could readily confound impact estimates which are demonstrated 
to be not robust to unobservables (Duvendack 2010b, Duvendack and Palmer-
Jones 2011). 
Table 16 presents the results of all PnK studies and supports evidence presented 
in Tables 11 and Table 13; not only are the outcomes for which estimates are 
provided ones which occur early on in the causal chain, predominantely at the 
‘effects’ stage in this case, but also while the effects are mainly positive, the 
majority are not statistically significant. This follows from the discussion above, 
namely that Chemin, RnM, Duvendack (2010b) and Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 
(2011) have cast doubts about the reliability of these estimates because of 
methodological flaws of the PnK study, and as replication has shown that the 
original authors seem to have overestimated the results that can be produced 
from the data of this study. 
Table 16: Significance and sign of estimates by outcome variable and its 
location in causal chain (PnK) 
Outcome 
category 
Location 
in causal 
chain 
Sign & significance 
Ns sig 
+ - total + - total 
Economic 
inputs 63 57 120 68 47 115 
effects 111 107 218 193 39 232 
impacts  8 8    
total 174 172 346 261 86 347 
Social 
inputs       
effects  1 1    
impacts 66 26 92 55 5 60 
total 66 27 93 55 5 60 
Empowerment 
inputs       
effects       
impacts 25 32 57 63 6 69 
total 25 32 57 63 6 69 
 
                                                 
43 Thus Pitt (2011) challenges RnM (2009) on the grounds that they make a logical and a coding error in their 
replication, but these errors do not apply to Duvendack (2010b) and Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011) who 
use a different analytical method.   
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Note that, largely because of the failure to replicate the results of the earlier 
study, and the generally much less positive results that have emerged from 
replications of the PnK study that have been undertaken, we decided that it was 
beyond the scope of this section to review the results of other included papers 
based on the PnK dataset until they have been replicated. The interested reader 
is referred to Appendix 17, section 6.17. 
3.4.2 USAID studies (Peru, India, Zimbabwe) 
These three longitudinal studies aim to evaluate the impact of microfinance on 
poor people; USAID produced three panel datasets, each with two waves in the 
late 1990s 2-3 years apart. The studies seem to have employed a common 
dataset and the panels seem to contain the same or very similar variables, hence 
we only discuss USAID’s India study as an example. The Indian study was on the 
microfinance operations of a well known NGO - the Self Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) – based in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, in western India. There are 
data at the individual, household and enterprise levels which can be used for 
panel difference in difference and PSM estimation of impact (Duvendack, 
2010a). The problems encountered in these three IEs are similar to those 
encountered in PnK. There are doubts about the robustness of the USAID 
sampling procedure of the control groups. Taking the example of the USAID 
study on SEWA Bank, Chen and Snodgrass (2001) argue that the neighbourhoods 
where most of SEWA Bank’s clients reside are reasonably homogeneous in terms 
of caste, occupation and class (p53) and hence the control group is relatively 
similar to the treatment group. However, if the households in the control group 
are so similar, then why are they not clients of SEWA Bank? This question points 
towards a selection process that is driven by unobservable characteristics which 
account for why otherwise apparently eligible households did not belong to 
SEWA Bank. As a consequence, the control group sampling of USAID does not 
convince. Chen and Snodgrass (2001) admit that SEWA Bank members 
are not chosen at random but are in fact purposefully selected from a 
larger population, both by themselves and by SEWA Bank. A woman must 
first self-select by deciding to open a savings account and later to apply 
for a loan. Once she does so, SEWA Bank decides whether to provide her 
with the financial service in question (p60).   
The headline findings of the USAID study provide evidence that microfinance 
leads to changes at the household level, i.e. higher household income in terms 
of total income and per capita income was observed. In addition, minor positive 
impacts could be observed on income diversification, food expenditure and the 
ability to cope with shocks. However, the evidence was rather mixed. Moreover, 
impact at the enterprise and individual levels were negligible. Chen and 
Snodgrass (2001) admit that measuring impacts at the enterprise and individual 
levels were rather challenging due to the fact that SEWA Bank clients are not 
classical micro-entrepreneurs per se. Most clients do not have microenterprises 
but are dependent sub-contractors or labourers, thus do not require 
microenterprise capital. SEWA Bank provides loans for a range of purpose, e.g. 
business, housing improvements/repairs, repayment of other debts and 
consumption but without a particular focus on microenterprise development.  
Augsburg (2006) and Duvendack (2010a) re-visit the evidence of the USAID SEWA 
Bank panel dataset and subject it to PSM and DID to account for selection bias. 
The results presented by these two studies broadly confirm the findings of the 
USAID study if one ignores selection on unobservables. However, doubts remain 
as there are strong qualitative (see for example Ito 2003) and theoretical 
reasons to think that unobservables have not been fully controlled for, as argued 
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by Duvendack (2010a). This is not too surprising at least in the case of PSM since 
its drawbacks are well-known although still debated (see debates between 
Dehejia and Wahba 1999, Smith and Todd, 2005). This notion is confirmed by the 
sensitivity analysis which shows that SEWA Bank’s matching estimates are quite 
sensitive to selection on unobservables (Duvendack 2010a). Also, the quality of 
the matches is doubtful, considering PSM requires rich and large datasets in 
order to function properly (Heckman et al. 1997, Heckman et al. 1998, Smith 
and Todd 2005). Moreover, the panel does not resolve the issue because it is not 
a ‘true’ panel (it does not allow a before/after comparison), and, even if it 
were, might not control for the effects of unobservables. Microfinance clients 
might have been better off than non-clients even before participating in 
microfinance, i.e. in terms of access to social networks, wealth, skills or 
motivations (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2010). This may in turn have led 
them to self-select or to be selected into microfinance either by their peers or 
the staff of the microfinance organisation, and to be able to benefit more from 
membership than otherwise observationally similar households. The re-
investigation of USAID’s SEWA Bank study and PnK provides evidence that 
reduces the credibility of the quantitative support for microfinance and for 
lending to women in general. Furthermore, qualitative evidence (Fernando 1997) 
strongly suggests other less beneficent interpretations leading to an unraveling 
of the microfinance narrative. 
We do not provide a separate table for the USAID studies on the significance and 
sign of the estimates by outcome variable and its location in the causal chain 
due to the sheer number of estimates provided by the USAID studies; we could 
not extract all to our database due to time and budget constraints. 
3.4.3 Other with/without studies 
First we discuss in general terms the characteristics of the papers which have 
applied PSM, IV, panel and other methods of analysis to with/without and panel 
studies. Summaries of selected individual papers can be found in Appendix 15, 
sections 6.15.5 and 6.15.6 with summaries of key characteristics in Appendix 12 
and 13, sections 6.12 and 6.13, to allow an assessment of their reliability and 
the impacts that can be drawn from them. 
The studies in Appendix 12 all use a two-stage approach in common; using IV, 
Heckman or LIML models which all require the selection of appropriate 
identification variables(s) commonly termed instruments. The two-stage 
methods applied to cross-sectional data (as also when applied to panel data) 
may be able to address some endogeneity and selection bias problems, but are 
crucially dependent on the availability of appropriate instruments. As discussed 
earlier, tests for assessing the validity of instruments can be made (e.g. Sargan-
Hansen and Hausman tests), but not all studies report these tests (see Appendix 
12 for a two-stage checklist).  
Almost all of the studies in Appendix 12 are classified as having a high risk of 
bias since they have not sufficiently demonstrated the validity of their 
instruments using the various tests available and even if they have, doubts 
remain about the trustworthiness of these tests as argued by Deaton (2010).  
The study by Cuong (2008) is the only one that is classified as moderate but only 
because it is a panel - the drawbacks of panels are discussed above and below. 
Ideally, to fully understand the studies listed in Appendix 12 and to verify their 
findings, they should be replicated. However, given the time and budget 
constraints of this SR and availability of data, it is beyond the scope of this study 
to attempt any replications. 
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Table 17: Significance and sign of estimates by outcome variable and its 
location in causal chain (other with/without studies) 
Outcome 
category 
Location in 
causal chain 
Sign & significance 
Ns sig 
+ - total + - total 
Economic 
inputs 1 1 2 3  3 
effects  53 43 96 125 16 141 
impacts 6  6 11 7 18 
total 60 44 104 139 23 162 
Social 
inputs       
effects       
impacts  12 14 26 4 4 8 
total 12 14 26 4 4 8 
Empowerment 
inputs       
effects       
impacts        
total       
 
Table 17 summarises the directions and significances of the various outcomes of 
the other remaining (other than PnK and USAID) with/without studies by their 
location in the causal chain. As before, the majority of outcomes tested are 
early on in this chain, at the ‘effects’ stage, with a majority of significant and 
positive results. However, as we have indicated earlier, with/without designs 
can be problematic due to selection bias and limitations of the analytical 
methods commonly used to control for it. These methods have shortcomings; 
hence caution is required as to the trustworthiness of these results – a brief 
discussion of the pros and cons of the various techniques commonly used in the 
context of with/without studies follows below. We note that it is not unusual for 
the methodologically weaker papers to find more positive and significant results 
(Schulz et al. 1995), and it seems not unreasonable to apply this insight to these 
studies.  
Since IV approaches are not free from controversy, many researchers advocate 
the use of panel data to deal with selection bias, since unobserved unit level 
confounders can be swept out of the analysis by differencing. Analysis of fixed or 
random effects models can test whether unobservables are likely to bias 
estimated coefficients. However, panels have shortcomings too as seen in the 
case of PnK and USAID; panel datasets require a ‘true’ baseline, i.e. the 
respondents should not have been microfinance participants at the time of the 
collection of the baseline dataset, which in the instance of most of the panel 
studies included in this section (e.g. PnK (Khandker. 2005), USAID, Abera 2010, 
Cuong 2008, Imai and Azam 2010, Tesfay 2009, Swain and Wallentin 2009 which 
established a panel by recall method) is not the case. In most of panel datasets 
the baseline included participants who had already been members of a 
microfinance programme for some years, and consequently cannot be shown to 
be indistinguishable from the control group. Moreover, it is assumed that the 
unobservables are time-invariant (as argued by Cuong 2008 for example), and 
that observables do not have diverse time varying effects. However, these 
assumptions usually do not hold and the changing nature of the unobservables 
cannot be accommodated by fixed or random effects models, and some studies 
do not include these analyses.  
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More recently, PSM has increasingly been used in the context of microfinance IEs 
(examples include Abera 2010, Abou-Ali et al. 2010, Imai et al. 2010, PnK (the 
Chemin and Duvendack papers) and USAID (the Augsburg and Duvendack papers) 
and Takahashi et al. 2010). However, PSM is not the wondrous tool advocated by 
many and researchers must follow certain procedures to ensure their matching 
estimates are robust, e.g. they must assess the quality of their matches amongst 
other things (see Appendix 13, section 6.13 for a PSM checklist). Caliendo and 
Kopeinig (2005, 2008) briefly outline the various procedures that are available to 
assess matching quality, e.g. t-tests and stratification tests to investigate 
whether the mean outcome values for both treatment and control groups are 
significantly different from each other. Only in the PnK, USAID and Takahashi et 
al. (2010) studies is matching quality assessed. One way to improve matching 
quality is to have more control than treatment households as well as reasonably 
homogenous groups, a requirement that only the study by Takahashi et al. 
(2010) fulfils (see Table 14 (last column) and Appendix 13).  
Furthermore, Dehejia (2005) points out that the correct specification of the 
propensity score is crucial, i.e. the balancing properties of the propensity score 
should be satisfied. Appendix 13 shows that 5 of 7 studies have given evidence 
on whether there were good quality, balanced44 covariates characterising 
participation. As discussed earlier, by itself PSM provides little information on 
the robustness of the estimates such as provided by confidence intervals in 
standard statistical estimation; hence sensitivity analysis should be applied since 
it can provide some (contested) evidence on robustness – as advocated by 
Rosenbaum (2002), Becker and Caliendo (2007), Ichino et al. (2006) and 
Nannicini (2007).  
Appendix 13 shows that none of the microfinance studies that applied PSM (e.g. 
Abera 2010, Abou-Ali et al. 2010, Augsburg 2006, Chemin 2008, Deininger and Liu 
2009, Imai et al. 2010, Imai and Azam, 2010; Setboonsarng and Parpiev, 2008; 
and Takahashi et al. 2010) used sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of 
their matching estimates and hence the risk of bias for most of them is high. 
Exceptions in this regard are the studies by Duvendack (2010a, 2010b), 
Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011) and Abou-Ali et al. (2010), but Abou-Ali et 
al’s interpretation of sensitivity analysis is flawed and they do not assess the 
sensitivity of their microfinance results (discussed in more detail in Appendix 15, 
section 6.15.5.1. 
The studies by Bhuiya and Chowdhury (2002) and Shirazi and Khan (2009) are the 
only two remaining with/without studies that do not use two-stage or PSM 
techniques but rather basic methods of analysis, such as OLS multivariate 
analysis and DID with non-comparable control groups without control functions, 
which do not overcome the problems that commonly plague with/without 
studies. Hence, these two studies do not really warrant further discussion here.  
3.4.4 Conclusion of with/without studies 
The majority of microfinance IEs were applying a with/without design but this is 
gradually changing and pipeline studies as well as RCTs are slowly taking centre 
stage. These developments are hardly surprising due to the challenges of 
conducting with/without studies, i.e. the presence of placement and selection 
bias. Placement and selection biases can partially be mitigated by having a 
sound research design (e.g. appropriate control groups, inclusion of drop-outs – 
as outlined in Table 14) and applying sophisticated econometric methods such as 
PSM, IV, fixed and random effect estimations, etc.  
                                                 
44 I.e. the characteristics of the covariates of treatment and control samples should have similar distributions. 
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The with/without studies we include in this SR, listed in Table 14, investigated a 
wide range of outcome variables providing rather mixed results from 
significantly positive to significantly negative - thus it is difficult to find a 
common thread. As outlined in Appendices 12 and 13, section 6.12 and 6.13, 
most studies are classified as having a high risk of bias. In the case of two-stage 
studies this is because they either did not test the validity of their instruments, 
or doubts about the rigor with which these tests were conducted remain. The 
majority of the PSM studies classified as having a high risk of bias did not 
sufficiently demonstrate high matching quality and/or did not apply sensitivity 
analysis, hence we assume that selection bias has not been accounted for. Panel 
studies in combination with either PSM, IV or DID have all been categorised as 
having a moderate risk of bias mainly because of the assumption that 
unobservables are time invariant and can therefore be accounted for by panel 
data techniques and that observables were controlled for through IV or PSM. 
However, doubts remain about the validity of panel studies presented here due 
to a lack of ‘true’ baselines, and doubts about the assumption that the 
unobservables are time invariant. Hence, a healthy scepticism about the 
reliability of results of with/without studies included here is in order, precisely 
because of the problems that commonly plague them. 
The discussion earlier has stressed that various analytical methods that attempt 
to correct placement and selection bias have drawbacks in one way or another – 
as discussed above and further in Appendix 7, section 6.7.2. In addition, many 
studies in this section did not rigorously apply these techniques; hence risk of 
bias for almost all studies is relatively high. For example, in the case of the two-
stage studies, testing the validity of instruments is often not done and even if 
conducted, doubts remain about the ability of these tests validate instruments; 
in the context of PSM, sensitivity analysis is rarely conducted. This has adverse 
implications for the robustness of impact estimates, therefore doubts about the 
reliability of outcomes presented by most with/without studies remain. 
3.5 Gender empowerment 
Some included studies address issues of female empowerment; one RCT assessed 
the impact of basic MFI focused on lending to women micro-entrepreneurs. This 
study concludes it ‘appears to have no discernible effect on education, health, 
or womens' empowerment’ (Banerjee et al. 2009, p30). Of course we have drawn 
attention to potential limitations of this study, which mean that it may not have 
adequate statistical power; the authors themselves also highlight the short study 
period during which effects could occur may be insufficient for such impacts to 
appear.  
Among the pipeline studies Deininger and Liu (2009) are concerned with gender 
empowerment of a self-help group microfinance project in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh in India, and Steele et al. (year) are concerned with contraceptive use 
rather than indicators of intrinsic well-being. While Deininger and Liu (2009) find 
positive impacts, this study has high vulnerability to bias, and so cannot be 
taken as useful evidence of impact on gender empowerment45.  
                                                 
45 The Steele et al. (2001) study has higher credibility, and finds a positive impact of microfinance on 
contraceptive use in similar context and time period to Pitt et al (1999), who find no impact. Steele et al. 
(2001), rationalise this by arguing the broader indicator of microfinance empowerment that they use – 
membership – is more appropriate than the indicator used by Pitt et al. (1999) – borrowing – which identifies 
only those MFI members who borrow as ‘empowered’. This is a narrower definition as it includes MFI group 
members who do not borrow but who may be ‘empowered’ through discussions at group meetings and so on 
(Steele et al. 2001, p280). It may be that the types of social interactions of the groups which were subjects of 
the Steele et al. (2001) study were somewhat different with different implications for empowerment; PnK 
assessed impacts of GB, BRDB and BRAC, while Steele et al. evaluated ASA and Save the Children (USA). There 
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There have been very few with/without studies taking a closer look at women’s 
empowerment in the context of microfinance applying a mixture of methods, 
i.e. sample survey and case study methods, examples include Hashemi et al. 
(1996), Schuler and Hashemi (1994) and Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996). These 
three studies examine microfinance programmes in Bangladesh using a range of 
empowerment indicators such as mobility, economic security, decision-making, 
freedom from domination by family, political and legal awareness and 
participation in public and political life. These and other qualitative studies find 
negative as well as positive outcomes for women, especially if the enterprises in 
which they invest are not successful, or if notwithstanding being members of a 
MFI, they do not receive loans because their peers or the MFI judge them not 
creditworthy.  
However, all three studies have been excluded from this SR since they either did 
not meet the inclusion criteria in the first instance or failed the scoring 
assessment. Of the included with/without studies, the PnK study and many 
related PnK papers (notably Pitt et al. 2006) investigate empowerment issues, as 
does the study by Zaman (1999). The USAID studies indirectly investigate 
women’s empowerment by using decision-making as proxies for empowerment 
but with rather mixed results. Women’s empowerment is notoriously difficult to 
measure and the few quantitative studies included in this report that do 
examine empowerment issues might lack credibility due to unresolved issues of 
measuring womens’ empowerment. However, a wealth of qualitative studies 
exists (Todd 1996) suggesting that the perception of women within their 
communities changes due to their activities in microfinance. We are not 
examining the qualitative evidence further since that is beyond the scope of this 
SR and most are anecdotal. However qualitative evidence has often suggested 
that women become more involved in household and community decision-making 
or gain more control over resources. Much of this evidence has been assessed as 
‘inspiring stories’, which do not amount to convincing positive evaluation in the 
face of more ambiguous quantitative evidence (Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch 2010).  In an otherwise sympathetic review, Kabeer (2005b), pointed 
out that the mainly qualitative evidence she reviewed suggested effects that are 
highly contingent on ‘context, commitment and capacity’ (p4709), the 
assessment of which would take us well beyond the scope of this study.  
 
3.6 Discussion 
Microfinance has recently become a highly contested arena in recent years, 
although for many years there have been some dissenters from the mainstream 
enthusiasm (Bateman 2010, Roy 2010). There have also been those in the health 
care arena who doubt the ability of SRs to resolve long standing disputes, even 
when the evidence of SRs are extremely robust (e.g. the MMR dispute, or the 
effectiveness of homeopathy). An SR may not convincingly resolve issues. As we 
                                                                                                                                       
are differences of the location of the studies as well. However, while coming to a different conclusion to that 
derived by Pitt et al. (1999), from the PnK study using the two-stage approach used in most PnK papers, which 
we have argued is not robust based on the replication of PnK done by RnM and Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 
(2011), the argument of Steele et al. (2001) is of course at best indirect evidence on empowerment, since it is 
inferred as a latent causal variable of contraception adoption. Given the concerns we have about both studies, 
it would be best to replicate the Pitt et al. (1999) paper, which is possible since it would be relatively modest 
extension of our (i.e. Duvendack and Palmer-Jones, 2011) existing replication. It might also be desirable to 
replicate Steele et al. (2001), although the underlying problems with the design would still not raise it to have 
low bias vulnerability (and we do know what other problems might be encountered in an attempt at 
replication). Nevertheless, if both replications came to similar conclusions with regard to the effect of 
microfinance membership on contraceptive use, it would be suggestive evidence of whatever conclusion was 
reached. 
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argue throughout this SR, there seem to be two particular issues that readers are 
likely troubled by in evaluations of microfinance; firstly, the role of complex and 
sophisticated statistical, or econometric methods in prominent evaluations, and 
secondly why evidence and arguments that are convincing to the authors of this 
SR, such as that contesting the mainstream microfinance discourse, have not 
hitherto commanded more attention in the field46.  
Econometric methods are generally given high prestige in the economics 
literature and in policy analysis, at least by economists; we are more sceptical. 
We find them less than convincing in many cases, and refer the doubting reader 
to the literature that is critical of much of this work (e.g. Leamer 1983, and the 
symposium in the Journal of Economic Perspectives 2010, 24(2)). We present 
critical assessments of analyses above, but cannot elaborate due to constraints 
of time and space. We draw attention to the fragility of econometric results as 
shown by the relatively infrequent attempts to replicate results of econometric 
work (Hamermesh 2007). Few replications of microfinance evaluations have been 
undertaken (see above, section 2.2.3). Sceptical readers could consider the 
recent moves, for example by the American Economic Association47, towards 
developing codes of ethical practice in economics requiring deposition of data 
and code allowing third party replication, as well as calls for economists to 
reveal potential conflicts of interest (Economist,201148). Calls for better conduct 
with regards publication are also found in the medical literature49 and in other 
academic fields50.  
It is also not unusual, in the health care arena, for SRs to conclude that there is 
limited robust evidence to support the continued application of existing, widely-
used interventions, and that the current uncertainties ought to be subjected to 
further rigorous evaluation (Chalmers 2008). Indeed, there are examples of SRs 
that have led to considerable controversy because the widely adopted 
interventions reviewed were shown to be potentially harmful (Cochrane Albumin 
1998, Singh et al. 2007). Ioannidis et al. (2008) point out that the aim of SR and 
meta-analysis should not be limited solely to generating a single pooled 
estimate, but should extend to examining ‘consistency of effects’ as well as 
promoting ‘understanding of moderator variables, boundary conditions, and 
generalisability’ (Ioannidis et al. 2008). Hence, evaluation of results according to 
different study designs and analytic methods as we have done in this 
microfinance review can prove informative. A similar example can be seen in a 
healthcare meta-analysis that found substantial heterogeneity in results of 
randomised trials, propensity score matched studies and multivariate adjusted 
observational studies (Kwok and Loke 2010). 
In order to critically assess the quality of papers51 our classification apparently 
differs from two other schemes used to classify studies – the Scottish 
Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN) and the World Cancer Research Fund 
(WCRF). Both classificatory schemes require judgements about the quality of 
execution of studies as well as design features52. Taking the SIGN classification 
                                                 
46 For example, Fernando 1997, and some arguments marshalled in Bateman 2010.  
47 www.aeaweb.org/aer/data.php  
48 www.economist.com/node/17849319  
49 CONSORT (www.bmj.com/content/340/bmj.c332.full) 
50 See the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE): (http://publicationethics.org/about). 
51 We discuss below the problem that an excessively critical approach to papers leads to a higher likelihood of 
making type 2 errors (failing to accept evidence of impact when there is in fact impact). 
52 The SIGN classification assesses ‘Levels of evidence’ as follows 
(www.sign.ac.uk/guidelines/fulltext/50/annexb.html): 
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listed below, it is clear that most of the studies included in our review would be 
rates 2- or below. These classificatory schemes apply to fields with a much 
higher proportion of rigorous research designs that are available in most social 
science arenas. Such classificatory approaches are not very helpful although they 
lend support to our argument that evidence to contradict the null hypothesis of 
no impact is of low quality. 
In order to have more than a few studies we broadened the criteria of 
acceptability, but doing so opened the floodgates; we decided to use an 
intuitively plausible but arbitrary classificatory scheme with a cut-off that 
produced a good number of studies. The cut-off included most studies we had 
already graded and subjectively agreed in the screening phase as having some 
merit. We classified the research designs used in microfinance IEs into five broad 
categories; we put studies into descending (according to conventional 
assessments) order of internal validity these are – RCTs, pipelines, with/without 
comparisons (in panel or cross-sectional form), natural experiments and general 
purpose surveys. These five categories were cross-classified with three 
categories of statistical methods of analysis, which in descending (again 
according to conventional assessment) order of internal validity, are two-stage 
IV methods and PSM, multivariate (control function), and tabulation without 
controls methods.  
Because there were very few RCTs, which in principle do not, and many pipeline 
and with/without studies which do, require sophisticated analytical methods, 
and because we hold to the view that validity of studies based on poor research 
designs (of lesser internal validity) should be compensated by sophisticated 
statistical analysis, we adopted the general principle that weak research design 
requires more sophisticated methods of analysis in order to reach levels of 
validity to warrant review, although in general weak design cannot be fully so 
compensated (Meyer and Fienberg 1992, Rosenbaum 2002). Some papers use 
more than one method of analysis, and actual designs, data production 
processes, and analyses are complex and diverse; hence, papers assessed cannot 
be fully accommodated in such a basic two-way classification with limited 
numbers of categories. Nevertheless, we adopted a heuristic scoring of research 
designs and methods of analysis, combining these scores into a single value, 
which allowed us to use a single cut-off score for exclusion. A few papers which 
were marginally excluded by this approach were included based on our 
judgement, resulting in a final count of 58 included papers.  
Our overall judgement draws mainly on RCTs and pipelines, although we also 
devoted considerable attention to the most prominent with/without studies 
which have been highly influential in validating orthodox favourable views of 
microfinance impacts. These earlier studies occurred quite early in the 
                                                                                                                                       
1++ High quality meta-analyses, SRs of RCTs, or RCTs with very low risk of bias 
1+ Well-conducted meta-analyses, SRs, or RCTs with low risk of bias 
1- Meta-analyses, SRs, or RCTs with high risk of bias 
2++ High quality SRs of case control or cohort or studies 
High quality case control or cohort studies with very low risk of confounding or bias and high 
probability that the relationship is causal 
2+ Well-conducted case control or cohort studies with low risk of confounding or bias and moderate 
probability that the relationship is causal 
2- Case control or cohort studies with high risk of confounding or bias and significant risk that the 
relationship is not causal 
3 Non-analytic studies, e.g. case reports, case series 
4 Expert opinion 
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microfinance phenomenon, but have turned out to have low validity when 
subject to critical appraisal and/or when their analysis has been replicated. 
There are only two RCTs of relevance to our objectives; neither has appeared in 
peer-reviewed form, and our judgement is that one has low-moderate and the 
other high risk of bias. Neither finds convincing impacts on well-being. We found 
nine pipeline studies, which have been reported in ten papers. All pipeline 
studies were based on non-random selection of location and clients53, and most 
have only ex-post cross-sectional data, some with retrospective panel data 
information allowing (low validity) impact estimates of change in outcome 
variables. Thus, we deal with a set of relatively low validity papers, from which 
it would be unwise to draw strong conclusions. In contrast to some recent 
reviews, this is the conclusion we wish to emphasise, in large part perhaps 
because of a preference for avoiding type 1 errors. That is, we come down on 
the side of ‘there is no good evidence for’, rather than ‘there is no good 
evidence against the beneficent impact of microfinance’. 
It might be argued that we have been too critical of studies; certainly our 
conclusions contrast with some (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005, 2010, 
RnM) but not all (Bateman 2010, Roy 2009) other recent reviews of the impact of 
microfinance. It is harder to classify some of reviews into either camp (Odell 
2010, Stewart el. 2010, Orso 2011).  
RnM state 
In our view, nothing in the present paper contradicts those [the view 
that microcredit is effective in reducing poverty generally, that 
extremely poor people benefit most especially so when women are 
borrowers] ideas (p39-40). 
The views of Odell (2010), Stewart et al. (2010) and Orso (2011), are more 
equivocal, and we cannot be sure what impression they will leave with the 
reader, but just such ambivalence leaves it open for readers to draw conclusions 
according to their preferences. Thus reviews, systematic or other, may not 
resolve policy issues to the satisfaction of policy makers (Pawson et al. 2005).   
Our approach seeks to shine light on this situation by being rather more critical 
of the methodologies employed in studies reviewed. Petticrew and Roberts 
(2006), in their study of ‘Systematic Reviews in the Social Sciences’, point to the 
importance of critical assessment of the quality of methodologies used in 
papers, and also draw aattention to the way that an excessive emphasis on 
methodological rigour raises the risks of type 2 errors – rejecting on 
methodological grounds evidence that the intervention works. But, as is well 
known, reducing the likelihood of type 2 errors raises that of type 1 (accepting 
evidence that the intervention works, when in fact it does not). We try to steer 
a balanced course between the Scylla of type 2 and the Carybdis of type 1 
errors, but are inclined to believe that recent reviews of microfinance IE steer 
too close to Carybdis (although now perhaps the tide has reversed, pace Pitt 
2011) because of an overoptimistic view of what can be achieved by 
sophisticated econometric methods applied to data of questionable quality from 
research designs that are vulnerable to bias. 
Failing to contradict the alternate hypothesis encourages one to believe there is 
a positive effect and therefore to tend to (continue to) reject the null (no 
effect) hypothesis even though it (no effect) may be true. This of course 
                                                 
53 Banerjee et al. (2009) would have been a pipeline study with randomised allocation of communities to 
treatment and control, had the baseline data turned out to be usable. 
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depends on the decision procedure (see Neyman and Pearson 1933, for a 
detailed discussion on decision rules) and weighing the costs and benefits of an 
intervention. Even for critics of these evaluations the absence of robust 
evidence rejecting the null hypothesis of no impact has not led to a rejection of 
belief in the beneficent impacts of microfinance (Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch 2010, p310; Roodman and Morduch 2009, p39-40), since it allows the 
possibility that more robust evidence (from better designed, executed and 
analysed studies) could allow rejection of this nul. However, given the possibility 
that much of the enthusiasm for microfinance could be constructed around other 
powerful but not necessarily benign, from the point of view of poor people, 
policy agendas (Bateman 2010, Roy 2010), this failure to seriously consider the 
limitations of microfinance as a poverty reduction approach, amounts in our 
view to a failure to take seriously the results of appropriate critical evaluation of 
evaluations. 
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4 Conclusion 
In this concluding section we rehearse briefly the work done in this study before 
drawing some more general but tentative lessons for microfinance, for research 
on microfinance, and for SRs in the social science arena. 
Following the established medical and educational experience embodied in 
Cochrane and Campbell Collaborations, we searched eleven academic databases, 
four microfinance aggregator and eight NGO or aid organisation websites; we 
also consulted reviewed book, journal article, PhD, and grey bibliographies, 
using search terms given in section 2.1.2. Articles were screened in two further 
stages, reducing 2,643 items to 58 which we examine in detail. Our assessment 
of validity initially focuses on assessing the intervention (e.g. provision of 
microfinance), the measurement the outcome measures (e.g. income, 
expenditure, assets, health and education, empowerment, and so on), 
contextual factors (including other microfinance services) affecting 
heterogeneity of outcomes, and potential existence and likely significance of 
confounding factors.  
We investigate the included studies categorised by intervention and outcome; 
this was challenging due to the diverse nature of the microfinance interventions 
and the wealth of outcomes investigated. Table 18 summarises our findings 
reported in section 3 above. We find that most of the  effects assessed occur in 
the early stages of the causal chain (Figure 1), with both positive and negative 
outcomes; the bulk of estimates reported were statistically insignificant even at 
the beginning of the causal chain, and a significant number of estimates suggest 
negative outcomes throughout the causal chain. These findings are not 
inconsistent with at least some of the qualitative literature (e.g. Fernando 
1997).  
The majority of microfinance IEs included investigate group lending and credit 
only interventions which do not reflect the diversity of the sector, hence this 
does not allow us to reach a conclusion as to the impact of the microfinance 
sector as a whole; individual lending is a more recent phenomenon that has not 
yet been evaluated widely. Paired with doubts about research designs and 
analytical methods used by various microfinance IEs, we can neither support nor 
deny the notion that microfinance is pro-poor and pro-women; what this might 
mean for policy makers is discussed further below. 
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Table 18: Combined research designs and analytical methods 
Outcome 
category 
Location in 
causal chain 
Significance & sign 
Ns sig 
+ - total + - total 
Economic 
inputs  194 189 383 127 70 197 
effects 362 313 675 441 117 558 
impacts 27 15 42 92 42 134 
Total 583 517 1,100 660 229 889 
Social 
inputs  12 7 19 5  5 
effects  1 1    
impacts 154 118 272 79 22 101 
Total 166 126 292 84 22 106 
Empowerment 
inputs        
effects       
impacts 47 67 114 76 19 95 
Total 47 67 114 76 19 95 
 
4.1 Policy recommendations 
If indeed there is no good evidence to support the claim that microfinance has a 
beneficial effect on the well-being of poor people or empowers women, then, 
over the last decade or so, it might have been more beneficial to explore 
alternative interventions that could have better benefitted poor people and/or 
empowered women. Microfinance activities and finance have absorbed a 
significant proportion of development resources, both in terms of finances and 
people. Microfinance activities are highly attractive, not only to the 
development industry but also to mainsteam financial and business interests 
with little interest in poverty reduction or empowerment of women, as pointed 
out above. There are many other candidate sectors for development activity 
which may have been relatively disadvantaged by ill-founded enthusiasm for 
microfinance. Even within the microfinance sector, the putative success of basic 
models of lending such as the Grameen Bank and related models, may well have 
diverted attention from opportunities for alternatives; for example, recent 
studies (Collins et al. 2009) have pointed out that poor people do not just need 
credit but access to other financial products such as savings, and insurance. 
Also, the financial products offered by MFIs must become more flexible and 
adjust to rapidly changing circumstances faced by poor people. Many MFIs have 
already moved in that direction, providing more diverse and flexible products.  
However, it remains unclear under what circumstances, and for whom, 
microfinance has been and could be of real, rather than imagined, benefit to 
poor people. Unsurprisingly we focus our policy recommendations on the need 
for more and better research. Thus, to have obtained a clearer picture on the 
impacts of microfinance, on whom, where, and when (e.g. under what 
circumstances), and the mechanisms which account for these effects, more and 
better quality quantitative evidence was required at an earlier stage in the 
diffusion of this intervention. While there is currently enthusiasm for RCTs as the 
gold standard for assessing interventions, there are many who doubt the 
universal appropriateness of these designs. Indeed there may be something to be 
said for the idea that this current enthusiasm is built on similar foundations of 
sand to those on which we suggest the microfinance phenomenon has been 
based. 
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Such research could have used a range of research designs (not just RCTs), and 
analytical methods, to assess both the short and longer-term impacts of 
microfinance. Thus, we suggest, the somewhat sorry tale of (mis-)evaluation of 
microfinance impacts leads us to advocate, specifically: 
• Conduct of well designed experimental and observational studies, 
including longitudinal studies; 
• Replication of highly regarded studies of whatever research design;  
• Capacity building in the multi-disciplinary, mixed methods research, 
especially surveys drawing on ethnographically rich understanding of 
local context. 
Such well designed and conducted studies54 should be complemented with 
qualitative tools prior to, as well as during and after, embarking on quantitative 
studies. Also, and fashionably, orthodox social survey methods can be enhanced 
with coordinated behavioural and experimental economics research with 
microfinance participants (lenders and actual and potential borrowers) to gain a 
better understanding of the mechanisms underlying microfinance participation 
and conduct, and the role of the unobservables in this context. Exploring why 
what appears to have been inappropriate optimism towards microfinance 
became so widespread would also be a suitable subject for further research 
which would involve political scientists. 
 
 
  
                                                 
54 Cook et al. 2008, report several conclusions which are likely to improve the quality of results of 
observational studies judged by their concordance with experimental results. These include using appropriate 
comparison groups, using the same measurement instruments (survey procedures) for both treatment and 
control and comparison subjects, and use of high quality field research designs and procedures building on the 
best, local, qualitative information (see also Rosenbaum 2002, 2010, Rosenbaum and Silber 2001).  
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Reviewer:  MD   JGC   RPJ 
 
If all 'yes's are circled the study is 'in'.  If any 'no' is circled the study is 'out'.  
If any '?'s are circled the study is 'pending'.  Decision (circle):  
in  out  pending 
   
 Issue  Reviewer 
decision 
1 Participants: Individuals living in poor, lower and upper-
middle income countries with very few assets that could be 
used as collateral, and are poor, excluded or marginalised 
within their society.  Participants can be individuals, 
households and microenterprises. 
Yes / No/ ? 
2 Exposure or intervention: Microcredit, ‘credit plus’ or ‘credit 
plus plus’ programmes of any sort that include one or more of 
loans, savings, insurance or other financial services. Provision 
is by basic, transformed or commercial NGO-type MFIs, 
commercial banks, credit cooperatives and other public sector 
providers of financial services. 
Yes / No/ ? 
3 Duration of the microfinance programme at least 3 years. Yes / No/ ? 
4 Methodologies: Controlled trials, before/after studies, action 
research, observational and qualitative research, impact 
evaluations, or social survey datasets (circle which) 
Yes / No/ ? 
5 Sample size: Quantitative studies >100 (treatment and control 
combined), qualitative studies >10. 
Yes / No/ ? 
6 Comparison group: Is the effect of microfinance compared to 
the effect of a lack of microfinance (a comparison group, such 
as a time before microfinance or another location without 
microfinance)? 
Yes / No/ ? 
7 Outcomes: At least one of the following is reported: income, 
microenterprise profits and/or revenues, labour supply, 
employment, expenditure (food and/or non-food), assets 
(agricultural, non-agricultural, transport and/or other assets), 
housing improvements, education (enrolment and/or 
achievements for adults and children), health and health 
behaviour, nutrition, women’s empowerment.   
Yes / No/ ? 
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6.3 Appendix 3: Low, lower middle and upper middle income 
countries - Microfinance systematic review  
Income groups correspond to 2009 gross national income (GNI) per capita (World 
Bank Atlas method). Source: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications/country-and-lending-groups 
 
Afghanistan Angola Sri Lanka Albania 
Bangladesh Armenia Sudan Algeria 
Benin Belize Swaziland American Samoa 
Burkina Faso Bhutan Syrian Arab Rep. Antigua and Barbuda 
Burundi Bolivia Thailand Argentina 
Cambodia Cameroon Timor-Leste Azerbaijan 
Central African Republic Cape Verde Tonga Belarus 
Chad China Tunisia Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Comoros Congo, Rep. Turkmenistan Botswana 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Côte d'Ivoire Tuvalu Brazil 
Eritrea Djibouti Ukraine Bulgaria 
Ethiopia Ecuador Uzbekistan Chile 
Gambia, The Egypt, Arab Rep. Vanuatu Colombia 
Ghana El Salvador Vietnam Costa Rica 
Guinea Georgia West Bank and Gaza Cuba 
Guinea-Bissau Guatemala Yemen, Rep. Dominica 
Haiti Guyana  Dominican Republic 
Kenya Honduras  Fiji 
Korea, Dem. Rep. India  Gabon 
Kyrgyz Republic Indonesia  Grenada 
Lao PDR Iraq  Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Liberia Jordan  Jamaica 
Madagascar Kiribati  Kazakhstan 
Malawi Kosovo  Lebanon 
Mali Lesotho  Libya 
Mauritania Maldives  Lithuania 
Mozambique Marshall Islands  Macedonia, FYR 
Myanmar Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  Malaysia 
Nepal Moldova  Mauritius 
Niger Mongolia  Mayotte 
Rwanda Morocco  Mexico 
Sierra Leone Nicaragua  Montenegro 
Solomon Islands Nigeria  Namibia 
Somalia Pakistan  Palau 
Tajikistan Papua New Guinea  Panama 
Tanzania Paraguay  Peru 
Togo Philippines  Romania 
Uganda Samoa  Russian Federation 
Zambia São Tomé and Principe  Serbia 
Zimbabwe Senegal  Seychelles 
   South Africa 
   St. Kitts and Nevis 
   St. Lucia 
   St. Vincent and Grenadines 
   Suriname 
   Turkey 
   Uruguay 
   Venezuela, RB 
1.1  Low income 1.2  Lower middle income 1.3 Upper middle income 
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External databases 
JOLIS 
Date: 25 August 2010 
 
Searched at: 
http://external.worldbankimflib.org/uhtbin/cgisirsi/UQ7ccqhw8C/JL/29410072/60/495/X  
 
Searches Performed: 
Keywords anywhere ‘((microfinanc* OR microcredit OR micro-credit OR micro-financ* OR 
microenterprise OR micro-enterprise OR ‘group lending’) AND (evaluat* OR impact OR income 
OR expenditure OR consumption))’  
 
ELDIS 
Date: 27 August 2010 
 
Searches Performed: 
Note: Limited search functionality (single field only, OR unavailable, only default AND), no 
export facility 
 
microfinanc* impact  
111 Document results 
http://www.eldis.org/index.cfm?Search_string=microfinanc*+impact&objectID=42B0EF43-
E4B7-FB32-
9CE720C904CB143A&submit_button=Go&RestrictToCategory=False&offerRestrictToCategory=t
rue&Search_type=cDocument&DocCats=getDocCats&Search_author=&Search_publisher=&date
_pub=6  
 
microcredit* impact  
67 results 
http://www.eldis.org/index.cfm?Search_string=microcredit*+impact&objectID=42B0EF43-
E4B7-FB32-
9CE720C904CB143A&submit_button=Go&RestrictToCategory=False&offerRestrictToCategory=t
rue&Search_type=cDocument&DocCats=getDocCats&Search_author=&Search_publisher=&date
_pub=6 
Google Scholar 
Date: 27 August 2010 
 
Searches Performed: 
NOTE: Limited search functionality (no* allowed); no export facility 
 
allintitle: microfinance AND evaluation  
16 results 
http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?hl=en&num=100&q=allintitle%3A+microfinance+AND+eval
uation&as_sdt=2001&as_ylo=&as_vis=0 
 
allintitle: microcredit AND evaluation  
9 results 
http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?hl=en&num=100&q=allintitle%3A+microcredit+AND+evalua
tion&as_sdt=2001&as_ylo=&as_vis=0  
 
allintitle: microcredit evaluation OR impact OR income OR expenditure 
91 results 
http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?as_q=microcredit+&num=100&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_e
pq=&as_oq=evaluation+impact+income+expenditure&as_eq=&as_occt=title&as_sauthors=&as_
publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdt=1.&as_sdts=5&hl=en&num=100  
 
6.4 Appendix 4: Log of search process 
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allintitle: microfinance evaluation OR impact OR income OR expenditure 
386 results 
http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?hl=en&num=100&q=allintitle%3A+microfinance+evaluation
+OR+impact+OR+income+OR+expenditure&as_sdt=2001&as_ylo=&as_vis=0 
 
 
NGO/Funder websites – not all searched websites listed, sample only 
DFID 
Date: 25 August 2010 
 
Searched at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/Publications/  
 
Searches Performed: 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/Publications/?q=micro-credit   
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/Publications/?q=microcredit  
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/Publications/?q=micro+credit   
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/Publications/?q=micro+finance   
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/Publications/?q=microfinance  
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/Publications/?q=micro-finance  
CGAP 
Incomplete 
 
MicroFinance Gateway 
Date: 27 August 2010 
 
Search at 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m/library/template.rc/advancedsearch  
 
Searches Performed: 
Keywords (all fields): impact, evaluat*, consumption, income, expenditure 
 
MicroBanking Bulletin 
Date: 27 August 2010 
 
Search at: http://www.themix.org/publications/search  
 
Searches Performed: 
impact OR evaluation OR evaluate OR income OR consumption OR income OR expenditure 
 
MicroFinance Network 
Date: 25 August 20 10 
 
Searches Performed: 
All publications specified (see Annex1) 
Criteria used: documents related to the evaluation of microfinance or microcredit  
Link to page searched: MFNetwork publications @ 
http://www.mfnetwork.org/publications.html 
 
USAID  
Incomplete 
 
World Bank 
Incomplete 
 
Evidence of the impact of microfinance: a systematic review  
100 
 
6.5  Appendix 5: Data extraction and validity assessment 
form - microfinance systematic review 
 
Study details - Author(s):                             Year:          
 Journal ref: 
Reviewer:  
(Note: questions in bold italics are validity questions – see the validity section 
for details of how to answer these) 
1 Study information 
1a Research question as 
expressed in study 
 
 
 
 
1b Clarity of research 
question 
Done              Not done 
1c Study design – describe 
 
 
 
1d Methodology – allocation  Done              Not done              Unclear 
1e Methodology – control for 
external circumstances 
 
Done              Not done 
1f Describe the funding 
sources for the study, and 
financial or other issues 
declared 
 
1g  Researcher bias  Done              Not done 
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 Participants Microcredit group No-Microcredit group 
1h Number of study 
participants 
  
1i Ethnicity, religion and caste 
 
  
1j Gender mix   
1k Marital status   
1l Age    
1m Level of education   
1n  Household size and 
composition 
  
1o Baseline income   
1p Baseline assets   
1q Description of 
participants 
Done          Partial          Not done 
1r Similarity of participants  Done          Partial          Not done 
1s Confounding re 
participants 
Done          Partial          Not done 
1t Country of study    
1u Country income Low           lower middle 
    Upper middle 
Low           lower middle 
    Upper middle 
1v Setting characteristics (eg 
urban/rural) 
  
1w Numbers dropping out from 
baseline to outcome 
assessment and reasons 
  
1x Attrition bias Done          Unclear           Not done 
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2 Microcredit and non-
microcredit conditions  
Microcredit group No-Microcredit group 
2a Types of microcredit 
provided by study (e.g. 
credit plus, insurance, 
advice etc) 
  
2b Types of microcredit 
available in area (outside of 
intervention if trial, 
generally if observational 
study) 
  
2c Accessibility of microcredit 
to disadvantaged groups 
  
2d Accessibility of microcredit 
to women 
  
2e Description of conditions Done          Partial          Not done 
2f Confounding interventions – 
describe (e.g. land reform, 
aid, employment 
intitiatives, new job 
opportunities, public-
private partnership etc.) 
  
2g Confounding re 
interventions 
Done          Partial          Not done 
2h Duration of participants 
accessing microcredit  
  
2i Duration of microcredit Done          Partial          Not done 
2g Microcredit provider(s)   
2h Other data on the 
microcredit provided 
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Provide quantitative data as feasible, including mean and variance or median 
and inter-quartile range, units and descriptions of tools for assessment. Collect 
data at the latest time point available. For complex data use highlighter pen in 
original document (and page numbers below). 
3 Outcomes  Microcredit group Non-Microcredit group 
3a Time point for outcome 
assessment (study and 
participant points of view) 
  
3b Income  data 
 
  
3c Profits or revenues   
3d Labour supply/ employment   
3e Expenditure (food/ non-
food) 
  
3f Assets (agricultural, non-
agricultural, transport, 
other) 
  
3g Housing changes 
 
  
3h Education 
(enrolment/achievement, 
adults/children) 
  
3i Health or health behaviours   
3j Nutrition (intake or status)   
3k Women’s empowerment   
3l Tools used to assess the 
outcomes above 
 
  
3m Outcome ascertainment Done                  Partial                  Not done 
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4 Additional information and summary 
4a Additional validity 
problems: 
 
 
 
4b Any other validity 
problems? 
 
Done          Not done 
4c Does the study offer 
additional information to 
help address any of the 
following (if so please 
describe here)? 
Is the impact of microcredit 
on any outcome modified 
by  
a) gender of borrower,  
b) poverty status of 
household,  
c) rural/urban setting,  
d) geographical location,  
e) presence of second 
income earner in the 
household, or  
f) type of product? 
 
 
4d Summary of validity Risk of bias:   
Low                 Moderate                  High 
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6.6  Appendix 6: Marking criteria for assessing validity 
Criterion Score as: 
Clarity of the 
research question 
(F) 
• ‘done’ when the question addressed by the research is 
clear, specific and addressed by the methods and results 
•  ‘not done’ when there are any major problems with the 
above 
Description of 
Participants (A,F) 
• ‘done’ when the participants are in both groups are well 
described (e.g. gender, marital status, age, level of 
education, religion, caste, household size and 
composition, baseline (pre-microfinance) income and 
assets) 
• ‘partial’ when one or two of these ten factors are not well 
described or only in one group 
• ‘not done’ when three or more factors are not well 
described 
Similarity of 
participants 
between 
microfinance and 
control sites 
(A,B,F) 
• ‘done’ when before/after study or when populations in 
microfinance and control sites appear very similar (e.g. 
geographically close, similar participant characteristics 
(above), and no consistent trend that puts either group at 
greater risk of poor outcome) 
• ‘partial’ when there are both similarities and differences, 
and no consistent trend of disadvantage (or some factors 
are similar and some unclear) 
• ‘not done’ when the two sets of participants exhibit 
substantial differences (or several factors are unclear) 
Methodology – 
allocation (A, F) 
• ‘done’ when the intervention and control participants are 
allocated to microfinance or not randomly  
• ‘unclear’ when method of allocation is unclear 
• ‘not done’ when allocation to microfinance or not was by 
a non-random method (e.g. marketing decision, choice of 
an appropriate population for microfinance etc) 
Methodology – 
control for 
external 
circumstances (F) 
• ‘done’ where there is assessment of change between 
baseline and a time point at least 3 years later in the 
microfinance group, and this change is compared to 
change in the control group over the same time period 
• ‘not done’ where this design is not used (e.g. simple 
before after design with no separate control group or 
separate control group but no before/after assessment) 
Duration of 
microfinance (G) 
• ‘done’ when all the individual participants assessed have 
had access to microfinance for at least 5 years 
• ‘partial’ when the individual participants assessed have 
had access to microfinance for 3-5 years or at least 50% 
have had access for at least 5 years. 
• ‘not done’ when not either of the above 
Confounding re 
participants (B) 
• ‘done’ when the study attempts to account for and 
minimise the effects of any differences in gender, marital 
status, age, level of education, religion, caste, household 
size and composition, baseline (pre-microfinance) income 
and assets (or these are equivalent in both settings)  
• ‘partial’ when one or two of these factors are not 
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equivalent, accounted for or minimised (or are unclear) 
• ‘not done’ when three or more factors are not equivalent, 
accounted for or minimised (or are unclear) 
Confounding re 
interventions (B) 
• ‘done’ when where there is a similar presence/absence of 
other poverty-alleviating interventions (such as land 
reform, public-private partnership, employment initiatives 
etc.) 
• ‘partial’ where there are some differences but they are 
not major 
• ‘not done’ where there are any major differences 
• ‘unclear’ where the presence or absence of these is not 
described 
Description of 
conditions (F) 
• ‘done’ when the microfinance and no microfinance 
conditions are well described (e.g. types available, from 
which providers, accessibility for disadvantaged, women 
etc.) 
• ‘partial’ when one or two of these factors are not well 
described 
• ‘not done’ when three or more factors are not well 
described 
Researcher bias 
(A-E) 
• ‘done’ when study funding and financial interests of 
authors are declared, and no bias is apparent 
• ‘not done’ when either funding or financial interests are 
not declared or there is potential bias apparent 
Outcome 
ascertainment (D) 
• ‘done’ when outcome measures are appropriate for both 
conditions, carried out the same way for both conditions, 
and appear valid and well executed 
• ‘partial’ when any one criteria above is not met 
• ‘not done’ in other cases 
Attrition bias (C) • ‘done’ when the participants who drop out are accounted 
for by study arm, and there do not appear to be big 
differences in the numbers dropping out, or their reasons, 
between arms (in before after studies the reasons for 
dropping out do not appear related to the outcomes 
assessed, ‘done’ for surveys without follow up 
• ‘not done’ when there are important differences in 
attrition 
• ‘unclear’ when not clearly described 
Any other validity 
problems for this 
study? 
• ‘Done’ if no further issues around validity 
• ‘not done’ if additional validity issues are raised 
Summary of 
validity (I) 
• Low risk of bias when all criteria above are ‘done’ 
• Moderate risk of bias when confounding of both 
participants and interventions is ‘done’ but one or two 
other criteria are partial, unclear or not done 
• High risk of bias for all remaining studies 
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6.7  Appendix 7: Research designs and methods 
This appendix provides a more theoretical and in-depth discussion of the various 
research designs and analytical methods to provide the reader with more 
background information. 
6.7.1 Research designs 
The last two decades have seen advances in the improvement of putatively 
rigorous econometric techniques designed to account for selection bias. Given 
those developments experimental designs, e.g. RCTs slowly took centre stage in 
the area of microfinance. In experimental designs, data are derived from units 
of observation with individuals assigned randomly to treatment and control 
groups, hopefully without any bias in allocations. Since, in principle, other 
factors apart from treatment are equal between treatment and control groups, 
it is reasonable to attribute differences between groups after treatment has 
been applied to treatment itself. Many scientists believe that randomisation is 
the only method that can convincingly establish causality (Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2008). It is claimed that social experiments provide an accurate 
counterfactual and control for self-selection bias, provided that the experiment 
is properly implemented and individuals are randomly allocated to either 
treatment or control groups (Blundell and Costa Dias 2008). Furthermore, the 
analysis of experimental data is usually rather simple. Researchers commonly 
analyse the differences in mean values by treatment status. Alternatively, a 
regression-based approach can generate an unbiased estimator for the average 
treatment effect of a programme (Imbens and Wooldridge 2008). 
However, limitations exist in the case of randomised experiments, i.e. double-
blinding, ethical issues, pseudo-random methods, attrition and the fact that 
behavioural changes caused by the experiment itself, such as Hawthorne and 
John Henry effects, cannot be ruled out. Also, spill-over effects cannot be 
eliminated (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000, 2002). 
On the other hand, non-experimental or observational designs have played a 
dominant role in the past; they are based on data that occur naturally, generally 
from surveys or censuses, direct observation or administrative data. In these 
observational situations subjects (individuals, households) generally choose what 
they do (or are chosen to do what happens to them), in particular, their 
‘treatment’ status. Observational data are what happens in everyday life, and 
are generally characterised by non-random assignment; in everyday life people 
who participate are generally different to those who do not. There are numerous 
threats to both internal and external validity55 that arise as a result (Shadish et 
al. 2002). 
The discussion of experimental versus non-experimental approaches reveals that 
evaluation results heavily depend on the quality of the underlying data 
(Heckman et al. 1999). Data quality, for example, refers to the availability of a 
rich set of appropriate variables that are related to participation as well as 
outcomes (Smith and Todd 2005). Also, data on control groups located in the 
same environment as treatment groups greatly improve quality (Heckman et al, 
1998). Many evaluations in the past provided results that were not particularly 
meaningful precisely because of the non-availability of rich datasets (Caliendo 
and Hujer 2005). Caliendo and Hujer (2005) further argued that researchers have 
                                                 
55 Internal validity refers to the rigour with which one can assert that outcomes between treatment and control 
groups are different; external validity refers to whether the findings of this comparison are relevant to the 
broader population from which they are drawn (Shadish et al. 2002). 
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no control over the origination of data in the case of observational studies and 
can thus only observe outcomes for participants and non-participants after the 
intervention was implemented. In other words, the task of non-experimental 
techniques is often to restore comparability between treatment and control 
groups to allow solving the evaluation problem. Rosenbaum (2002) expanded on 
this and argued that researchers should ideally be involved in the design stages 
of an observational study and take part in the data collection process, in order 
to be able to avoid many pitfalls that later transpire in the analytical process. 
Rosenbaum (2002) further argued that ethnographic or other qualitative tools 
can be of great help in designing an observational study. In a paper published 
with Silber in 2001, the authors emphasised the importance of making use of 
qualitative tools, in particular during the design or pilot stages of a study, to 
improve data collection procedures and hence the overall quality of the 
quantitative study. Well-known statisticians and econometricians such as 
Heckman, LaLonde and Rosenbaum have advocated the collection of better 
quality data since this could possibly be the solution to the evaluation problem; 
they have not necessarily advocated the introduction of further even more 
sophisticated evaluation techniques (Heckman et al. 1999; Rosenbaum  2002, 
Rosenbaum and Silber 2001, Caliendo and Hujer 2005). 
The data used in impact evaluations of microfinance are mainly from non-
experimental quasi-experimental research designs; only two randomised designs 
have been used in impact evaluations, although there are other papers which 
draw on data from randomised designs to analyse other features pertinent to 
microfinance. Other designs include, in rough order of internal validity, pipeline 
(without randomisation), panel (before/after), with/without, and natural 
experiments. Each design has strengths and weaknesses in the evaluation of 
social programmes. We discuss briefly the background and characteristics of 
each in the following sections before proceeding to discuss the analytical 
methods used to attenuate the characteristic lacunae of the research designs. 
6.7.1.1 RCTs 
At the heart of every experimental design lies a natural or an artificially 
formulated experiment which attempts to attribute the effects of an 
intervention to its causes (Hulme 2000). Evaluations applying a randomised 
design are generally believed to provide the most robust results. There is a long 
tradition of experimental methods in the natural sciences. Fisher (1935), 
Neyman (1923) and Cox (1958) were early proponents of randomised 
experiments. However, few randomised experiments have been conducted in the 
social sciences in the past. Many of these early experiments were regarded with 
suspicion as to their credibility of establishing causality and their importance for 
researchers and policy-makers alike (Imbens and Wooldridge 2008). Moreover, in 
many cases the availability of experimental data are limited and therefore, 
observational studies have continued to capture the attention of many 
researchers.  
Notwithstanding the critique of randomised studies, there has been a move 
towards RCTs in development economics driven by the so-called ‘randomistas’ 
(Banerjee et al. 2009, Duflo and Kremer 2005, Miguel and Kremer 2004).  
Applying a randomised study design requires random assignment of potential 
clients to so-called treatment and control groups, whereby both groups must be 
drawn from potential clients whom the programme has yet to serve, so that the 
impact of an entire programme can be evaluated (Karlan and Goldberg 2006). 
This random assignment to either treatment or control group ensures that 
potential outcomes are not contaminated by self-selection into treatment 
Evidence of the impact of microfinance: a systematic review  
109 
 
(Blundell and Costa Dias 2008). In other words, the potential outcomes or effects 
of the treatment are independent of treatment assignment. Proper 
randomisation ensures that individuals in treatment and control groups are 
equivalent in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics with the 
exception of the treatment status, assuming that no spill-over effects exist 
(Blundell and Costa Dias 2000, 2002, 2008). Hence, the mean differences in the 
outcomes of these individuals are understood to be the effects of the treatment 
itself (Caliendo and Hujer 2005). 
However, limitations exist in the case of randomised experiments, i.e. double-
blinding, ethical issues, pseudo-random methods, attrition and the fact that 
behavioural changes caused by the experiment itself, such as Hawthorne and 
John Henry effects, cannot be ruled out. Also, spill-over effects cannot be 
eliminated (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000, 2002). 
Furthermore, Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) claimed that the identification 
problem that generally occurs when trying to establish causality cannot be 
solved by randomisation alone in particular when interactions between 
individuals or units are prevalent which is often the case. In many medical 
studies, such interactions are limited or non-existing, therefore randomised 
studies are an appropriate choice for providing robust results. The so-called 
double-blinding can commonly be enforced in medical studies, i.e. individuals 
participating in the experiment are generally not aware of their treatment 
status. This further enhances the robustness of the studies’ results as well as 
improves external validity. However, double-blinding cannot necessarily be 
guaranteed in social science experiments and this raises serious concerns about 
the external validity of the results (Imbens and Wooldridge 2008). 
Scriven (2008) emphasised that double-blinding is a prerequisite for a robust 
RCT; this is further reiterated by Goldacre (2008). As argued by Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2008), most medical RCTs can ensure double-blinding but the case is 
different for studies in the area of the social sciences. For example, RCTs 
evaluating the impact of education, social services or microfinance programmes 
are usually not even single-blinded and essentially ‘zero-blinded’ (Scriven 2008, 
p12). In other words, individuals usually discover whether they belong to 
treatment or control groups, which undermines the notion of double-
blindedness. Hence, individuals in the treatment group may benefit from the 
programme  
due either to the experimental treatment, or to the sum of that effect 
plus the effect of any interaction of that treatment with the 
psychological impact of knowing that one is part of an experiment… 
(Scriven 2008, p14).  
If non-interaction can be assumed, then the benefits reaped are due to the 
experimental treatment alone. However, RCTs in the social sciences generally do 
not assume non-interaction, hence the challenge to separate out the causal 
effects of a programme from all  other factors that occur at the same time 
remains (Scriven 2008). 
In addition, ethical questions are raised (Imbens 2009). The implementation of 
randomised studies is not always feasible, e.g. on which grounds can it be 
justified that certain individuals are assigned to treatment while others are 
excluded from a potentially beneficial treatment. However, it could be argued 
that these ethical concerns are not valid considering treatment will eventually 
become available to individuals in the control groups after a certain time delay. 
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Furthermore, Goldacre (2008) argued that pseudo-random methods are often 
used during the process of assigning individuals to the various treatment and 
control groups. It pays to investigate how exactly individuals were assigned to 
their respective groups; was the underlying process truly random? Many studies 
fail to accurately describe their assignment process. This can have consequences 
for the reliability of estimates obtained from an RCT. 
Blundell and Costa Dias (2008) added to the limitations as follows:  
[F]irst, by excluding the selection behaviour, experiments overlook 
intention-to-treat. However, the selection mechanism is expected to be 
strongly determined by the returns to treatment. In such case, the 
experimental results cannot be generalised to an economy-wide 
implementation of the treatment. Second, a number of contaminating 
factors may interfere with the quality of information, affecting the 
experimental results. One possible problem concerns drop-out behavior 
(p 19).  
Drop-out behaviour - or attrition - refers to individuals assigned to either 
treatment or control groups who then decide not to proceed with the 
experiment. It is not clear why those individuals drop out and this behaviour can 
have adverse effects on the results of the experiment (Blundell and Costa Dias 
2008). Goldacre (2008) and Duflo et al. (2008) argued that the individuals 
dropping out would have been worse off than those remaining, so a risk of 
overstating impact estimates exists. To sum up, drop-outs change the 
composition of treatment and control groups thereby influencing results of the 
experiment since their outcomes cannot be observed (Blundell and Costa Dias 
2008). Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2008) argued that attrition can be 
managed by tracking drop-out individuals to allow gathering information on 
them. However, this is a costly undertaking and might not always be feasible. 
More importantly, all randomised studies should report the level of attrition and 
compare drop-outs with the individuals that remain in the study to gauge 
whether there are systematic differences between these two groups – at least in 
terms of observable characteristics (Duflo et al. 2008).  
Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2008) further argued that the generalisation and 
replication of randomised studies is further hampered by behavioural changes in 
treatment and control groups. To give an example, Hawthorne effects refer to 
behavioural changes in the treatment group while John Henry effects relate to 
behavioural changes in the control group. For example, individuals in the 
treatment group might positively change their behaviour for the duration of the 
study as they feel thankful for receiving treatment and as a response to being 
observed. The same behavioural changes might apply to members in the control 
group who might positively or in fact negatively alter their behaviour (Duflo, 
Glennerster and Kremer, 2008). However, a recent study by Levitt and List 
(2009) raised doubts about the existence of these Hawthorne effects. The 
authors’ claimed that the evidence is not as convincing as previously thought. In 
fact, it cannot be said with certainty that changes in lightning led to an increase 
in workers’ productivity. According to Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2008), 
Hawthorne and John Henry effects can be circumvented by continuing to collect 
data, even after the termination of the experiment, to confirm whether any 
behavioural changes were due to Hawthorne or John Henry effects, or due to the 
intervention itself.   
Blundell and Costa Dias (2000, 2002), Duflo et al. (2008) reiterated that spill-
over effects can have adverse effects on the impact estimates obtained from a 
randomised study. Spill-over effects refer to individuals in the control groups 
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With/without designs are the bases of most microfinance impact evaluations. 
They involve the comparison of treated groups with comparable untreated 
groups and in the absence of randomisation, are vulnerable to placement and 
selection biases. These may be mitigated by features of data design, and by 
methods of analysis. Key problems in designs are that treatment groups may not 
include drop-outs or graduates, and control groups may not come from the same 
population and sampling frame as the treatment group. Drawing the control 
group from the same community is risky since in most cases those who have 
chosen not to become members will clearly be different to those who have 
chosen to become members, generally as a result of an optimisation process (de 
Janvry et al. 2010). Also, since microfinance is likely to have spill-over effects to 
neighbours and to the local economy through general equilibrium effects, the 
comparison of MFI members and similar non-members from their own 
communities will be biased if it fails to account for these spill-overs.  
Taking control groups from other communities risks placement bias unless the 
communities are demonstrably comparable (ex-ante). This can be achieved to 
some extent by matching the communities; it may not be achieved by random 
choice of control groups or communities from which to draw them unless the 
treatment communities were themselves randomly chosen from the same 
domain. 
Many papers using data from with/without designs draw their control groups 
from different geographical domains; some provide descriptive statistics on 
observable characteristics, often with statistical tests of differences between 
treatment and control sub-samples, but this approach can not demonstrate 
equivalence on unobservables or variables for which there are no data.  
Common analytical methods to mitigate biases due to non-comparable treatment 
and control groups include PSM, IV, and fixed and random effect estimation, and 
control functions using community level variables.  
 
6.7.1.4 Natural experiments 
Only one natural experiment was included in studies meeting our selection 
criteria (Kaboski and Townsend, 2005 and 2009). Natural experiments have been 
much sought after since the study by Duflo (1999) of a schooling programme 
introduced at different times in different geographical locations  (see also Osili 
and Long 2008 for a very similar design based on the introduction of Universal 
Primary Education (UPE) in Nigeria).  
Natural experiments exploit some difference to identify impact of a programme 
on the assumption that the difference is between statistically equivalent 
domains. Thus, in the case of Kaboski and Townsend (2005), an ongoing 
longitudinal survey in Thailand allowed variation in the presence of village level 
MFIs with different lending policies as part of an identification strategy to 
estimate their impacts. The spatial variation in incidence of institutions with 
different policies constitutes a ‘natural experiment’ in the impact of these 
institutions and their policies.  
A later paper (Kaboski and Townsend 2009) used the data from the same survey 
to estimate the impact of a government programme (the Million Bhat Village 
Fund) which was introduced more or less simultaneously in all survey locations 
during the survey. Identification was achieved because the programme allocated 
the same fund (Thai Bhat 1million) to each ‘village’ regardless of size, thereby 
Evidence of the impact of microfinance: a systematic review  
114 
 
resulting in very different availability of loans - corresponding to the inverse of 
the village size. 
Key assumptions required for natural experiments to appropriately identify 
impacts are that different domains are functionally equivalent – that is that 
there is no systematic difference between treatment and control groups that 
interacts with the treatment which could account in part for the impacts.  
6.7.2 Methods of analysis 
A number of econometric methods for overcoming, mitigating, or at least 
documenting the existence and consequences of selection bias have been 
developed. However, these econometric techniques have limitations and are 
often poorly executed or simply misunderstood, as a review of the studies we 
included in this SR shows. A critique of econometric techniques is not new; in a 
landmark paper Leamer (1983) criticised the key assumptions many econometric 
methods are built on; despite this pessimistic view on the usefulness of 
econometric methods, there has been a trend towards ever more sophisticated 
techniques which, however, did not necessarily provide the solution to the 
selection bias challenge.  
Apart from technical challenges that impact evaluations must grapple with, they 
are further hampered by conflicting agendas of the various players involved. 
Such agendas influence the design, execution and the results of an impact 
evaluation. Hence, Pritchett (2002) argued that it is not surprising that there are 
so few rigorous impact studies. Not only is that a phenomenon in the area of 
microfinance, but health and education interventions are met with the same 
fate. Pritchett (2002) concluded that programmes usually have few incentives to 
be assessed seriously. 
6.7.2.1 PSM 
Matching has become a very popular technique in the area of development 
economics in recent years and has its roots in the experimental literature 
beginning with Neyman (1923). Rubin (1973a, 1973b, 1974, 1977, 1978) 
expanded on this literature and essentially laid the conceptual foundations of 
matching. The technique was further refined in particular by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983, 1984). Econometricians got involved in advancing matching 
techniques in the mid-1990s; see studies by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 
1998), Heckman et al (1998) and Heckman et al. (1999). 
The basic idea of matching is to compare a participant with one or more non-
participants who are similar in terms of a set of observed covariates X (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig 2005, 2008, Rosenbaum and Silber 2001). In a next step, the 
differences in outcome variables for participants and their matched non-
participants are calculated, i.e. the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT) is the mean difference between participants and matched non-participants 
(Morgan and Harding 2006). The objective of this technique is to account for 
selection on observables. The drawback is that selection on unobservables 
remains unaccounted for. 
Despite this drawback, Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) concluded that PSM 
results are a good approximation to those obtained under an experimental 
approach. They re-analysed the study of LaLonde (1986) and employed PSM to 
illustrate that PSM can in fact approximate the results obtained from an 
experimental setting. The author’s argued that their results  
‘are close to the benchmark experimental estimate’ (Dehejia and Wahba 
1999, p1062), i.e. ‘[a] researcher using this method [Author’s note: 
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Figure 5: Illustration of DID approach, microfinance context 
 
Source: Adapted from Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005, p204). 
In summary, it can be expected that participants differ from non-participants 
due to unobservable characteristics. These differences can lead to contrasting 
reactions in the event of macroeconomic changes, therefore macroeconomic 
effects can have diverse impacts across both groups (Blundell and Costa Dias 
2002). The authors further claimed that for a DID estimator to be unbiased, the 
decision to self-select into treatment must be independent from any temporary 
individual-level effects. It was further argued that any fixed individual-level and 
macroeconomic effects will eventually even out during the differencing 
procedure (Blundell and Costa Dias 2002). 
Returning to Figure 5, Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) suggested 
comparing T1 with T2. By doing this, village attributes, observable and 
unobservable attributes that are assumed to be time-invariant are netted out, 
thus enabling the microfinance impact to be captured. However, the 
macroeconomic changes occurring between the years of observation and which 
are independent of the microfinance impact are also displayed but not yet 
controlled for. Thus, attributing the entire difference of T2 – T1 to the impact of 
microfinance would be misleading. This problem cannot be solved without the 
introduction of a control group (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005). 
Hence, Figure 5 identifies a control group consisting of individuals who never had 
access to microfinance. This control group, however, is clearly not identical to 
the treatment group because of observable and unobservable differences. In a 
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next step, Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) suggested comparing T2 
with C2 as this will address the biases arising from macroeconomic changes. This 
comparison appears to be adequate as these economic changes are felt in the 
same way by control and treatment groups. To isolate the true impact of 
microfinance, however, the single difference of T2 – T1 must be compared to 
the difference of C2 – C1; this is the DID approach. This approach would work 
well in terms of accurately measuring the causal impact of microfinance if only 
the underlying assumptions would hold. As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that 
village attributes, observable and unobservable attributes in treatment and 
control group are time-invariant. As a result, their effects net out when 
analysing T2 – T1 and C2 – C1. This assumption, however, does not hold in 
practice since attributes are bound to change over time and thus negatively 
affect the quality of DID estimates (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005).  
Overall, the DID approach is immensely popular but not without flaws, therefore 
it should be combined with other techniques. For example, Heckman et al. 
(1997) and Khandker et al. (2010) advocated combining DID with matching 
methods as this would account for selection on both observables and 
unobservables by comparing outcomes of participants before and after an 
intervention with before and after outcomes of matched non-participants 
(Caliendo 2006, Caliendo and Hujer 2005). This, however, assumes that 
observable and unobservable attributes in treatment and control groups are 
time-invariant, which is often not the case. 
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Study  Outcomes  Sign   Risk of bias
Banerjee et 
al 
Table 3a 
Business Creation 
New Business 
Stopped business 
 
Existing busineses 
 
 
 
 
New businesses 
+ selection effect 
 
 Table 3c 
Industries of business 
Fd&agric 
Clothing/sewing 
Rickshaw driving 
Repair./constr 
Crafts vendor 
other 
 
 
 
Monthly hh expenditure 
 
 
 
 
Women Empowerment 
All hh 
Primary decision maker 
Primary non‐food spend. 
Health expend 
Index of social outcomes 
 
Women with loans 
Primary decision maker 
Child major illness 
 
Incidence of Shocks 
 
 
Borrowing to deal with 
shocks 
 
 
Conditional on shock 
Borrowed from  
 
 
All  
+ive (10%) 
+ive (ns) 
 
Profit/Inputs/Revenues/Employees/Wages/Valu
e of assets 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/‐ive (ns)/‐ive 
(ns)/+ive (ns) 
 
 
‐ive (ns)/‐ive (ns)/‐ive (ns)/‐ive (10%)/‐ive (ns)/‐
ive (ns)/ 
 
Old/new 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(10%) 
+ive (ns)/‐ive(ns)/ 
‐ive (ns)/‐ive(10%) 
‐ive (ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive (ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive (ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
Total pce/Nondurable pce/Food pce/Durable 
pce/Durables for business/Temptation 
goods/Festivals – not weddings/Any home 
repair/75th pctile home repair 
+ive (ns)/‐ive (ns)/‐ive (ns)/+ive (10%)/+ive 
(10%)/‐ive (10%)/‐ive(5%)/+ive (ns)/‐ive (ns) 
 
 
 
+ive (ns) 
‐ive (ns) 
+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns) 
 
 
+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns) 
 
Health shock/Property loss/Job losss/Death 
+ive (ns)/‐ive (ns)/‐ive (ns)/‐ive (ns) 
 
Borrowed/Amount/Borrowed from 
MFI/Amount from MFI/Borrowed from 
Spandana 
‐ive (ns)/‐ive (ns)/+ive (5%)/+ive (ns)/+ive (1%) 
 
Spandana/Relatives/friends/Money lender/Other 
source/Received gift/Other financing/Missed 
Low‐moderate ‐ 
ideally would have 
analysed a panel 
data set, but 
baseline proved 
unusable. Possible 
bias due to 
unobserved 
attrition in 
treatment 
locations., and 
behavioural 
changes in control 
areas 
  6.10 Appendix 10: RCT Checklist 
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Table 8 
Effects by business status 
Borrowing 
 
Any MFI 
Non‐MFI 
Pmce 
Durable 
Business durable 
Nonodurable 
Temptation 
 
Business outcomes 
Started new business 
Stopped business 
 
Social index 
 
Table 9 
Existing business owners 
OLS 
Profits 
Drop business with zero 
95th percentile quantile  
Drop business with zero 
Median  regression 
Drop business with zero 
 
 
any work/Days missed 
+ive (1%)/‐ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/‐ive (10%)/‐ive (ns)/‐
ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/‐ive (ns)  
 
 
 
Main New/any old business/w interaction no 
old/new/any old 
+ive (ns)/+ive (1%)/+ive (5%)/‐ive(ns)/+ive (10%) 
‐ive(5%)/‐ive(5%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(5%)/‐ive(5%)/+ive(5%)/+ive(5%) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(5%) 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/‐ive(1%)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(5%)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(10%)/‐ive(1%)/‐ive(10%) 
 
 
+ive(5%)/+ive(5%)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(10%)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
 
 
+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns) 
 
+ive (ns) 
 
+ive (ns) 
Karlan  & 
Zinman 
Borrowinga, business 
outcomesb and other 
outcomesc 
Effects on borrowing 
From lender of close subs 
Any loan outst < 50k 
Loan size >= 50k 
Number of loans <=50k 
 All formal 
Any loan outst < 50k 
Loan size >= 50k 
Number of loans <=50k 
All informal 
Any loan outst < 50k 
Loan size >= 50k 
Number of loans <=50k 
All loans 
Any loan outst < 50k 
Intention to treat basis 
 
 
 
All/male/female/>median/<mdian 
 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%) 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%) 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(5%)/+ive(5%)/+ive(5%)/+ive(ns)/+ive(1%) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(10%)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(5%) 
Moderate 
mainly due  to high 
attrition  (response 
rate)  and 
randomisation 
effects (loan officers 
perceiving  loanees 
with  low  credit 
scores) 
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Loan size >= 50k 
Number of loans <=50k 
 
Business outcomes  
Table 5 
profit 
profit trimmed 
log profit 
total sales 
total sales trimmed 
log total sales 
Business inputs 
Value of inventory 
”  “  “  trimmed 
Lovg inventory 
Number of businesses 
Number of helpers 
Number of paid helpers 
Number unpaid helpers 
Table 6 
Second job 
Any member helping 
“ “ empl outside 
Any overseas wkr 
Any students 
Table 7 
Non‐inventory fixed 
Purchased any assets 
Sold any assets 
wall_concrete 
Floor_concrete 
roof_concrete_metal 
Phone 
Table 8 
health_insurance 
other_insurance 
any_savings 
any_remittances_out 
Table 9 
trust_1 
trust_2 
trust_3 
trust_4 
get_emergency_friend 
get_emergency_family 
get_emergency_famfriend 
 
Table 10 
Household income 
income 
income_trimmed 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(10%) 
 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(10%)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(10%)/+ive(5%)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(10%)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(10%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(10%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(5%)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(5%)/‐ive(10%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(10%)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(10%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(5%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(10)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(10%)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(10%)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(1%)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(1%s)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(5%) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(5%) 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(5%)/‐ive(5%)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(5%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(1%)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
ordered probit 
‐ive(ns/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(5%)/+ive(10%)/+ive(10%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/ive(10%)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
OLS 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(5%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(5%)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
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Notes:   a. 3 variables – any outstanding loans > 50k pesos, <= 50k pesos; loan size, for three 
loan 
 sources –   Lender or  close  substitutes; all  formal  loan, all  informal  loans; and all  loans. 
   b.     Business profits (profits and sales ‐ 6 variables); business inputs (7 variables);   
  c.  Human  capital  and  occupational  choice  (5  variables) 
     non‐inventory  fixed  assets  (6  variables) 
     household  investments  and  risk  management  (4  variables) 
     trust  and  informal  access  (4  variables  –  estimated    by  probit  and  OLS) 
      household  income  and  consumption  (7  variables) 
      subjective measures of well‐being (9 variables and an aggregate index) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
60 Scales of optimism, calmness, (lack of) worry, life satisfaction, work satisfaction, job stress, decision making 
power, and socioeconomic status” (p. 17). 
log_income 
not_poor 
any_remittances_recieved 
food_qual_improved 
could_visit_doctor 
 
Table 11 
Aggregate index of 
subjective well‐being 60 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
 
‐ive(1%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
Evidence of the impact of microfinance: a systematic review  
131 
 
Stu
dy 
D
es
ig
n 
&
 M
et
ho
d 
O
ut
co
m
es
(T
ab
le
 
2)
 
Si
gn
 
&
 
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
 
Fu
rt
he
r d
et
ai
ls
 
R
is
k 
of
 B
ia
s 
an
d 
C
om
m
en
ts
 
Col
ema
n 
Classic 
pipeline 
with 
non‐
participa
nts  in 
both 
Table 2 
Months as VB member  
Sex of household head (females1) 
highest educated female years. 
highest educated male years. 
Number  generations  family  in 
village 
Number relatives in village 
member village chief or assistant? 
Is female in hh a civil servant? 
Is male in hh a civil  servant?  
Female‐owned  land  value  5  years 
ago baht. 
Male‐owned  land value 5 years ago 
baht. 
Does  hh  have  a  village  bank 
member? 
Number females age 5–15 
Number females age 16–21  
Number females age 22–39  
Number females age 40–59  
Number females age 60 and over 
Number males age 5–15  
Number males age 16–21  
Number males age 22–39 
Number males age 40–59  
Number males age 60 and over 
 
Table 3 
Physical assets  
Household wealth  
Women’s wealth  
Men’s wealth  
Household land value _ 
Women’s land value T  
.Men’s land value T 
.Household nonland assets 
Women’s nonland assets  
Men’s nonland assets  
.Household productive assets  
Women’s productive assets. 
Men’s productive assets  
.Household nonland farm assets  
Women’s nonland farm assets  
Men’s nonland farm assets  
Household livestock  
Women’s livestock 
Men’s livestock  
Household business assets  
Women’s business assets  
.Men’s business assets  
Household consumer durables  
Women’s consumer durables  
Men’s consumer durables  
House value  
 
 
Fe/nonfe/naïve/super_naive 
+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/ +ive(1%)/ +ive(1%) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(1%) 
+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
+ive(10)/ +ive(10)/+ive(10)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(10)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(1%) 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%) 
 
‐ive(10)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(10)/ +ive(ns)/ 
 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(5%) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(1%) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(5%) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(5%) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(5%)/+ive(1%) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(5)/‐ive(1%)/‐ive(1%) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(5)/+ive(ns)5 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(5) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(10) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
Except 
super‐
naive 
model 
High 
No 
coefficie
nts 
significa
nt 
except 
in super‐
naive 
model 
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Savings, debt, lending 
Household savings cash 
bank deposits, etc 
Women’s savings 
Men’s savings  
Household low interest debt 
(interest rateF2%rmonth) 
 
 
SaÍings, debt, lending  
Women’s low interest debt  
Men’s low interest debt 
Household high interest debt  
interest rate )2%rmonth  
Women’s high interest debt  
.Men’s high interest debt 
Household lending out at positive 
interest  
Women’s lending out at positive 
interest  
 
Production, sales, expenses, and labor 
Household self‐employment  
production sales and own 
consumption 
Women’s self‐employment sales  
Men’s self‐employment sales  
Household agricultural production 
Women’s agricultural sales  
Men’s agricultural sales  
Household animal production sales 
and own consumption.  
Women’s animal sales  
Men’s animal sales  
Household business sales  
Women’s business sales  
Men’s business sales  
Household self‐employment 
expenses  
Women’s self‐employment expenses  
Men’s self‐employment expenses  
Household farming expenses  
Women’s farming expenses  
Men’s farming expenses  
Household animal‐raising expenses  
 
Production, sales, expenses, and 
labor 
Women’s animal  raising expenses   
Men’s animal‐raising  expenses   
Household business expenses   
Women’s business expenses   
Men’s business expenses   
Household self‐employment labor 
hours  
Women’s self‐employment labor 
hours  
Men’s self‐employment labor hours  
Health care, education  
Household medical expenses   
Medical expenses made for women   
Medical expenses made for men   
Medical expenses made for 
_.children  
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
 
 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(5)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(5)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(5)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
+ive(5)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(10)/+ive(10) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(10)/+ive(10) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(5)/‐ive(5) 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(10)/‐ive(5) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(5)/‐ive(5) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(1)/‐ive(1) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(1)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(1)/‐ive(5)/‐ive(5) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
‐ive(5)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(10)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
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61 E.g. Women’s wealth; household wealth; women’s wealth; men’s wealth; household land; women’s land. 
  
Medical expenses made for girls  
Medical expenses made for boys   
School expenses for children in 
household  
School expenses made for girls  
School expenses made for boys  
 
 
Many economic and social variables: 
Coleman, 1999, Table 3 lists 25 
outcome variables under “assets”, 12 
variables under “Savings, debt 
lending”; 27 under “Production, 
Sales, expenses, and labour”; & 9 
under “Health care , education”61 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 out of 292 possible impacts were significant at p>0.10 
or better 
COl
ema
n, 
200
6 
Pipeline 
t‐tests 
 
Table 11 
Household wealth 
Women’s wealth 
Men’s wealth 
Household land value  
Women’s land value (T)  
Men’s land value (T)  
Household nonland assets  
Women’s nonland assets  
Men’s nonland assets  
Household productive assets  
Women’s productive assets (T)  
Men’s productive assets (T)  
Household nonland farm assets  
Women’s nonland farm  
assets (T)  
Men’s nonland farm assets (T)  
Household livestock  
Women’s livestock (T)  
Men’s livestock (T)  
Household business assets (T)  
Women’s business assets (T)  
Men’s business assets (T)  
Household consumer durables  
Women’s consumer  
durables (T)  
Men’s consumer durables (T)  
House value  
Savings, debt, lending  
Household savings  
(cash, bank deposits, etc.)  
Women’s savings (T)  
Men’s savings (T)  
Household low‐interest debt  
(interest rate 6 2%/month) (T)  
Women’s low‐interest debt (T)  
Men’s low‐interest debt (T)  
Household high‐interest debt  
(interest rate > 2%/month) (T)  
Women’s high‐interest debt (T)  
Men’s high‐interest debt (T)  
Household lending out at  
positive interest (T)  
Women’s lending out at  
Ols with controls mnths rf/mnths comm. Memb 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(1) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(1) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(1) 
 
  high 
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positive interest (T)  
Production, sales, expenses, labor  
Household self‐employment  
production (sales and own 
consumption)  
Women’s self‐employment sales (T)  
Men’s self employment sales (T)  
Household agricultural production  
Women’s agricultural sales (T)  
Men’s agricultural sales (T)  
Household animal production  
(sales and own consumption)  
Women’s animal sales (T)  
Men’s animal sales (T)  
Household business sales (T)  
Women’s business sales (T)  
Men’s business sales (T)  
Household self‐employment  
expenses (purchase of inputs)  
Women’s self‐employment expenses 
(T)  
Men’s self‐employment expenses (T)  
Household farming expenses 
(purchase of inputs)  
Women’s farming expenses (T)  
Men’s farming expenses (T)  
Household animal‐raising  
expenses (purchase of inputs)  
Women’s animal‐raising expenses 
(T)  
Men’s animal‐raising expenses (T)  
Household business expenses 
(purchase of inputs) (T)  
Women’s business expenses (T)  
Men’s business expenses (T)  
Household self‐employment labor 
hours  
Women’s self‐employment labor 
hours  
Men’s self‐employment labor hours  
Health care, education  
Household medical expenses (T)  
Medical expenses made for women 
(T)  
Medical expenses made for men (T)  
Medical expenses made for children 
(T)  
Cop
esta
ke  
200
1 
Pipeline 
&  DID 
on 
growth 
of 
outcome
s 
Growthrate of profits 
Growth rate of profits 
first loan 
second loan 
 
Business diversification  
first loan 
second loan 
 
Household income growth  
first loan 
second loan 
 
‐ 
ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)  
 
‐ive(ns) 
+ive(sig) 
 
 
‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns) 
 
Control 
function 
analysis 
high 
Cop
esta
ke 
200
Pipeline 
& DID 
Table 2  
 
Household income 
 
Value of loans * loans * poverty 
loans ‐ pooled/loans pooled/pooled loans*p/>pl/<pl 
+ive(5%)/+ive(ns)/+ive(1%)+ive(ns)/+ive(1%) 
Controls   High 
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2    ess ‐ive in real terms for those with larger loans 
Cop
esta
ke 
et al 
200
5 
Non‐
clients & 
DID 
control 
function 
Poverty status 
Table 6 DiD 
Business activities 
change in sales  
change in profits 
change in family income 
change in monthly income 
Table 7 & 8 
change monthly per capita income 
 
 
+ive 
 
 
+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns) 
+ive (1%)  
+ive (1%) 
(model 1/model 2/model 3/poorer/richer 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(1%) 
 
 
 
 
Effect 
sizes not 
reported 
 
Cotl
er & 
Wo
odr
uff 
Pipeline, 
panel 
with 
non‐
compara
ble 
control 
Table 2 
Business performance 
profits 
revenues 
inventories 
fixed assets 
Table 3 
profits 
revenues 
inventories 
fixed assets 
 Table 4  
profits 
revenues 
inventories 
fixed assets 
Table 5 
profits 
revenues 
inventories 
fixed assets 
 
Recieving a Loan/sales 
‐ive (sig)/+ive(ns) 
+ive (ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive (sig)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns) 
Recieving loan/loan*assets/sales 
+ive(ns)/ive(sig)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
Amount of loan/amount * size/sales 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
Recieving a loan/loan * assets 
+ive(sig)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/‐ive(sig 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)) 
 
for 
overall 
results, 
but 
some 
differenc
es  by 
loan size 
Medium 
Short 
term – 
3rd wave 
of data 
dropped 
Dei
nin
ger 
& 
Liu 
Pipeline 
& PSM 
Table 5 
Female empowerment; 
social capitala 
economic empowermentb 
political participationc 
 nutritional status; 
energy 
protein  
per capita income, consumption, 
and  
assets 
 
Table 7 
Change 
female social capital 
female econ empowerment 
female polit representation 
energy intake 
protein intake 
consumption 
income pc 
 
 
(trimmed ps weight/kernel) 
+ive (1%)/+ive(1%)  
+ive (1%)/+ive(1%) 
+ive (1%)/+ive(1%) 
 
+ive ns/+ive(ns) 
+ive (1%)/+ive(1%) 
‐ive (ns) /‐ive(ns) 
‐ive (ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
New ps/new kernel/conv ps/conv conv/non ps/non kern 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1/+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1) 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1/+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1) 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1/+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1) 
+ive(5)/+ive(1)/+ive(1/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(5)/+ive(5)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(1)/+ive(5)/+ive(ns/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
PSM 
kernel 
matchin
g    ATT 
estimate
s 
Basically 
similar 
results 
for  two 
sub‐
groups 
of 
participa
nts 
(new, 
and 
converte
d) 
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62 Difference between published paper and original report – latter is consistent with text in paper 
asset pc 
 
 
Table 8 Change 
female social capital 
female econ empowerment 
female polit representation 
energy intake 
protein intake 
consumption 
income pc 
asset pc 
Diff new‐conv/diff new‐non‐part
‐ive(ns/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
0ive(ns)/+ive(5%) 
+ive(10%)/+ive(10%) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(5%) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(5%) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
Kon
do – 
Phil
ippi
nes 
Pipeline 
w/wo; 
matched 
barangu
ays; 
control 
function 
DID 
Table 6 simple t‐tests  
Economic 
Income per capita 
expenditure per capita 
savings 1 
savings 2 
food expenditure 
poor62 
subsistence poor 
Table 7 Program loans 
Economic 
Income per capita 
expenditure per capita 
savings 1 
savings 2 
food expenditure 
Table 8 
non‐GBA loans 
amont other loans 
number other loans 
 
Table 9 
took up non‐GBA loans 
Amount non‐GBA loans 
No. non‐GBA loans 
Table 10 
has savings account 
savings < 5k 
savings 5‐10k 
savings >10k 
Table 11  total savings 
has savings account 
savings < 5k 
savings 5‐10k 
savings >10k 
Table 12 
enterprisese & employment 
with hh enterprise 
no enterprise 
empl fam 
empl non‐fam 
tot empl 
Table 13 
no enterprises 
Participation vs non‐participation 
existing/extension 
+ive(10%)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(5%)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(5%)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(1%)/‐ive(ns 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
Existing areas (psm)/expansion area 
+ive (10%) 
+ive (10%) 
+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns) 
+ive(10%) 
Existing areas/expansion areas 
‐ive(5%)/0ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(1%)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
‐ive(10%) 
0ive(ns) 
0ive(ns) 
Existing areas/expansion areas 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(1%) 
 
+ive(1%) 
‐ive(1%) 
+ive(1%) 
+ive(1*) 
 
Existing areas/expansion areas 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%) 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%) 
+ive(1%)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(5%)/+ive(ns) 
 
+ive(1%) 
+ive(1%) 
Expansi
on  areas 
+ive  (ns) 
all 
 
Participa
nts 
likely  to 
be poor  
moderat
e 
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no employees 
Table 14 Household Assets 
agric&communal land 
agr&commercial land 
farm equipment 
livestock & poultry 
hh appliances 
value hh appliances 
Table 15 education outcomes 
with children 6‐12 
% enrolled 
with children 13‐16 
% enroled 
with children 17‐24 
among children 17‐24 
years per school age child 
year eper attening child 
Table 16 
% ill/injured 
with ill/inj members 
% seeking treatment 
with 0‐5 
prop immunised 
percap medical expend. 
Table 17 Hunger and reduced food 
hunger incidence 
reduced food intake 
Table 18 per capita income 
per capita income 
per capita expenditure 
per capita savings 1 
percapita savings 2 
per capita food expend 
Table 21 by education status 
per capita income 
per capita expenditure 
per capita savings 1 
percapita savings 2 
per capita food expend 
existing areas/expansion areas 
+ive(ns)/0ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(1%) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(5%)/+ive(5%) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(1%)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(1%)/+ive(5%) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(1%)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
q1/g2/g3/g4 
‐ive(1%)/‐ive(1%)/‐ive(ns)/‐iove(1%) 
‐ive(1%)/‐ive(5%)/+ive(ns)/+ive(1%) 
‐ive(1%)/‐ive(1%)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(1%) 
‐ive(1%)/‐ive(1%)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(1%) 
‐ive(1%)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(1%) 
primary/secondary/tertiary 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(1%)/+ive(5%) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(1%)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(10%)/+ive(ns)/+ive(5%) 
‐ive(10%)/+ive(ns)/+ive(5%) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(10%)/+ive(5%) 
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Mo
ntg
ome
ry  – 
Pak
ista
n 
Pipeline  
(OLS 
DID) 
Table 9.2 
 
Household expenditure 
p. c: Food 
p. C.: Non‐Food 
per child medical expenditure. 
per child education  
Table 9.3 Health and education 
prob attending school 
days absent 
seeking medical treatment 
treatment from trained practitioner 
prob. take medicine 
prob. vaccinated  
Table 904 Income and assets 
 
 
livestock (sales) 
livestock (profits) 
microenterprise (sales) 
microenterprise ( profits) 
agriculture (sales) 
 
(OLS) 
Client/corepoor/duration/duration*/poor*duration/amnt 
loans/core poor*amount/cycles/core poor*cycles 
‐(ns)/‐(1)/‐(ns)/0(ns)/0)ns)/+)(ns)/+(ns)/‐(ns) 
+(ns)/‐(5)/+(ns)/‐(ns)/0(ns)/0(ns)/‐(ns)/‐(ns) 
‐(ns)/+(ns)/+(ns)/+(ns)/0(ns)/0(ns)/+(ns)/+(ns) 
+(ns)/‐(1)/+(ns)/+(ns)/0(10)/0(10)/‐(5)/+(5) 
(logit) 
+(5)/‐(1)/‐(1)/+(5)/0(50)/0(ns)/‐(1)/+(5) 
+(ns)/+(ns)/‐(ns)/+(ns)/0(10)/0(ns)/‐(ns)/‐(ns) 
‐(ns)/‐(ns)/+(5)/+(ns)/0(1)/0(ns)/+(1)/‐(ns) 
‐(ns)/‐(ns)/+(10)/+(5)/+(ns)/+(ns)/+(5)/‐(ns) 
+(ns)/‐(ns)/0(ns)/+(ns)/0(ns)/0(ns)/+(ns)/+(ns) 
‐(ns)/‐(5)/+(ns)/+(1)/0(ns)/0(ns)/+(ns)/+(ns) 
(ols) client/core poor/mnths/urban*mnths/core 
poor*mnths/amnt/urban*amnt/core 
poor*amnt/cycles/urban*cycles/core poor*cycles 
‐(ns)/+(ns)/+(ns)/ /‐(ns)/+(ns)//‐(ns)/+(ns)//‐(ns) 
‐(ns)/+(ns)/+(ns)/ /‐(ns)/+(ns)//‐(ns)/+(ns)//‐(ns) 
+(ns)/+(1)/‐(ns)/+(1)/‐(10)/+(ns)/+(1)/‐(10)/+(ns)/+(1)/‐(10) 
+(ns)/‐(1)/‐(ns)/+(1)/+(ns)/‐(ns)/+(1)/‐(ns)/‐(ns)/+(1)/‐(ns) 
+(1)/‐(ns)/+(ns)/ /+(5)/+(1)//+(5)/+(1)//‐(5) 
 
Logit  & 
OLS 
coefficie
nts 
Results 
also 
given 
for 
interacti
on terms 
with 
core 
poor  & 
amount 
borrowe
d 
And 
core 
poor  * 
number 
of  loan 
cycles 
 
Most 
values 
non‐
significa
nt 
Set
boo
nsar
ng 
and 
Par
pie
v  – 
Pak
ista
n 
Pipeline 
with 
PSM  & 
DID  
(same 
data  as 
Montgo
mery) 
Table 13 
Consumption and expenditure 
 
Agricultural inputs  sales and profits  
 
Animal Raising 
 
Household outside income 
Quantity and value of consumer 
durables 
Non‐ag enterprise assets 
 
Household savings 
School expense per child (by sex) \ 
monthly expend per child 
Health seeking 
 
 
 
Women empowerment  
 
 
Working hours for adults and 
children by activity  
 
 
 
Table 14 effects on poor 
Consumption and expenditure 
Agricultural inputs  sales and profits 
 
Nearest neighbour
mpce_total/mpce/mpce_food/mpce_nonfood 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
ag sales/pesticides/ farm equipment ‐value/rent income 
 +ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig) 
livestock value/sales/annual inputs/agricultural profits 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig) 
‐ive(ns) 
quant/value 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
capital assets/net assets/monthly inputs/sales/profits 
 +ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive (ns) 
school exp per child/ per girl / per boy 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive (ns) 
medical expenditure per capita/when ill seeks 
treatment/can pay for medic expend/ORS/under 5 
vaccinated  
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
have say in schooling/have say in health care/use 
contraception/incidence of domestic violence 
‐ive(ns)‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
working hours adult on crops/animals/non‐agric 
business/ total/child working hours on farm 
crops/animal raising/ non‐agric bs/ total  
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/‐
ive(sig)/+ive(ns) 
mpce_total/mpce/mpce_food/mpce_nonfood 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
ag sales/pesticides/value of farm equipment/rental 
income from farm equipment  
  Impact 
of 
member
ship  on 
MDG 
variable
s. 
Second 
set  of 
results 
of 
lending 
on MDG 
variable
s  – 
similar 
mixed 
results 
of  low 
statistica
l 
significa
nce) 
Evidence of the impact of microfinance: a systematic review  
139 
 
 
Notes:   a.  self‐reported  level  of  trust  in  individuals  of  the  same  or  different  caste  or 
religion from within or outside the village as well as  in government officials and 
police, all on a 1‐5 scale. 
b. woman can set aside money for her own use, go to the market, to the clinic or 
the community centre, visit friends, or work on fields outsides the village, without 
asking permission from her husband or  other males  in  the  family.  In  either  case, 
we use principal component method to generate an index based on a single factor. 
  c. frequency of their attendance at village meetings. 
 
Household outside income 
Quantity and value of consumer 
durables  
 
Non‐ag enterprise assets 
 
 
Household savings 
School expense per child (by sex)  
 
 
Health seeking 
 
 
 
Women empowerment  
 
 
Working hours for adults and 
children by activity  
 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)
‐ive(ns) 
Quant/val 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
gross capital assets/net capital assets/monthly 
inputs/sales/profits 
 +ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns) 
monthly expend per child/school exp per child/school 
exp per girl/school exp per boy 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
medical expenditure per capita/when ill seeks 
treatment/can pay for medic expend/ORS/under 5 
vaccinated 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
have say in schooling/have say in health care/use 
contraception/incidence of domestic violence 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
working hours adult on crops/animals/non‐agric 
business/ total/child working hours on farm 
crops/animal raising/ non‐agric bs/ total  
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/‐
ive(sig)/+ive(ns) 
Stee
le, 
Am
in 
and 
Nav
ed, 
200
1 
Pipeline 
panel    
fixed/ra
ndom 
effects 
models 
Table 7Use of modern 
contraceptives 
Basic (naive) estimate 
use all & modern methods 
 all ASA & SC members 
Random effects 
use of modern contraception 
 
 
 
 
+ive (0.1%) 
old area member/new area non‐ASA SC member/new 
area SC member /new area‐ASA ASA member 
+ive (1 %)/+ive ns/+ive (ns)/+ive (5%) 
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Study Identific
ation/sp
ecificati
on tests 
perform
ed?a  
Identific
ation 
problem 
address
ed? 
Metho
d, 
tests 
Outcome variables63 
 
 
Sign and significance 
 
Comments Risk 
of 
Biasb 
Cuong 
2008 
Y Y IV & 
LIML 
 
 
 
 
log pcexpend () 
logpcincome 
 
 
 
logpcexpend (loan size) 
logpcincome 
(participation) 
 
Table 6 poverty indexes 
hcr 
pg 
pg2 
Appendix Table 4 2SLS 
log pc expend 
log income pc 
 
Table 5 
2sls/gmm/liml/2sls fe 
log pc expend 
log income pc 
Table 6 poverty index 
hcr 
pg 
pg2 
Appendix Table 7 
interaction prog * pov 
log pc expend 
2sls 
 
gmm 
 
liml 
 
log income pc 
 
2sls 
 
gmm 
 
liml 
 
loan size - 
2sls/gmm/liml/2sls/gmm/liml 
participation -
2sls/gmm/liml/2sls/gmm/liml 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1)/ 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1) 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1)/ 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1) 
 
 
+ive(1)  
+ive(1) 
 
(size of loans – not clear) 
2sls/gmm/liml 
-ive(10)/-ive(5)/-ive(5) 
-ive(ns)/-ive(5)/-ive(5) 
-ive(10)/-ive(5)/-ive(10) 
loan size/participation 
+ive(1)/+ive(1) 
+ive(5)/+ive(5) 
 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1) 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1) 
2sls/gmm/liml 
-ive(10)/-ive(ns)/-ive(10) 
-ive(5)/-ive(5)/-ive(5) 
-ive(5)/-ive(5)/-ive(10 
 
 
Lnsize/loansize*poor/poor2002/p
art /part*poor/poor2002 
+ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/-
ive(1)/+ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/-ive(1) 
+ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/-
ive(1)/+ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/-ive(1) 
+ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/-
ive(5)/+ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/-ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/-
ive(1)/+ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/-ive(5) 
+ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/-
ive(1)/+ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/-ive(5) 
+ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/-
ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/-ive(ns) 
Various 
estimations: 
IV with FE and 
LIML 
Various 
estimations: 
IV with FE, 
LIMIL 
Moder
ate 
Diagne 
and 
Zeller 
2001 
Y Possibly LIML 
model 
Table 25 Income per 
capita 
 
Table 26 Crop income  
 
All results insignificant 
+ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns) 
 
Broken down 
by credit 
membership 
 
High 
                                                 
63 As noted above, many papers do not set out a clear theory of change elaborating pathways between 
microfinance and desirable outcomes. Hence, many papers list and report impact estimates on very large 
numbers of outcome variables. They also use different significance levels. The variables reported are listed 
more fully in an Excel spreadsheet which can be made available on request. The original papers are the most 
useful source of both. 
  6.12 Appendix 12: With/without 2SLS Checklist  
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Table 27 nonfarm 
seasonal income 
Table 28 Food 
expenditure 
5 dummies 
Table 29 calorie intake 
 
Table 30 Protein 
5 dummies 
Table 31  
waz 
Table 32  
haz 
+ive(ns) 
 
-ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns) 
 
 
+ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns) 
 
-ive(ns) 
 
 
 
Imai et 
al. 2010 – 
discussed 
in section 
5.3.1.2 
Y Possibly Treat
ment 
effects 
model, 
essenti
ally a 
Heckm
an 
proced
ure 
Table 2 2stage 
treatment effects 
IBR (Index based 
Ranking) 
Income 
Food Security 
 
Table 3 tobit 
IBR 
Income 
Food Security 
 
Table 4 tobit 
IBR 
Income 
Food Security 
Appendix 2 – PSM 
poverty reducing effect 
whole sample 
access  
Productive loan 
 
Appendix 3–psm  
access 
poor  
mod por  
 
productive loan 
poor 
mod por 
Access - Total/urban/rural/Use- 
Total/urban/rural 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+i
ve(1)/+ive(1) 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1)/-ive(1)/-
ive(1)/-ive(1) 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+i
ve(1)/+ive(1) 
Amount of prod loan 
Total/urban/rural/Use 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(10)  
-ive(1)/-ive(ns)/-ive(1) 
+ive(1)/+ive(ns)/+ive(1) 
Total amount of loan 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(1)  
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+ive(5)  
+ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/+ive(ns)  
 
Nn total/u/r/kern t/r.u 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)+ive(ns)/+ive(1)/+i
ve(1)/+ive(1) 
+ive(1)/+ive(ns)+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+i
ve(1)/+ive(1) 
 
 
+ive(5)/+ive(ns)+ive(5)/+ive(1)/+i
ve(ns)/+ive(1) 
+ive(1)/+ive(ns)+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+i
ve(1)/+ive(1) 
 
+ive(1)/+ive(ns)+ive(1)/+ive(1)/-
ive(ns)/+ive(1) 
+ive(1)/+ive(5)+ive(1)/+ive(1)/+iv
e(1)/+ive(1) 
Results for 
total sample 
also presented 
but the 
heterogeneity 
renders them 
uninteresting.  
High 
PnK (all 
except 
those 
applying 
PSM on 
PnK data) 
(SEE 
APPENDIX 
17 FOR 
FURTHER 
DETAILS) 
Y – RnM 
N other 
studies 
N – issue 
of 
mistarge
ting 
remains 
LIML 
model 
Main PnK paper 
consumption 
female non-landed 
assets 
male & female labour 
supply 
boys & girls school 
enrolment 
Main PnK paper: positive & 
significant for most outcome 
variables 
for other outcome variables see 
Appendix 17 
Morduch, 
Chemin, RnM, 
Duvendack 
and 
Duvendack 
and Palmer-
Jones find 
different 
results see 
Table 10b 
Main 
PnK 
paper: 
High 
Shimamu
ra and 
Lastarria-
Cornhiel 
2010 
N Unclear IV Table 8 school 
attendance all 
6-14 
15-18 
 
OLS/2SLS 
-ive (ns)/-ive (10%) 
-ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
 
 
 
High 
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Table 9 + 10 
Girl 
6-14 
15-18 
Boy 
6-14 
15-18 
Table 12 Child work 
Crop farming 
6-14 
15-18 
Table 13 Household 
chores 
6-14 
15-18 
 
 
-ive (10%)/-ive (10%) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
 
+ive (ns)/-ive (ns) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
 
 
-ive (5%)/+ive(ns) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
 
-ive (5%)/-ive (1%) 
-ive (ns)/-ive (ns) 
Zaman 
1999 
Y Possibly Heckm
an 
Table 4.0 poverty 
 
 
 
Table 5.0  
membership 
6 land ownership * loan 
amount variables 
 
Table 11 
Aware that dowry is 
illegal 
 
Aware of method of 
divorce  
Aware of minimum 
marriage age  
Aware of local 
chairman’s name  
Owns land  
 
Owns poultry 
 
If owns poultry % that 
can sell poultry 
independently (N = 980) 
Owns livestock 
 
If owns livestock % that 
can sell livestock 
independently (N = 103) 
Owns jewelry  
 
If owns jewelry % that 
can sell jewelry 
independently (N = 694)  
Has savings  
If has savings % can use 
savingsindependently (N 
= 379) 
Forced pregnancy  
Visits local market - 
Equ3.1/eq3.2/equ3.3/equ3.4: 
identificationwith  
no elig hh/no elig ff/ff/ols vill fe 
-ive(ns)/-ive(ns)/-ive(5%)/-ive(ns) 
  
-ive(10%) 
ml1/ml2/ml3/ul1/ul2/ul3 
+ive(ns)/-
ive(ns)/+ive(10)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)
/+ive(ns) 
BRVO/LOADUM1/LOADUM2/LOAD
UM3 
 0.033(ns)/-0.001(ns)/ 
0.047(ns)/.077(ns) 
-0.006(ns)/-
0.01(ns)/0.007(ns)/0.045(5%) 
0.036(ns)/-0.076(5%)/-
0.064(5%)/0.008(ns) 
0.021(ns)/0.160(5%)/0.089(ns)/0.
123(5%) 
0.112(5%)/0.036(ns)/0.106(10%)/0
.058(ns) 
0.121(1%)/-0.094(ns)/-0.133(5%)/-
0.144(5%) 
 
-0.103(10%)/0.048(ns)/-
0.007(ns)/0.245(1%) 
-
0.046(10%)/0.058(10%)/0.036(ns)/
0.046(ns) 
 
-0.178(ns)/-0.021(ns)/0.094(ns)/-
0.265(ns) 
0.08(10%)(ns)/-0.014(ns)/-
0.093(ns)/-0.089(ns) 
 
0.017(ns)/0.032(ns)/0.011(ns)/0.0
79(10%) 
 
0.473(1%)/0.086(10%)/0.110(5%)/
0.118(1%) 
 
-
0.345(1%)/0.085(ns)/0.064(ns)/0.
151(10%) 
0.004(ns)/-0.035(10%)/-
Paper has 
many 
problems, for 
example 
including 
(presumably 
wrongly) of 
BRVO as the 
dependent 
variable in the 
first stage and 
also on the 
RHS in the 
second stage 
of the Heckit 
estimation of 
equations 
High 
Evidence of the impact of microfinance: a systematic review  
143 
 
Visits Matlab market - 0.006(ns)/-0.001(ns) 
0.037(ns)/0.084(ns)/0.097(5%)/0.
029(ns) 
0.038(ns)/0.037(ns)/0.026(ns)/0.0
07(ns) 
Zeller et 
al. 2001 
N Unclear IV Table 5.4 & 5.5  
(BRAC&ASA vs RDRS) 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 
Mpce food expenditure  
 
Table 5.7 Calorie cons. 
all seasons 
Income 
Credit limit  
HYV cultivation/ mpce - 
aus/aman/boro 
 -
ive((10%)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(
ns) 
Aus/Aman/Boro  
+ive (5%)/+ive (5%)/+ive (ns) 
 
aus/aman/boro 
+ive sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig 
+ive sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig 
 High 
 
Notes: a. Identification and/or specification tests can include Sargan-Hansen, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests, 
and/or others. 
b. For reasons explained elsewhere in this report we have included these studies which have low inherent 
credibility because of their with/without design, but among these we provide an essentially subjective 
assessment of risk of bias based on criteria in data extraction tables. It is, in our view, better to provide this 
judgement which influences our overall judgements rather than leave this unreported. Readers are, of course, 
free to disagree on the informational basis of our account. 
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Study  Balanci
ng tests 
perfor
med? 
Mor
e 
contr
ols 
than 
treat
ed? 
Match
ing 
qualit
y 
assess
ed 
throu
gh 
tests? 
Sensiti
vity 
analysi
s? 
Outcome 
variables 
Sign & Significance Comm
ents 
Risk 
of 
bias 
Abera 
2010) 
Report
ed  that 
balanci
ng 
propert
ies  are 
satisfie
d  but 
no 
evidenc
e 
provid
ed. 
Uncl
ear 
N  N  Table  4.3
Househol
d medical 
expenditur
es 
Expenditu
re on 
children’s 
education 
 
Expenditu
res on 
social 
occasions 
Expenditu
re on 
clothing 
and 
personal 
items 
Table  4.4 
Househol
d fixed 
assets 
(house) 
Househol
d fixed 
assets(wit
hout 
house) 
Househol
d 
productive 
assets  
Table  4.5 
Househol
d 
expenditur
e on food 
Househol
d 
expenditur
e on food 
& non‐
food 
Househol
d poverty 
gap 
squared 
Strat/radius/nn/kernelc 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(1%)/+ive(1%)/+ive(ns)/=ive(5
%) 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/++ive(ns)/+ive(ns
) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/++ive(10%)/+ive(
ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/++ive(10%)/+ive(
ns) 
+ive(10%)/+ive(ns)/+ive(5%)/+ive(
ns) 
 
‐ive(5%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(5%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(5%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
 
+ive(5%) 
+ive(ns) 
 
olsfe /ols 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
re/ols 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
PSM 
results 
only 
Mode
rate 
6.13 Appendix 13: With/without PSM Checklist 
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Study  Balanci
ng tests 
perfor
med? 
Mor
e 
contr
ols 
than 
treat
ed? 
Match
ing 
qualit
y 
assess
ed 
throu
gh 
tests? 
Sensiti
vity 
analysi
s? 
Outcome 
variables 
Sign & Significance Comm
ents 
Risk 
of 
bias 
Table  4.7
(2step) 
Househol
d total and 
food 
expenditur
e 
Table 4.8 
(2step fe) 
Productive 
assets 
Fixed 
assets 
Table  4.11 
hhpercapit
a monthly 
expenditur
e 
Table  4.12
pov gap 
ratio 
Table  4.13
pove gap 
ratio 
Abou‐
Ali et al 
(2010) 
N 
Y in 
workin
g paper 
version 
Uncl
ear 
N  Y – but 
not  for 
the 
microc
redit 
estimat
es  of 
their 
study 
(MF 
results 
only) 
PSM 
kernel 
matching 
Farm 
income 
per capita 
 
 
Non‐farm 
income 
per capita 
 
 
Ln(expend
iture per 
capita)  
 
 
Ln(income 
per capita) 
 
 
Ln(food 
expenditur
Met/LEU/LER/UEU/UERa 
 
+ive(10%)/‐ive(10%)/‐
ive(10%)/+ive(5%)/‐ive(10%) 
 
+ive(10%)/+ive(10%)/+ive(10%)/+i
ve(10%)/+ive(10%) 
 
+ive(10%)/+ive(10%)/‐ive(ns)/‐
ive(10%)/‐ive(10%) 
 
+ive(10%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(10%)/‐
ive(10%)/‐ive(10%) 
 
+ive(10%)/+ive(10%)/‐ive(ns)/‐
ive(10%)/‐ive(10%) 
 
+ive(10%)/+ive(10%)/+ive(ns)/+ive
(10%)/+ive(10%) 
 
+ive(5%)/+ive(ns)/+ive(10%)/‐
ive(ns)/+ive(5%) 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(10%)/+ive(10%)/‐
ive(ns)/+ive(10%) 
 
+ive(10%)/+ive(10%)/+ive(10%)/+i
Lower 
& 
Upper 
Egypt 
rural 
mainly 
‐ive 
High 
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Study  Balanci
ng tests 
perfor
med? 
Mor
e 
contr
ols 
than 
treat
ed? 
Match
ing 
qualit
y 
assess
ed 
throu
gh 
tests? 
Sensiti
vity 
analysi
s? 
Outcome 
variables 
Sign & Significance Comm
ents 
Risk 
of 
bias 
e per 
capita) 
 
 Food as 
share 
ofexpendit
ure 
 
  
Unemploy
ment rate 
(in area)  
 
Percentage 
in area 
working 
for awage 
 
 
Percentage 
in area 
self‐
employed  
 
Illiteracyra
te (in area)
 
  
Povertyga
p rate (P1) 
 
 
 
Headcoun
t poverty 
rate (P0) 
Percentage 
in area  
 
ve(10%)/+ive(10%) 
 
‐ive(10%)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(10%)/‐
ive(ns)/‐ive(10%) 
 
‐ive(10%)/‐
ive(10%)/+ive(10%)/+ive(10%)/+iv
e(10%) 
 
‐ive(10%)/‐
ive(ns)/+ive(10%)/+ive(10%)/+ive(
10%) 
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Study  Balanci
ng tests 
perfor
med? 
Mor
e 
contr
ols 
than 
treat
ed? 
Match
ing 
qualit
y 
assess
ed 
throu
gh 
tests? 
Sensiti
vity 
analysi
s? 
Outcome 
variables 
Sign & Significance Comm
ents 
Risk 
of 
bias 
Imai, 
Arun 
and 
Annim 
(2010)1 
N  N  N  N  See  Table 
in 
appendix 
12 
See Table in appendix 12    High 
Imai 
and 
Azam 
(2010) 
Y  N  N  N  Income 
per capita 
panel 
 
wave 1 
wave 2 
wave 3 
wave 4 
 
‐ive (ns)  
TE/NN/Knlb 
+iv(1)/+ive(5)/+ive(5%) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)  
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)  
‐ive(1)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(1%) 
 
 
Mode
rate 
PnK 
(Chemi
n, 
Duven
dack) 
Y  N  Y  Y  See  Table 
in 
appendix 
17 
See Table in appendix 17    High 
Takaha
shi, 
Higashi
kata 
and 
Tsukud
a (2010) 
Y  Y  Y  N  Table 5
Income/pr
ofits 
income 
Profits 
self‐empl 
business 
Profits 
non‐fm 
enterprise 
Profits 
aqua/farmi
ng 
Sales 
Self‐empl 
business 
non‐fm 
enterprise 
Profits 
aqua/farmi
ng 
Assets 
savings 
durables 
livestock 
Expenditu
res 
Schololing 
per attend 
Schooling 
Per child 
Medical 
Female 
clothing 
Ols/did 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(10%) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(10%) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(10%)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
Att/slope poor 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(5%)/‐ive(5%) 
+ive(5%)/‐ive(5%) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
PSM 
DID 
High 
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Study  Balanci
ng tests 
perfor
med? 
Mor
e 
contr
ols 
than 
treat
ed? 
Match
ing 
qualit
y 
assess
ed 
throu
gh 
tests? 
Sensiti
vity 
analysi
s? 
Outcome 
variables 
Sign & Significance Comm
ents 
Risk 
of 
bias 
Table 6
Income/pr
ofits 
income 
Profits 
self‐empl 
business 
Profits 
non‐fm 
enterprise 
Profits 
aqua/farmi
ng 
Sales 
Self‐empl 
business 
non‐fm 
enterprise 
Profits 
aqua/farmi
ng 
Assets 
savings 
durables 
livestock 
Expenditu
res 
Schololing 
per attend 
Schooling 
Per child 
Medical 
Female 
clothing 
+ive(ns)/+ive(5%) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(5%) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
USAID 
(Augsb
urg,  
Y  N  Y  N  
 
Main 
USAID 
papers:  
Table 3 
 
Hh yearly 
income 
 
Hh income 
per capita 
 
Total 
income 
last year 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Hh yearly 
income 
Main USAID papers:  
 
Nn1/nn2/kernel1/kernel2 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(si
g) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(si
g) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(si
g) 
 
Nm31/nmsav35/nm260/nm+sav47
5 
+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(si
g) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(si
g) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
First diff 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
  Main 
USAI
D 
paper
s:  
High 
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Sign & Significance Comm
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of 
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Hh income 
per capita 
 
Total 
income 
last year 
 
No table 
Hh yearly 
income 
 
Hh income 
per capita 
 
Total 
income 
last year 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
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gh 
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variables 
Sign & Significance Comm
ents 
Risk 
of 
bias 
Usaid 
Duven
dack 
       Y   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Total 
household 
income 
per annum 
in Rupees 
R1 
 R2 
Total 
household 
income 
per annum 
per capita 
in 
Rupees R1
R2 
 
Expenditu
re for 
housing 
improvem
ents in 
Rupees R1
R2   
 
School 
enrolment 
for girls 
aged 5 to 
10 R1 
R2 
 
School 
enrolment 
for boys 
aged 5 to 
10 R1 
R2 
 
School 
enrolment 
for girls 
aged 11 to 
17 R1 
R2 
 
School 
enrolment 
Round 1 ‐ USAID/PSM ‐ 5 nearest 
neighbour matching/PSM – 
kernel matching/PSM ‐ kernel 
matching bandwidth 0.01 
ROUND 2 
 
+ive(1%)/+ive (1%)/+ive (1%) 
+ive (1%)/+ive (1%)/+ive (1%) 
 
 
 
+ive (1%)/+ive (1%)/+ive (1%) 
+ive (1%)/+ive (1%)/+ive (1%) 
 
 
+ive(1%)/+ive (1%)/+ive (1%) 
+ive /+ive (1%)/+ive (1%) 
 
 
‐ive (ns)/+ive(ns) /+ive(ns)  
‐+ive (ns)/+ive(ns) /+ive(ns) 
 
 
+ive (ns)/‐ive(ns) /‐ive (ns) 
+ive(ns) /+ive(ns) /‐ive(ns) 
 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive /0+ive  
‐+ive /+ive /+ive 
 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ ive(ns) /‐ ive(ns) 
‐ ive (1%)/‐ ive(ns) /‐ ive(ns) 
 
 
 
 
 
+ive(1%) 
 
+ive(1%) 
+ive(ns) 
 
+ive(1%) 
 
+ive(5%) 
 
‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns) 
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treat
ed? 
Match
ing 
qualit
y 
assess
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gh 
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Outcome 
variables 
Sign & Significance Comm
ents 
Risk 
of 
bias 
for boys 
aged 11 to 
17 R1 
R2 
 
Table7 
PSM and 
DID  
Househol
d level 
hypothese
s 
Total 
household 
income 
per annum 
in Rupees 
Total 
household 
income 
per annum 
per capita 
in Rupees 
Inverse 
Simpson 
index 
Expenditu
re for 
housing 
improvem
ents in 
Rupees 
Expenditu
re on 
household 
assets in 
Rupees 
School 
enrolment 
for girls 
aged 5 to 
10 
School 
enrolment 
for boys 
aged 5 to 
10 
School 
enrolment 
for girls 
 
+ive(ns) 
 
‐ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns) 
 
 
 
+ive(5%) 
 
 
+ive(5%) 
 
 
+ive(5%) 
 
 
 
 
+ve(5%) 
 
 
+ive(ns) 
 
 
 
 
+ive(ns)  
 
 
+ive(1%) 
 
 
 
+ive(1%) 
 
R1 5nn/Kern.01/R2 R1/5nn 
Kern.01 
 
 
+ive(1)/+ive (1)/+ive (1)/+ive (1) 
+ive (1)/+ive/(1)/+ive (1)/+ive (1) 
+ive (5)/ +ive (5)/+ive (1)/+ive (1) 
+ive (5)/+ive (1)/+ive (1)/+ive (1) 
+ive(1)/ +ive (1)/+ive(ns)/ 
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Sign & Significance Comm
ents 
Risk 
of 
bias 
aged 11 to 
17 
School 
enrolment 
for boys 
aged 11 to 
17 
Food 
expenditur
e per day 
per capita 
in Rupees 
Enterprise 
level 
hypothese
s 
Informal 
sector 
income of 
whole 
household 
‐ per 
month in 
Rupees 
Informal 
sector 
income of 
responden
t only ‐ per 
month in 
Rupees 
Microenter
prise 
revenues 
of all 
enterprises 
in 
household 
‐ per 
month in 
Rupees 
Microenter
prise 
revenues 
of 
microenter
prises for 
which 
responden
t is 
 
 
 
+ive(1)/ +ive (1)/ +ive (1)/ +ive (1) 
+ive(5)/+ive(10)/+ive (5)/+ive(5) 
+ive (5)/ +ive(5)/ +ive(1)/ +ive(1) 
+ive(5)/ +ive(5)/ +ive(1)/ +ive(1) 
+ive(1)/ +ive(1)/ +ive(ns)/ 
 
 
 
+ive (1)/ +ive (1)/ +ive(5)/ +ive(5) 
+ive (5)/+ive(5)/ +ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(5)/ +ive(10)/ +ive(1)/+ive(10) 
+ive(1)/+ive(1)/ +ive(10)/+ive(10) 
+ive(1)/ +ive(1)/‐ +ive(ns)/ 
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Risk 
of 
bias 
primarily 
responsibl
e ‐ per 
month in 
Rupees 
Current 
value of 
fixed 
assets of 
all 
microenter
prises in 
household 
in Rupees 
Current 
value of 
fixed 
assets of 
microenter
prises for 
which 
responden
t is 
primarily 
responsibl
e in 
Rupees 
Hours 
worked in 
previous 
week in all 
microenter
prises in 
household 
Days 
worked in 
previous 
month in 
all 
microenter
prises in 
household 
 
Table 8 
PSM with 
sub‐
groups 
Total 
household 
income 
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Sign & Significance Comm
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of 
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per annum  
borr vs 
control 
borvs 
saver 
saver vs 
control 
one time 
vs control 
repeat vs 
control 
 
Total 
household 
income 
per annum 
per capita 
borr vs 
control 
borvs 
saver 
saver vs 
control 
one time 
vs control 
repeat vs 
control 
 
Expenditu
re for 
housing 
improvem
ents  
borr vs 
control 
borvs 
saver 
saver vs 
control 
one time 
vs control 
repeat vs 
control 
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6.14 Appendix 14: Other with/without studies 
Study Method Control 
Group 
Control 
Variabl
es 
Outcome variables Sign & 
Significance 
Comments Risk of 
bias 
Barnes 
2001, 
USAID 
Zimbabwe  
Panel Y N Multiple  
Economic 
Social 
Empowerment variable 
Mainly +ive & 
significant 
Discussed in 
depth in 
section 3.4.2 
High 
Chen 1999,  
USAID India 
Panel Y N Multiple  
Economic 
Social 
Empowerment variable 
Mainly +ive & 
significant 
Discussed in 
depth in 
section 3.4.2 
High 
Chen 2001, 
USAID India 
Panel Y N Multiple  
Economic 
Social 
Empowerment variable 
Mainly +ive & 
significant 
Discussed in 
depth in 
section 3.4.2 
High 
Dunn 1999, 
USAID Peru  
Panel Y N Multiple  
Economic 
Social 
Empowerment variable 
Mainly +ive & 
significant 
Discussed in 
depth in 
section 3.4.2 
High 
Dunn 2001, 
USAID Peru  
Panel Y N Multiple  
Economic 
Social 
Empowerment variable 
Mainly +ive & 
significant 
Discussed in 
depth in 
section 3.4.2 
High 
Tedeschi 
2008, 
USAID Peru 
Panel Y N Re-analysis of USAID Peru 
study 
   
Shirazi and 
Khan 2009 
DID Yes No Poverty 
Extremely poor 
Ultra poor 
Vulnerable 
Quasi-non poor 
Non poor 
-ive(ng) 
+ive(n) 
-ive(ng) 
-ive(ng) 
+ive(ng) 
-ive(ng 
+ive(ng) 
Significance 
levels not 
given 
High 
Swain and 
Wallentin 
2009 
Robust 
Maximum 
Likelihood 
Yes Yes Empowerment +ive(sig) Control group 
does not 
account for 
unobervables 
High 
Tesfay 
2009 
Panel Yes Yes (Table 5.3) 
Per captia consumption 
Housing improvement 
(Table 5.4) 
Per captia consumption 
Housing improvement 
 
+ive(1%) 
+ive(1%) 
 
+ive(1%) 
+ive(1%) 
 Moderate 
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6.15 Appendix 15: Selected summaries of key studies 
The studies summarised in Appendix 15 were selected in an arbitrary way. We 
could not possibly summarise all studies included in this review due to time and 
budget constraints, therefore we only provide a summary of those studies we 
felt appeared to be particularly rigorous, i.e. with the least amount of bias, or 
have received a lot of attention from researchers and deserved further 
attention. 
6.15.1 RCTs 
6.15.1.1 Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan 2009/2010 (India) 
This study claimed, apparently correctly, to be the ‘first randomized experiment 
of the impact of microfinance in a new market’ (abstract); it found that 15-18 
months after introduction of loans: 
no effect of access to microcredit on average monthly expenditure 
per capita, but expenditure on durable goods increased in treated 
areas and the number of new businesses increased by one third. The 
effects of microcredit access are heterogeneous: households with an 
existing business at the time of the programme invest more in 
durable goods, while their nondurable consumption does not change. 
Households with high propensity to become new business owners 
increase their durable goods spending and see a decrease in 
nondurable consumption, consistent with the need to pay a fixed 
cost to enter entrepreneurship. Households with low propensity to 
become business owners increase their nondurable spending. We find 
no impact on measures of health, education, or women’s decision-
making. 
The randomisation design was a subset of 104 ‘slums’ of Hyderabad which the 
MFI, lending ‘almost exclusively’ to women in self-formed groups, was 
considering entering. Slums were paired on a minimum distance by a set of 
variables, one of which was randomly chosen for entry by the MFI; approximately 
65 households (not the poorest of the poor) from each slum (treatment and 
control) were selected64. External design validity was subject not only to the 
location in a single city at a specific time, but also to exclusion of the largest 
slum areas where the MFI was ‘keen to start operations’, and to areas with a 
‘high proportion of migrant’ or construction workers. 
The randomisation of areas, if they are separated spatially sufficiently, allows 
accounting for spill-over effects within the location; no evidence on spatial 
separation was provided. 
The study planned a panel starting with a pre-intervention baseline and an 
endline survey, but the baseline survey turned out to be ‘non-random’ and too 
small to detect effects, although some data are reported. The endline survey 
was independently sampled based on a census of the locations, except for some 
500 households which reported borrowing (from any source) in the baseline 
                                                 
64 ‘The remaining 104 were assigned to pairs based on minimum distance according to per capita consumption, 
fraction of households with debt, and fraction of households who had a business, and one of each pair was 
assigned to the treatment group’ (p5). We presume that the MFI was considering entry in the control locations 
at a later date making this an incipient pipeline design with randomised allocation of areas to treatment and 
control. This does not seem to be reported but would be required for ethical reasons to not discriminate 
against the control locations.  
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survey who were retained65. All areas had few MFI loans but most households 
reported borrowing from informal or formal sector sources. About a third 
reported having an existing (very small) business. Health shocks were common as 
was borrowing consequent on such shocks. 
Samples from treatment and control locations seem to have been chosen 
subsequent to allocation to treatment arm66, a possible threat to validity (Puffer 
et al. 2003), and were shown not differ on a number of relevant variables from 
baseline and endline surveys; samples were also subdivided by propensity to 
become entrepreneurs. Although other MFIs entered both treatment and control 
areas, entry of the partner MFI was associated with increased borrowing in 
treatment areas (27% vs. 18.7%), particularly from MFIs. A further threat to 
validity was that potential borrowers in the control areas may have postponed 
investments in the expectation of entry by the MFI.  
Households can respond to availability of credit through three channels; by 
lowering interest rates and relaxations of present and possibly future credit 
constraints leading to changed investments in fixed and working capital. 
Secondly, by lending to women it can alter their specific credit constraints, and 
also alter intra-household dynamics leading to changed patterns of employment, 
time allocation (including school enrolment), and expenditure, often argued 
particularly on health and children. Thirdly, it can alter behaviour that may be 
constrained by lack of savings vehicles. 
The analysis was conducted on an intention-to-treat basis without covariates, 
and with dummies for business status differentiating between those who already 
have businesses and those with a high propensity to form new businesses. 
Estimates took account of heteroscedasticity and clustering (by slum). Many 
outcome variables were tested, with no allowance for increased likelihood of a 
chance effect due to multiple outcome assessment, but ‘[W]hile microcredit 
succeeds in affecting household expenditure and creating and expanding 
businesses, it appears to have no discernible effect on education, health, or 
womens’ empowerment’ (p30) within the 15-18 month time period of the study. 
This left the study to conclude: 
at least in the short-term (within 15-18 months), microcredit does not appear to 
be a recipe for changing education, health, or womens decision-making. 
Microcredit therefore may not be the ‘miracle’ that is sometimes claimed (p31).  
Thus, this study did not find very convincing meaningful impacts on well-being, 
did find impacts on intervening variables, but in a short time period only, and 
may not have had adequate statistical power to identify impacts on the well-
being characteristics that were the primary purpose of development 
intervention. Had a true panel been available as presumably originally intended, 
there may have been sufficient statistical power to identify effects on well-
being. Thus, the door is left open to others to conclude that ‘[The] study’s 
                                                 
65 ‘These problems were both corrected in the follow up survey, at the cost of not having a panel. The 
exception to the non-resurveying of baseline households is a small sample of households (about 500 households) 
who indicated they had loans at the baseline, who were surveyed with the goal of understanding the impact of 
an increase in credit availability for those households who were already borrowing (though not from MFIs). This 
analysis is ongoing’ (p6). 
66 It is not clear when selection into the control sample was undertaken; the baseline survey was conducted in 
2005 prior to entry. It appears that allocation of cluster to treatment and control took place prior to ‘Spandana 
then progressively [beginning to operate] in the 52 treatment areas, between 2006 and 2007’ (2009, p5). A 
sample frame was constructed from a ‘comprehensive census’ in 2007, and the endline survey was conducted 
between August 2007 and April 2008 (ibid, p5). Thus, while recruitment of individuals into treatment occurred 
after randomisation, selection into treatment and control samples occurred subsequent to randomisation. In 
addition 500 households with high propensity to form businesses were held over from the baseline, although 
this occurred ‘prior to cluster randomisation’ (p6). 
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relatively short time frame .... limits the scope of results and their implications 
to the short term. Social outcomes may take longer to emerge. In the short-run, 
at least, nothing big and positive leaps out from the evaluation’ (A&M 2010, 
p299). This seems an interpretation aimed to minimise type 2 errors. 
6.15.1.2 Karlan and Zinman (K&Z) 2009 (Philippines) 
The other RCT study included in our stage three selection (Karlan and Zinman 
2009) randomised selection of applicants for consumer credit who marginally 
failed the selection criteria of the MFI, in the outskirts of Manila in the 
Philippines; loan officers were instructed to offer individual liability loans to 
some randomly chosen people whose creditworthiness score (an aggregation of 
scoring by various characteristics) came below the usual cut-off. Their uptake of 
the loan offer and repayment were reported. A similar approach was taken in 
another study by the same authors in South Africa which we do not include 
because it pertains to non poor individuals (Karlan and Zinman 2005, 2010).  The 
methodology was explained as follows. After canvassing applicants by ‘normal 
marketing procedures’ and interviewing and scoring applicants, the final scoring 
was produced by the MFIs adapted software to instruct loan officers to offer 
loans to both those who achieved a high enough score, and a selection of 
marginal failures. Loan officers did not see the score and so were presumed not 
to know who was a marginal failure. 
‘Our sample frame is comprised of 1,601 marginally creditworthy 
applicants ..... (1,583) of whom were first-time applicants to the 
Lender’ (p6). ‘1,272 marginal applicants were assigned ‘approve’, and 
329 applicants were assigned ‘reject’. The software simply instructed 
loan officers to approve or reject — it did not display the application 
score or make any mention of the randomisation. Neither loan officers, 
branch managers, nor applicants were informed about the credit 
scoring algorithm or its random component (p7).  
Survey data were produced by researchers who sought out the selected 1,601 
applicants achieving a 70% response rate some 22 months after application for a 
loan. The impacts were estimated using the intention-to-treat control function 
approach with all marginal clients offered loans, treated regardless of whether 
they took up the offer or not. Two categories of marginal clients (those just 
below and those further below the normal cut-off) were distinguished67 and the 
actual risk score and date of application and of interview were covariates68. 
The authors reported finding that marginal applicants who were offered loans 
did borrow more, but appeared to shrink their businesses while increasing profits 
if they were male, increased their access to informal credit ‘to absorb shocks’ 
and substituted informal for formal insurance.  Males seemed to increase 
enrolment and decrease family employment outside the family; no evidence of 
other increases in well-being were identified, but there was some evidence of ‘a 
small decline in self-reported well-being’(p18).  
The authors termed these results ‘diffuse, heterogeneous and surprising’, and 
some commentators ‘surprisingly positive impacts ... and ... a creative way to 
apply randomization’ (A&M 2010, p297).  
                                                 
67 This was necessary because different probabilities of assignment to be offered a loan were used for these 
two groups (0.85 and 0.60). 
68 It is not clear how the specification of dates ‘control(s) flexibly for the possibility that the lag between 
application and survey is correlated with both treatment status and outcomes’ (p10), rather than just indexing 
these dates.   
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It is not clear however that these conclusions are warranted. Crucial issues in 
RCTs are the randomisation effects which derive from the possibility that 
knowledge of taking part in an experiment affects behaviour69.  These are part 
of the broader categories of ‘meaning’ effects (Moerman 2002) of which placebo 
effects are most well known.  
These effects are not mentioned in K&Z. It was claimed that this is a double 
blinded approach70, but it takes little imagination to perceive that loan officers 
will readily grasp that quite a number of individuals they are instructed to 
accept have lower creditworthiness than others, and indeed those they are used 
to dealing with. This will surely affect the disposition of loan officers towards 
marginally accepted clients. In a companion paper Karlan and Zinman (2008) 
showed that 47% of the marginally accepted were in fact rejected by the loan 
officers (loan officer non-compliance) leading to the intention-to-treat analysis. 
But an intention-to-treat analysis will not address issues of selective loan officer 
behaviour71. It is not clear what rates of non-compliance are in the Philippines 
study of Karlan and Zinman, although they write that ‘In all, there were 351 
applications assigned out of the 1,272 assigned to treatment that did not 
ultimately result in a loan. Conversely, there were 5 applications assigned to the 
control (rejected) group that did receive a loan (presumably due to loan officer 
noncompliance or clerical errors)’ (p9). It is not clear why allocating loans to 
those rejected is ‘non-compliance’ but at least some loans not received were 
among those allocated to treatment. 
The high attrition rate in the survey with only 70% of those in the original 
randomisation interviewed is another cause for concern, notwithstanding that 
the rates of attrition are similar between treated and control subjects.  
6.15.2 Pipelines/Control functions 
Since Coleman’s pioneering72 study (1999, 2006) pipeline designs have become 
quite widely used (we have eight papers – seven studies). As mentioned earlier, 
they allow randomisation and appropriate control groups. However there are 
several less than ideal variants on the design used by Coleman, and, indeed, it 
may be that Coleman’s design has some problems, particularly in relation to 
statistical power. 
6.15.2.1 Coleman 1999 (Thailand) 
Coleman’s (1999) highly regarded study on the impact of group-lending in 
Northeastern Thailand controlled for self-selection and non-random programme 
placement bias using observable village characteristics, and village-level fixed-
effects using data from a quasi-experimental design carried out in 1995 – 1996. 
The study conducted a survey on 455 households; in addition to selecting 
participating and non-participating households in villages where MFIs were 
already active (had disbursed loans), the innovation was to get MFIs to identify 
households which would participate in villages where they planned to operate, 
and to survey a sample of these future participating households and a sample of 
                                                 
69 Two of these effects are known as Hawthorne (those being treated act differently because they know they 
are being treated) and John Henry effects (those in the control group behave differently because they are not 
being treated). 
70 ‘Only the Lender’s Executive committee was informed about the details of the algorithm and its random 
component, so the randomisation was 'double-blind' in the sense that neither loan officers (nor their direct 
supervisors) nor applicants knew about assignment to treatment versus control’ (p8). 
71 This is, of course, similar to the effect that doctor knowledge has on patient outcome (Moerman, Chapter 4), 
and why (genuine) double blinding, which is possible in the case of indistinguishable pills but not when loans 
are offered to identifiably different clients.  
72 Steele et al. (2001), is also a pipeline study for which the fieldwork and indeed initial reporting (Steele et al. 
1998) actually precedes Coleman’s. 
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non-selected control households from these future villages into which MFIs would 
expand.  The control group was surveyed one year before receiving its first loan.  
Coleman’s design consisted of 14 village clusters (8 and 6 per treatment) and 
large numbers of cases per cluster. The intra- and inter-cluster correlations of 
important variables were not given, but it is clear that there were too few 
clusters per treatment and too many observations per cluster to provide much 
statistical power.  
A DID estimation with village fixed effects and household covariates were used 
to estimate difference of incomes between participants and non-participants in 
programme villages with difference of incomes between participants and non-
participants in control villages. Coleman’s (1999) study concluded that the 
microfinance programme in Northeastern Thailand had little impact although 
other studies which were ignorant of selection bias provided evidence to the 
contrary. More importantly, Coleman’s (1999) study found that microfinance had 
positive impacts on increased money-lending activities and leads to an increase 
in debts.73 However, as the author pointed out, the results should be read 
critically because Thailand is already fairly rich and less credit constrained 
compared to other developing nations.  
6.15.2.2 Copestake et al. 2001 (Zambia) 
Copestake et al. (2001) reported impact of microcredit accessed by individuals 
in a group liability context in Zambia using a cross-section sample of two groups 
of borrowers (1-2 years since first loan and 12-18 months since first loan) and a 
pipeline group. Estimates were made of impacts of growth rates and profits 
(recall) from borrowing status, and of growth of profits, business diversification, 
and household income growth by size of loan in a control function framework. A 
variety of impacts were reported, with some barely statistically significant 
(Table 1, p88). Larger second loans had largest and most statistically significant 
impacts. But this finding was vitiated by the high exit rate of clients between 
first and second loans. This means that the full sample of pipeline clients were 
compared with a subset of borrowers who survived to second loans and were 
likely to be quite unlike the intake into either the first loan or pipeline. Part of 
the pipeline sample is from a different geographical area. Footnote 10 notes 
possibility of bias due to unobservable notwithstanding inclusion of proxies such 
as ‘receipt of training and subscription to government health services’; see also 
footnote 21 which argues ‘that the problems of programme endogeneity and 
selection bias were [not] fully controlled but that they were sufficiently dealt 
with fort yield plausible results and hence reduce expectations about likely 
impacts among key stakeholders’ – because estimated impacts were slight and 
data on comparability of areas were not provided. It is likely that loanees were 
not poorer individuals as an initial payment of 10% of agreed loan had to be paid 
into the Loan Insurance Fund.  
6.15.2.3 Copestake 2002 (Zambia) 
Copestake (2002), focused on inequality in impacts of microfinance in Zambia 
comparing ‘‘one-year-old’ clients with a comparison group of ‘pipeline’ clients’ 
interviewed once using recalled profits etc. over the previous year to assess 
impact using a control function. Significant polarising impacts of borrowing on 
                                                 
73 Coleman (1999) discovered that many borrowers joined the microfinance programme mainly for social 
reasons (e.g. peer pressure). They had no projects to invest in and solely borrowed for consumption purposes. 
Hence, they frequently did not have the funds to repay the microfinance loan at the end of the loan cycle. As a 
result, they borrowed from moneylenders to repay the microfinance loan. Then, in order to repay the 
moneylender they had to apply for another microfinance loan. This circle continued until they ended up in a 
downward spiral of bad debt. 
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expenditures for the very poor, as indicated by the statistically significant 
positive’ (p11). In terms of social development indicators (education and 
health), participation had mixed impacts with some positive and some negative 
effects, although in some cases the core poor individuals appeared to benefit 
more (p12). There were also significant positive impacts on households with 
microenterprises in urban areas and very poor borrowers involved in agriculture 
(p13).  
This pipeline study assumed that later (pipeline) and earlier (treatment) 
borrowers were perfect substitutes; however, as noted, if earlier borrowers had 
different characteristics then these estimates were biased. This issue was 
addressed in another paper included in this review (Setboonsarng and Parpiev 
2008), who used PSM to address this selection bias; Setboonsarng and Parpiev 
(2008) is discussed below (and to which the reader might now refer, although to 
preserve the logic of our structure we next address the panel studies that use a 
pipeline approach). 
6.15.3 Pipeline and panel 
Panel methods are widely claimed to address problem of selection bias and the 
robustness can be tested by estimating fixed and random effects models, and 
testing the differences between coefficients estimated by these two methods. 
With this in mind we discuss the two included panel pipeline studies. 
6.15.3.1 Steele et al. 2001 (Bangladesh) 
This study, which seems to have been largely overlooked in the literature75, also 
innovated the pipeline design attributed to Coleman76. It used ‘three areas: an 
area where SC  (Save the Children, USA) had operated non-credit programs since 
the mid-l970s (the ‘old’ area); an area where SC was soon to begin new 
programme interventions (the ‘new’ area); and villages in the same area that 
were similar to those in the new area but where no SC intervention was planned 
(the ‘control’ area)’ (p269), for which a panel data set for 199377 and 199578 was 
available. It aimed to assess the impact of participation in women’s savings and 
credit organisation on contraceptive use. It founds that ‘the analysis of program 
impact on the use of modem contraceptives reveals a positive effect of the 
credit program, after we adjust for this selectivity: we see no evidence of an 
effect of participation in a savings group’ (p267). 
The authors emphasised that the sample clearly suffers from selectivity and 
placement biases, which were addressed through the use of fixed and random 
effects estimations applied to the panel data, and applying Hausman type tests 
to the difference in coefficients between the two models. It found 
 no significant differences at the .05 level between the fixed-effects 
and random-effects estimates. The test statistic comparing the two 
                                                 
75 i.e. it does not appear in Armendáriz and Morduch (2010). Goldberg (2005) refers to the 1998 working paper 
version, but does not highlight the methodological innovation in the study (pipeline and IV in panel analysis). 
76 Coleman’s study conducted later (1995-6) than the field work used in the Steele study, but the earliest 
publication of the latter is 1998, which is a year earlier than the year in which the Coleman study was 
published. Steele et al. 2001 is methodologically more sophisticated using a panel analysis, while Coleman is 
restricted to cross-sectional analysis.  
77 Women surveyed in 1993 may be divided into four categories tor our analysis: (1) members of savings groups 
in the old area; (2) poor women in the new area where SC had not yet introduced a program, but who would be 
eligible for membership when the savings and credit groups were formed; (3) women in the same area who did 
not fulfil SC's eligibility criteria for group membership; and (4) the control group (p269). 
78 By 1995, category 2 had been divided into five subcategories: (a) those who had chosen to join one of the 
newly formed SC savings groups in a village where ASA did not work; (b) non-members in non-ASA villages; (c) 
SC members in villages where ASA worked; (d) SC-ASA members in ASA villages; and (e) those in ASA villages 
who did not participate in either programme. 
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sets of estimates from an analysis of ASA villages is calculated as 8.24 
on 4 degrees of freedom (P= .08) (p 278).  
It referred to plots of the residual errors and asserted that: 
Although we find some suggestion of a difference in the distribution of 
u, between the old area and the other categories, there is little 
evidence of a difference between non-members in ASA villages (group 
6) and SC-ASA members in ASA villages (group 8), the contrast found to 
be significant in the random-effects model. This provides further 
evidence of little correlation between program membership status and 
the individual-level, time invariant unobservables. Therefore we 
conclude that the estimates of program effects obtained from the 
random effects model are consistent (p278). 
Unfortunately neither interpretation is very convincing. It is not clear why a P-
value of 0.08 is indicative of insignificance rather than of marginal significance, 
and the tables of results presented refer to P-values <0.10. Further, the plots for 
groups 6 and 8 (non-members in ASA villages, and SC-ASA members in ASA 
villages) are visibly different in location and dispersion, even if the difference 
with ‘old’ areas appears greater. 
This apparently rigorous and methodologically sophisticated paper warrants 
further investigation; it has design limitations in that treatment areas have 
significant differences in characteristics, which may have been largely controlled 
by sub-group analysis and/or village/area fixed effects, there is also differential 
attrition, as described in an appendix where it is asserted that ‘because our 
analysis is based only on women who respond in both surveys, we must control 
for area of residence to adjust for the effect of attrition bias on the parameter 
estimates (Little and Rubin 1987:15)’ (p281). However, it is not evidence that 
attrition control is conducted since the analysis is restricted to the sample for 
which there are responses in both waves79. 
While this paper found evidence that  
After controlling tor non-random program effects, allowing for 
exclusion criteria in identifying comparison groups, controlling for prior 
characteristics such as women s propensity to use contraception before 
they joined, and controlling for the effect of child health 
interventions, our analysis shows a substantial impact of membership in 
SC-ASA credit programs on contraceptive use. This increase in 
contraception is over and above the substantial rise that can be 
attributed to the introduction of new health measures for children, 
directed primarily to mothers, which also included some motivational 
messages to accept family planning. Those who joined SC-ASA credit 
programs showed a proportionately larger gain in contraceptive use; 
this finding suggests that something about membership in credit groups 
spurred further change in an environment that already was changing 
with regard to family planning (p280). 
The authors hypothesised that ‘uptake of modem contraception is explained by 
social networks associated with membership and by exposure to new ideas 
fostered by group dynamics. We lack the data necessary to demonstrate these 
mechanisms, however’. They also discussed the difference between these 
findings and those of Pitt et al. (1999), which used data from a different area of 
                                                 
79 One standard method to address attrition is to use the data from the first wave model the attrition in a 2-
stage process (Heckman, 1979); there is no evidence that this is done in this paper. 
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Bangladesh just before the period studied in Steele et al. (2001), and also 
estimates the effects of MFI membership on contraceptive use, finding ‘clear 
negative effects for female participants relative to nonparticipants’. This 
difference is attributed in part to the different specification of participation 
used by Pitt (amount of loans taken), which was narrower, and may be less 
appropriate given the mechanism of transmission suggested. It is not clear how 
valid an objection this is since in the programmes addressed in Pitt et al. (1999), 
all members were also borrowers, although the amount they borrowed did vary. 
This difference in specification, the queries about the Steele et al. study raised 
here (failure to address attrition, doubts about the interpretation of the fixed vs 
random effects model), and the doubts raised about the method used in the PnK 
oeuvre suggest a replication of both these studies. Until this is done no clear 
conclusion can emerge from the contrasting findings of these two studies. 
6.15.3.2 Cotler and Woodruff 2008 (Mexico) 
This pipeline study of small-scale retail outlets of the largest snack food 
company in Mexico collected data on clients of an MFI, which rolled out its 
programme ‘neighbourhood by neighbourhood’. In one neighbourhood where the 
MFI started its programme in summer 2004, and another neighbourhood where 
the MFI planned to roll out its programme the following year it agreed to screen 
and select retail outlets which applied to be prospective clients of its 
programme when the MFI proposed to roll out its programme the following using 
‘identical methods’ of screening (a point made on pages 830 and 831). Of 
course, the exception was that in the second neighbourhood, prospective clients 
were aware that they could not receive loans until the MFI programme was 
rolled out there, i.e. for a year or more80 (p818; see further discussion below).  
Retail enterprises (n=216) were selected in the former and 188 in the later 
neighbourhoods, which would serve as ‘a comparison group’. A three wave 
survey was conducted with waves separated by 4-6 months. Attrition between 
the second and third waves was so large that only the first two waves were 
analysed (allowing a period of only some 4-6 months for impacts to accrue). 
Because of the way in which samples were selected the authors claimed that 
‘the two groups should be comparable in terms of unmeasured characteristics 
related to demand for credit, entrepreneurial ability, and so on’ (p831). The 
main difference between the samples collected from locales which were 37 km 
apart would relate to ‘local shocks [that] might have affected the treatment and 
control groups differently’. But these could be controlled using monthly data on 
sales from the two localities which, though highly seasonal showed ‘very similar’ 
trends81. 
The delay in access to funds might well alter the profile of applicants in the 
control area compared to those who accessed loans immediately. Successful 
applicants might also alter their activities in the interim between being selected 
and, later survey waves before, receiving the loan; they might do this because 
the MFI’s interest rates were lower than the marginal loans immediately 
available, with a resulting bias in favour of estimating a positive impact (p838), 
although the delay might select out more profitable potential loanees.  
                                                 
80 This is discussed on page 838, where it is stated that ‘In sum, since members of both the treatment group 
and the control group were selected through similar screens, we expect that they possess similar 
entrepreneurial spirit and face similar economic restrictions and opportunities.' 
81 But there were differences in growth of sales in the two neighbourhoods, in one period the control 
neighbourhood experienced more than twice the growth rate (-1./2 vs -3.7%) around the time of the baseline 
and first follow up; and a difference of nearly 3.8% (9.3 vs 13.1%) between the first and second follow up 
surveys (p839). Different figures are given on page 841, where is appears that total sales of all firms of the 
population from which the sample was drawn, grew at 5.6% between July 2003 and October 2004 in the 
treatment neighbourhood but only 1.7% in the control. 
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The data are seen as of better quality than usual, because interviews were 
conducted by loan officers, who were given training, included much information 
pertinent to selection of successful loanees and whose remuneration depended 
on loan performance. Although re-interviews would normally only be to loanees 
who applied for further loans the loan officers agreed to re-interview all who 
had applied for loans in the first round (when presumably the incentive effects 
claimed above would not have applied, a contention that may gain some support 
from the fact that those only receiving a first loan were not re-interviewed at 
the third round. 
Treatment and control groups had some statistically significant differences in 
business characteristics (mean and median fixed assets at P<=0.01%, mean 
inventories as P<=0.1%) 
We use differences in the phasing in of a new lending program designed 
to serve clients of the largest snack food company in Mexico to identify 
the impact of credit on outcomes of small retail enterprise in Mexico 
City. We find that the loans have positive impacts on the smallest firms 
but negative impacts on larger firms. These results are consistent with 
hypotheses that smaller firms have higher returns to capital and face 
greater credit constraints. Given that the program involved loans given 
for 4-month terms, we find surprisingly large effects on investment in 
fixed assets. 
This study uses a pipeline design and an unbalanced panel data analysis; while 
here are three rounds of data the attrition between rounds 2 and 3 was 
substantial so only the first two rounds are used. 
6.15.4 Pipeline and PSM 
Three papers use PSM to conduct their impact assessments of a pipeline design 
(Kondo et al. 2008, Setboonsarng and Parpiev 2008, Deininger and Liu 2009). As 
noted above, PSM cannot account for the effects of unobservable characteristics 
which affect both selection into treatment and the outcomes of treatments. 
Nevertheless, it may be a useful technique to construct the counterfactual 
provided there are a large number of potential matches, with a wide range of 
good quality covariates which are causally related to selection on observables 
and good proxies for unobservables. It is also important to report the common 
support and numbers of potential matches, balancing of covariates and to 
conduct sensitivity analysis (as discussed earlier).  
6.15.4.1 Kondo et al.  2008 (Philippines) 
Conducted in the Philippines with a selected treatment group and a pipeline 
drawn from an ‘expansion area’:  
The comparison barangays, on the other hand, are expansion areas 
where programme clients have been identified and organised into 
groups but no loans have yet been released to them (p51). 
Statements that control villages were matched, with no quality evidence of the 
matching process, provide little assurance that this was in fact achieved.  
The innovation of this study was to include drop-outs and graduates in the 
pipeline design (p51), thus mitigating biases due to sub-selection of borrowers 
that occurs in Coleman’s design. The estimating equation is standard control 
function with village (V) and household (X) characteristics, and membership (M=1 
if member in treatment or pipeline villages, 0) and treatment (T=1 if ever 
borrowed, 0) dummies.  
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Characteristics of members and non-members in existing and expansion 
(pipeline) areas were compared and some differences found in the treatment 
and pipeline areas. Outcome variables were per capita income and expenditure, 
savings (2 definitions) and food expenditures, poverty status and subsistence 
poverty, with some differences between members and non-members in 
treatment areas but none in pipeline areas. Impacts estimated from the control 
function showed positive impacts significant only at 10% level for per capita 
incomes, total expenditures and food expenditure. Quite a number of 
participants and non-participants took up non-MFI loans, but, while take up of 
loans (impact on financial transactions of households) was investigated, the 
impact of loans on outcome variables was seemingly not addressed. Impacts on 
numbers of enterprises and employment, assets, education and health were also 
explored. Impact heterogeneity by per capita income quartile and educational 
status of the reference person was also explored.  
The results showed that the majority of respondents were non-poor by the 
official definition (p67), that impacts were only marginally statistically 
significant, and somewhat regressive with some negative (and insignificant or 
marginally significant) impacts on lower income quartiles and significant positive 
impacts among higher income quartiles (p68). This heterogeneity explained the 
marginally significant impact for the whole sample, and corresponded with 
Coleman’s findings of impacts only among the better-off (among clients who 
were themselves not among the ‘official poor’). 
The study found reduced reliance on (‘presumably’) higher priced loans, and 
some consumption smoothing, positive impacts on employment and number of 
enterprises, but no significant impacts on assets or human capital, although the 
length of time in which impact could occur on these variables might be 
considered short. 
6.15.4.2 Setboonsarng and Parpiev (S&P) 2008 (Pakistan) 
This paper used the same dataset used in the paper by Montgomery (2005) 
discussed above, which it criticised describing that: ‘[T]he first study, conducted 
by Montgomery in 2005, assumed no self-selection bias occurred, whereas this 
study adopted econometric methods [PSM] to address that issue’ (p1). Strangely 
they did not mention the pipeline nature of the data and Montgomery’s 
approach was not discussed although it was noted that ‘Montgomery (2005) drew 
causal linkages in part based on the assumption that the survey design would 
minimize the selection bias’ (p10). S&P do not seem to make use of the ‘future 
client’ indicator.82 Using the classification of S&P, existing borrowers were 
significantly different (wealthier) to non-borrowers including future clients; they 
claimed that borrowers ‘appear to be initially wealthier than the control group’, 
although this comparison was made after borrowers may have already benefitted 
from loans.  
Using PSM the ‘researcher can match participants from the treatment group with 
participants from the control group, so that the treatment group and control 
group can be balanced. This approach can significantly reduce bias in 
observational study’ (p10-11). The probit estimation of propensity score has a 
reasonably high pseudo R-squared (0.38, N=2881), with coefficients indicating 
                                                 
82 Montgomery (2005) reported 1,454 Khushhali clients and future clients, and 1,427 non-clients (p9); S&P 
reported 1,204 KB borrowers and 1,677 non-borrowers (Table 8, p9). This implied that there were 250 future 
clients. 
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that wealthier females from landowning higher status households who already 
borrowed from other sources and were living in somewhat more remote locations 
were more likely to be Khushhali Bank borrowers (Table 10, p13). Restricting the 
sample to the range of common support drops the sample from 2,881 to 2,856 in 
11 blocks but ‘the distribution of Khushhali Bank borrowers and non-borrowers 
along the propensity score is not similar’ (p14). In fact the distribution of 
propensity scores of Khushhali Bank borrowers was distinctly bimodal while that 
of non-borrowers was unimodal, located around the lowest P scores. This means 
that the majority of control households (non-borrowers) had low P scores while 
of course the majority of borrowers had high P scores; there were some 
borrowers with low P scores (30%) for whom there were many potential matches 
(1,542 non-borrowers to match with 363 borrowers with low P scores), while for 
the bulk of Khushhali Bank borrowers there were very few potential matches (83 
non-borrowers to match with 861 borrowers with high P scores). This was clearly 
a ridiculous basis on which to proceed to undertake an impact analysis, if only 
because as we have noted it is recommended that there are more potential 
matches than treatment cases in the relevant ranges.   
The paper discussed the use of several methods of matching, but used nearest 
neighbour and presented results of kernel and stratification methods (not 
described in detail) by way of robustness checks; this only checked robustness to 
matching methods rather than to unobservables which was the main issue. It did 
not use sensitivity analysis. It found a number of largely positive impacts83 with 
‘t’ values indicating statistical significance of difference between matched 
treatment and control cases. 
When discussing the impact on the poor84 S&P used a poverty expenditure 
threshold of Rps 878.6  (Montgomery uses Rps 1,000 per capita per month), and 
match ‘749 poor households who borrowed from Khushhali Bank ....  with 439 
non-poor [sic], non-KB borrowers’ (p18) and find impacts ‘essentially similar to 
those for clients in general’ (p18).  
As noted, robustness of results is assessed by comparing the results of nearest 
neighbour with kernel and stratification matching However, while this 
comparison showed broadly similar results, it revealed nothing about robustness 
with regard to unobservables. This, as we have emphasised earlier, can be 
addressed by sensitivity analysis, which was not performed. Consequently we 
rate the findings reported in this paper as highly vulnerable to bias. 
As an example of the need for sensitivity analysis, properly interpreted we refer 
to the one example we know of where sensitivity analysis was reported in a 
paper that addressed the impact of microfinance (although sensitivity analysis 
was not reported for microfinance impact). Abou-Ali et al. (2010) (see below), 
reported sensitivity analysis for their results to describe the impact of SFD 
intervention in roads on transportation spending to compare SFD intervention 
with no SFD intervention. They found that the gamma at which the estimated 
difference in spending became insignificant was 1.17, and interpreted this to 
mean that ‘In this example, the results are thus relatively robust to hidden bias’ 
(p542). Unfortunately this is the wrong interpretation, as such a value close to 1 
                                                 
83 Some positive impacts such as on use of pesticides were qualified as having potentially negative 
environmental and or health impacts not accounted for in the analysis. 
84 That was apart from the earlier claim that ‘KB borrowers have PRs 6,494.2 higher profit on livestock than 
that of non-borrowers. This shows the strong positive effect of KB borrowing on a farmer’s poverty situation’ 
(p15). 
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indicates that the results are highly vulnerable to unobservables (Rosenbaum 
2002, Rosenbaum 2005, p181285). 
Given the parlous effective common support, the failure to report balancing of 
covariates, and the lack of sensitivity analysis, one can only conclude that this 
study provides no satisfactory evidence of impact of microfinance on poor 
people. 
6.15.4.3 Deininger and Liu 2009 (India) 
This paper employed a pipeline design based on two phases of a World Bank 
Funded development project in Andhra Pradesh (AP), India. The project 
combined predominantly female social and economic empowerment oriented 
self-help groups (SHGs) with access to microcredit, targeting especially the 
‘leftover poor’86. The evaluation used the first three years of Indhira Kranthi 
Patham (IKP), known as District Poverty Initiatives Program (DPIP) which started 
in 2000 and aimed to strengthen SHGs in 6 poorest districts of the State. A 
second phase – Rural Poverty Reduction Project (RPPP) – expanded the project to 
the states remaining 16 districts from July 2003, which supplied the pipeline 
sample. The survey was conducted in 2004 of some 6,000 households. Villages 
were randomly selected villages and then households with ‘weights applied 
based on their poverty status according to the census of PIP [Participatory 
Identification of the Poor). The survey included a community questionnaire and 
an SHG questionnaire,  administered to randomly selected SHGs in DPIP areas. As 
expected, pipeline areas were clearly and markedly different from DPIP areas in 
a wide range of variables including ‘backwardness’, infrastructure, levels of 
female economic activities (outside the household), caste panchayats, 
untouchability and other variables.  Participants could be classified into 
‘converted’ (from previous SHGs), new, and non-participants. Propensity Score 
(PS) matching was used to control for differences in observables; both cross 
sectional (programme effects) and DID estimates based on recall were 
computed. The idea was that since DPIP and RPRP were two phases of the same 
project conducted in distinct districts of the Indian State of AP, identification 
could accomplished ‘by combining pipeline, propensity score (PS) matching and 
difference-in-difference estimation methods’ (p9), since self-selection would be 
the same in both DPIP and RPPP areas (p10). However, as discussed above, it is 
simply not plausible that selection could have been similar because of 
differences in time and circumstances; indeed the paper itself noted that the 
survey took place immediately following a famine which would surely affect 
recruitment, as would the different contexts of DPIP (in the six poorest districts) 
and RPPP (the remaining districts). Plots of propensity scores for the two areas 
(p 30 and 31) confirm these doubts, with almost mirror image distributions 
between DPIP and RPPP areas for each of the three categories (New and 
converted participants and non-participants). Nevertheless, the authors argued 
‘that under fairly general assumptions, villages or households in RPRP areas can 
serve as a control for those in DPIP areas’ (p9). ATET effects were estimated 
without covariates. Sensitivity analysis was not conducted, and there was only 
limited information about the quality of matches (e.g. the number of control 
households used after matching). While there was no evidence of impact on 
incomes or assets, there were significant impacts on consumption and access to 
food nutrients, which may have been due to the immediate transfers involved in 
loans to SHG members, or to consumption smoothing. The authors suggested that 
                                                 
85 ‘The study of the effects of diethylstilbestrol becomes sensitive at about gamma = 7, while the study of the 
effects of coffee becomes sensitive at gamma = 1.3. A small bias could explain away the effects of coffee, but 
only an enormous bias could explain away the effects of diethylstilbestrol.’ 
86 Those who tend to get excluded from ‘normal’ SHGs.  
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income effects might materialise in the longer term; however, it is unlikely that 
this can be demonstrated since the initial differences in timing to access project 
inputs is small. The likelihood is small that differences, due to this variation in 
timing of access, would remain some years after the project began in the 
pipeline area. 
6.15.5 With/without and PSM 
Most microfinance evaluations included in this SR adopt a with/without approach 
and we merely provide summaries of a few selected key papers that are largely 
representative of the with/without studies in this report. We begin summarising 
the with/without studies employing PSM. 
6.15.5.1 Abou-Ali et al. 2010 (Egypt) 
The study by Abou-Ali et al. (2010) was an impact assessment of the Egyptian 
Social Fund for Development (SFD) that actively promoted community 
development, public works projects and microcredit. The paper evaluated 
various SFD activities by measuring its impact on a wide range of outcome 
indicators using PSM. We focus on the microcredit part of this paper which 
assessed the impact of microcredit on income, expenditure, employment, 
literacy rates, and poverty levels. The authors’ headline findings for microcredit 
were that it generally increased income per capita but their results varied 
substantially by region. In the metropolitan areas as well as in urban Upper 
Egypt microcredit increased household expenditure and reduced poverty, but 
these results could not be confirmed in other regions investigated. 
Abou-Ali et al.’s paper is one of the few PSM microfinance IEs that applied 
sensitivity analysis to estimate the vulnerability of their matching estimates to 
selection on unobservables or ‘hidden bias’ using Rosenbaum’s (2002) term. 
However, sensitivity analysis was not applied to their microfinance estimates 
and interpretation of sensitivity analysis, i.e. their gamma values, raises doubts. 
For example, the authors argued that ‘[U]sing a significance cut-off of 10 per 
cent, we see that [gamma] could be as high as 1.17 before the results lose their 
statistical significance. ... In this example, the results are thus relatively robust 
to hidden bias’ (p543). The opposite is in fact true, the gamma value at which 
the estimated impact becomes insignificant (i.e. gamma = 1.17) indicates that 
their results are highly vulnerable to selection on unobservables or ‘hidden bias’. 
There are further concerns about this paper such as lack of evidence on common 
support or balancing (though these issues were raised and reported in the 
working paper version of their paper), as well as a lack of reporting the number 
of matched comparison groups for most outcome indicators, which is crucial for 
assessing the quality of the matches. 
6.15.5.2 Imai et al. 2010 (India) 
Imai et al. (2010) assessed the impact of microfinance on poverty reduction in 
India. Cross-sectional data on 5,260 client (from 20 different MFIs) and non-
client households was collected across India. They used a treatment effects 
model (i.e. a variant of Heckman’s sample selection model – see Heckman 1979) 
and PSM to account for selection bias. Impact was assessed on an index-based 
poverty ranking indicator that contains information on landholdings, income, 
assets, housing and sanitation. The authors found that microfinance had 
significantly positive impacts on poverty reduction. The focus of this study was 
on the treatment effects model which claims to account for the unobservables, 
and which is essentially a more sophisticated and robust method than IV. Puhani 
(2000), however, criticised the selection models and argued that they were 
driven by narrow assumptions about functional form and error distributions. In 
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other words, impact estimates obtained from selection models are only as good 
as these assumptions on distributional and functional form (Vytlacil 2002). This 
last point is similar to IV estimates whose reliability heavily depends on the 
quality of the underlying instruments (Caliendo and Hujer 2005). Hence, the 
authors applied PSM to check the robustness of results obtained from the 
treatment effects model. The treatment effect model and PSM results, which 
are not reported, are claimed to be conclusive and confirm that microfinance 
has significantly positive effects on poverty reduction. Details such as balancing, 
common support or quality of the matches, of the PSM estimation were not 
provided, and there was no evidence that sensitivity analysis was done on the 
PSM estimation. Therefore it remains unclear whether PSM estimates are 
vulnerable to unobservables; the PSM adds little independent support to the 2-
stage estimates. 
This paper is confusingly written and hard to interpret; for example, Table 2 
erroneously reports that the ‘Case B dependent variable: Index Based Ranking 
(the first stage probit estimates whether a household has taken a loan for 
productive purposes (‘MFI productive’))’. This should not include the words 
‘Index Based Ranking’. There are many other parts of this text which are 
unclear. An article with quite so much econometric elaboration should perhaps 
be reviewed and published in a specialist econometrics journal rather than a 
multi-disciplinary one such as World Development. 
6.15.6 With/without and 2-Stage 
6.15.6.1 Cuong 2008 (Vietnam) 
The study by Cuong (2008) assessed how well poor people are targeted by the 
microfinance programme of Vietnam Bank for Social Policies and measures its 
impact on expenditure and income per capita. Panel data was used and two 
methods applied: first, IV on the cross-section and second IV in combination with 
a fixed effects panel model. Cuong found that the microfinance programme 
under investigation had a positive impact on expenditure and income per capita 
and thus concluded that microfinance reduces poverty. However, the 
programme mainly targets non-poor people who also receive larger amounts of 
credit than poor people. Cuong’s findings are not surprising, as Coleman (1999) 
argued, more wealthy poor people and individuals who are more entrepreneurial 
are more likely to participate in microfinance; the observed impacts might not 
be due to microfinance but due to other unobserved characteristics. It can be 
hypothesised that other forms of finance might have been equally effective as 
microfinance in the context of non-poor individuals. The study by Cuong appears 
to be technically sound and rigorous but doubts remain about the relevance of 
its results since essentially non-poor people were targeted (67.1% programme 
participants were non-poor people, p171). 
6.15.6.2 Shimamura and Lastarria-Cornhiel 2010 (Malawi)  
The study by Shimamura and Lastarria-Cornhiel (2010) was motivated by the 
discussion on trade-offs between child labour and schooling. They investigated a 
microfinance programme in Malawi and its impact ‘on children’s school 
attendance and the likelihood of being involved in other productive activities’ 
(p569). The authors conducted a paired-site sampling survey to account for 
sample site variations and apply an IV approach (p569). They found that 
microfinance participation decreased school attendance by girls in particular, 
and that the programme did not reach the poorest people. Doubts are raised 
about the validity of the instrument and hence their findings; no identification 
tests were run to assess the validity of the instrument and no specification tests, 
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i.e. a Hausman test, was conducted to gauge whether OLS estimates would have 
been as useful as the IV estimates presented in this paper. 
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Abera H Can microfinance help to reduce 
poverty? With reference to Tigrai, 
northern Ethiopia? 
2010 
    X X    X          
Abou-Ali H, El-Azony H, 
El-Laithy H, Haughton J, 
Khandker SR 
Evaluating the impact of Egyptian social 
fund for development programs 
2009 
   X X  X   X        X  
Banerjee A, Duflo E, 
Glennerster R, Kinnan C 
The miracle of microfinance? Evidence 
from a randomised evaluation 
2009 
X X   X X X    X       X X 
Bhuiya A, Chowdhury M Beneficial effects of a woman-focused 
development programme on child 
survival: evidence from rural 
Bangladesh 
2002 
                 X90  
Coleman BE, Thailand 2 papers    X X X X X X X  X       X  
Copestake J, Bhalotra S, 
Johnson S 
Assessing the impact of microcredit: a 
Zambian case study 
2001 
X   X       X      X   
Copestake J. Inequality and the polarizing impact of 
microcredit: evidence from Zambia’s 
copperbelt 
2002 
X   X       X       X  
                                                 
87 Consumption/xpenditure per capita (food and non-food) 
88 Contraceptive use or maternal health 
89 Nutritional status/calorie intake/food security 
90 Infant mortality 
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Copestake J, Dawson P, 
Fanning JP, A. McKayA, 
Wright-Revolledo K 
Monitoring the diversity of the poverty 
outreach and impact of microfinance: a 
comparison of methods using data from 
Peru 
2005 
X  X X      X          
Cotler P, Woodruff C The impact of short-term Credit on 
microenterprises: evidence from the 
Fincomun-Bimbo programme in Mexico 
2008 
X X    X     X         
Cuong NV Is a governmental microcredit 
programme for the poor really pro-
poor? Evidence from Vietnam 
2008 
   X X     X          
Deininger K and Liu Y Economic and social impacts of self-
help groups in India 
2009 
   X X X         X  X  X 
Diagne A and Zeller M Access to credit and its impact on 
welfare in Malawi 
2001 
   X X          X     
Imai KS, Arun T and 
Annim SK 
Microfinance and household poverty 
reduction: new evidence from India 
2010 
   X      X     X     
Imai KS and Azam MS Does microfinance reduce poverty in 
Bangladesh? New evidence from 
household panel data 
2010 
   X                
Karlan D and Zinman J Expanding credit access: using 
randomized supply decisions to 
estimate the impacts 
2010 
X  X X X  X  X  X       X  
PnK, Bangladesh 20 papers 
 
 X   X X X X    X X  X     X 
Kondo T, Orbeta A, 
Dingcong C, Infantado C 
Impact of microfinance on rural 
households in the Philippines 
2008 
   X X   X            
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Montgomery H/ 
Setboonsarng Sand 
Parpiev Z, Pakistan 
2 papers  
X  X X X X X X     X     X X 
Shimamura Y and 
Lastarria-Cornhiel S 
Credit Program participation and child 
schooling in rural Malawi 
2010 
      X      X       
Shirazi NS and Khan AU Role of Pakistan poverty alleviation 
fund's microcredit in poverty 
alleviation: a case of Pakistan 
2009 
         X          
Steele F, Amin S and 
Naved RT 
Savings/credit group formation and 
change in contraception 
2001 
             X      
Swain RB and Wallentin 
FY 
Does microfinance empower eomen? 
Evidence from self-help groups in India 
2009                   X 
Takahashi K, Higashikata 
T and Tsukada K 
The short-term poverty impact of small-
scale, collateral-free microcredit in 
Indonesia: a matching estimator 
approach 
2010 
X  X X X X              
USAID, India, Peru, 
Zimbabwe 
10 papers  
X X  X X X  X   X X    X X X X 
Tesfay GB Econometric analyses of microfinance 
credit group formation, contractual 
risks and welfare impacts in northern 
Ethiopia 
2009 
    X      X91         
Zaman H Assessing the impact of microcredit on 
poverty and vulnerability in Bangladesh 
1999 
       X   X       X X 
                                                 
91 Housing Improvements 
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Zeller M, Sharma M, 
Ahmed AU, Rashid S 
Group-based financial institutions for 
the rural poor in Bangladesh: an 
institutional- and household-level 
analysis 
2001 
    X          X     
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6.17 Appendix 17: Results of other included papers based on 
PnK dataset 
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Outcome variable Headline findings
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PnK 
1998 
WES
LIM
L 
 
Log pc expenditure 
Female 
brac 
brdb 
gb 
 
Male 
brac 
brdb 
gb 
 
Ln women n‐lnd assets 
Female 
brac 
brdb 
gb 
 
Male 
brac 
brdb 
gb 
 
Ln female  lab supply 
Female 
brac 
brdb 
gb 
 
Male 
brac 
brdb 
gb 
 
Male labour supply 
Female 
brac 
brdb 
gb 
 
Male 
brac 
brdb 
gb 
 
ols/wmlols/wml/wmlfe 
 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/ +ive (sig) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (sig)/ +ive (sig) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/ +ive (sig) 
 
 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/‐ive (ns)/ +ive (ns) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/‐ive (sig)/ +ive (sig) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/‐ive (sig)/ +ive (ns) 
 
unwtTobit/ ols/wmlols/wml/wmlfe 
 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/ +ive (sig)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns)/‐ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/ +ive (sig)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (ns)/ +ive (sig)/+ive (ns) 
 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (sig)/ +ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (ns)/+ive (sig)/ +ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (ns)/ ‐ive (ns)/‐ive (ns) 
 
unwtTobit/wmltobit/wmlliml/wmlfe/wmllimlfe 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive (sig)/+ive (ns)/ +ive (sig)/‐ive (ns) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/ +ive (sig)/‐ive (ns) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/ +ive (sig)/+ive (ns) 
 
 
‐ive (sig)/‐ive (ns)/‐ive (ns)/ ‐ive (ns)/‐ive (ns) 
‐ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/ +ive (ns)/‐ive (ns) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (ns)/ ‐ive (nsig)/‐ive (ns) 
 
unwtTobit/wmltobit/wmlliml/wmllimlfe  
 
+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/‐ive (sig)/ ‐ive (sig) 
‐ive (nsig)/‐ive (nsig)/‐ive (sig)/ ‐ive (sig) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/‐ive (sig)/ ‐ive (sig) 
 
 
+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/ ‐ive (sig) 
+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/ ‐ive (sig) 
‐ive (nsig)/‐ive (sig)/+ive (nsig)/ ‐ive (sig) 
 
High 
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Girl school enrolment 
Female 
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brdb 
gb 
 
Male 
brac 
brdb 
gb 
 
Boy school enrolment 
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brac 
brdb 
gb 
 
Male 
brac 
brdb 
gb 
 
Uwprobit/wmlprobit/wmlliml/wmlfe/wmllimlfe 
+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/+ive (sig)/ +ive (nsig)/‐icve(nsig) 
+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/ +ive (nsig)/‐‐ive(nsig) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (nsig)/+ive (sig)/ +ive (sig)/+ive(nsig) 
 
 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/ +ive (nsig)/+ive(nsig) 
‐ive (nsig)/‐ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/ +ive (nsig)/+ive(nsig) 
+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/+ive (sig)/ +ive (nsig)/+ive(nsig) 
 
 
Uwprobit/wmlprobit/wmlliml/wmlfe/wmllimlfe 
+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/+ive (sig)/ ‐ive (nsig)/+ive(sig) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (nsig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive(sig) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/+‐ive (sig)/+ive(sig) 
 
 
‐ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/ ‐ive (nsig)/‐ive(nsig) 
+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/+ive (nsig)/+ive(nsig) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (nsig)/+ive (sig)/+ive(sig) 
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GB  
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GB  
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Hhchar/hh&vill char/full sample 
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‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig) 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig) 
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‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig) 
 
Problems reconstructing so not assessed 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns) 
ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig) 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig) 
 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig) 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/‐ive(sig) 
‐ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(sig) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns) 
 
High 
Pitt, 
1999 
  Log pc expend 
Female bor BRAC 
Male bor BRAC 
Female bor BRDB 
Male bor BRDB 
Female bor GB 
Male bor GB 
All BRAC 
All BRDB 
All GB 
 
 
 
Female bor BRAC 
0.5/0.66/1.20/1.60/2.0 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig) 
 
With land interactions 
None/0.5/0.66/1.20/1.60/2.0 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig) 
High 
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d 
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Bi
as
 
Male bor BRAC 
Female bor BRDB 
Male bor BRDB 
Female bor GB 
Male bor GB 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
Che
min, 
2008 
PSM   
Var Log per capita 
expenditure 
Log women non‐land  
assets 
Female lab supply 
Male labour supply 
Girl school enrolment 
Boy school enrolment 
Kernel0.05/0.02/0.01 
 
‐ive (ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(nss) 
 
+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
High 
Roo
dma
n & 
Mor
duc
h, 
2009 
cmp  Table 3 ‐ PnK 
Log female borr 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB 
 
Log Male borr  
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB 
 
Table 4 ‐ PnK 
Log per capita consum  
log female bor 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB 
 
Log male bor 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB 
 
Table 5 – PnK wwliml 
Ln fem n‐land assets 
ln fem hrs/mnth 
ln male hrs./mnth 
Girl school enrolment 
Boy school enrolment 
 
Table 6 ‐ Morduch 
Ln pc expend 
GB  
BRAC 
BRDB 
 
Tgt:LIMhh OLS/Vill/VillFE/ all: LIMhh OLS/Vill/VillFE/ 
+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ ‐ive(sig)/ ‐ive(sig) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/ ‐ive(ns)/ ‐ive(sig)/ ‐ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ ‐ive(sig)/ ‐ive(sig) 
 
 
+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/ +ive(sig)/ ‐ive(ns)/ ‐ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/ +ive(sig)/ ‐ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/ ‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/ ‐ive(ns) 
 
 
Rounds 1‐3/1/2/3/Srvy&vill dummies1‐3/1/2/3 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/ ‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/ ‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/ ‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/ ‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/ ‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/ ‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/‐ive(sig) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/ ‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
Fem borr BRAC/BRDB/GM: / male borr BRAC/BRDB/GB 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig): /+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns): /‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns): /‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns): /‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns): /‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
targ hh: hh char/arg hh hh& vill char/  all hh, hh & vill char Vill FE 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig) 
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Var Ln pc expend 
GB  
BRAC 
BRDB 
 
Log lab per adult pm 
GB  
BRAC 
BRDB 
 
Var Log adult lab pm 
GB  
BRAC 
BRDB 
 
 Male lab supply 
GB  
BRAC 
BRDB 
 
Adult Fem lab supply 
GB  
BRAC 
BRDB 
 
Boy school enrolment 
GB  
BRAC 
BRDB 
 
 Girl school enrolment 
GB  
BRAC 
BRDB 
 
Table 7 – Morduch DID 
ln pc exp 
did 
 
Table  10 ‐ Khandker,05 
Ln fem current loans 
Ln fem past loans 
Ln male current loans 
Ln male past loans 
 
 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
 
‐ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ve(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns) 
 
 
GB/BRAC/BRDB 
‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)‐ive(sig) 
 
OLS no FE/FE/2sls noFE/FE 2sls Interaction Vill dummies no FE /FE 
+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig) /+ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
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 Table 19 ‐ Chemin 
Var Log pc expend 
Log pc expend 
Log fem n‐land assets 
Female lab supply 
Male labour supply 
Girl school enrolment 
Boy school enrolment 
 
Table 25 
All 
Var Log pc expend 
Log pc expend 
Log fem n‐land assets 
Female lab supply 
Male labour supply 
Girl school enrolment 
Boy school enrolment 
 
Female borr 
Var Log pc expend 
Log pc expend 
Log fem n‐land assets 
Female lab supply 
Male labour supply 
Girl school enrolment 
Boy school enrolment 
 
Male borr 
Var Log pc expend 
Log pc expend 
Log fem n‐land assets 
Female lab supply 
Male labour supply 
Girl school enrolment 
Boy school enrolment 
 
Table 30 – Panel 
Var Log pc expend 
Log pc expend 
Log fem n‐land assets 
Female lab supply 
Male labour supply 
Girl school enrolment 
Boy school enrolment 
 
Table 39 – RnM 
log pc expenditure 
RnM 
MD  
Kernel0.05/0.02/0.01 
‐ive (ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive (ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig) 
+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/ +ive(sig)/ +ive(sig) 
 
 
NN comparisons 1/2/3/4/Kernel comparisons 1/2/3/4 
+ive(ns)/‐ ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/ +ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/ +ive(sig) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/ +ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/‐+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/+ ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/‐ive(sig) 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig) 
 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/ +ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig) 
‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
 
 
‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/ +ive(sig) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/‐ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/+ive(sig) 
 
RE / PSM DID 
‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig) 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/‐ive(ns) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig) 
‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig) 
+ive(sig)/+ive(sig) 
 
 
femBRAC/maleBRAC/femBRDB/MaleBRDB/FfemGB/maleGB 
‐ive(ns)/+ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)  
+ive(ns)/+ive(ns)/‐ive(ns)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(sig)/‐ive(ns) 
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Kha
ndk
er 
and 
Latif 
1996 
(Lati
f, 
1994 
excl
ude
d) 
Mult
ivari
ate 
Contraceptive use 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB 
 
 Fertility 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB 
 
Infant mortality 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB 
Presence of Programme 
+ive (sig) 
ns 
+ive (sig) 
 
 
ns 
ns 
ns 
 
 
ns 
ns 
ns 
High 
K
ha
nd
ke
r, 
Sa
m
ad
 a
nd
 K
ha
n,
 1
99
8  LIM
L 
Production 
Farm activities 
GB 
BRAC 
BRDB 
non‐farm 
GB 
BRAC 
BRDB 
all 
GB 
BRAC 
BRDB 
 
Employment – in LF 
Farm activities 
GB 
BRAC 
BRDB 
non‐farm 
GB 
BRAC 
BRDB 
all 
GB 
BRAC 
BRDB 
 
Employment – hr/ month 
self/wage/total 
Farm activities 
GB 
BRAC 
BRDB 
non‐farm 
GB 
BRAC 
BRDB 
all 
GB 
BRAC 
BRDB 
 
Income 
self/wage/both/total 
 
 
+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns) 
+ive (sig) 
 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig) 
 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig) 
 
 
 
+ive (sig) 
‐ive (ns) 
+ive (sig) 
 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig) 
‐ive (ns) 
 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns) 
+ive (sig) 
 
 
 
 
+ive (ns)/‐ive (sig)/‐ive (ns) 
‐ive (sig)/‐ive (sig)/‐ive (sig) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (ns)/+ive (sig) 
 
+ive (sig)/‐ive (ns)/+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (sig)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (sig)/‐ive (sig)/‐ive (ns) 
 
+ive (sig) 
‐ive (sig) 
‐ive (sig) 
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Farm activities 
GB 
BRAC 
BRDB 
non‐farm 
GB 
BRAC 
BRDB 
all 
GB 
BRAC 
BRDB 
 
Wages 
GB 
BRAC 
BRDB 
 
 
+ive (ns)/‐ive (sig)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns)/‐ive (sig)/‐ive (ns) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (ns)/+ive (sig) 
 
+ive (sig)/+ive (ns)/+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns)/‐ive (ns)/‐ive (ns) 
 
+ive (ns) 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns) 
 
 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns) 
‐ive(ns) 
 
Nan
da, 
1999 
IV 
prob
it 
Use of formal health car 
Women’s participation. 
Men’s participatione 
 
+ive (10%) 
ns 
High 
Pi
tt,
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r, 
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99
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L 
Modern contraceptive use 
females 
males 
 
Fertility 
Female participation 
 
male participation 
 Ns 
‐ive (?5%) 
+ive (ns) 
 
 
+‐ive for female participation 
 
‐ive for male participation 
 
 
High 
Pitt, 
2000 
LIM
L 
Contractual relations 
Employment 
 
Sharecropped land 
Elig0.5 
Female 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Male 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Elig 1.0 
Female 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Male 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Fixed Rental land 
 
+ive for sharecropping, agricultural self‐employment – more so for women 
 
 
 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig) 
 
 
+ive (ns)/‐ive (ns) 
+ive (ns)/‐ive (ns) 
+ive (sig)/‐ive (ns) 
 
 
 
+ive (ns)/‐ive (ns) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig) 
 
 
‐ive (ns)/‐ive (ns) 
‐ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
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Elig0.5 
Female 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Male 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Elig 1.0 
Female 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Male 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Male self‐employment in 
agric 
Elig0.5 
Female 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Male 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Elig 1.0 
Female 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Male 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Male wage employment in 
agric 
Elig0.5 
Female 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Male 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
‐ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
 
 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
‐ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
‐ive (sig)/‐ive (sig)/‐ive (ns) 
 
 
+ive (ns)/‐ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (sig)/+ive  (sig) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
 
 
 
 
 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (sig) 
 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig) 
 
 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (sig)/+ive (sig) 
 
 
 
 
 
‐ive (ns)/‐ive (sig) 
‐ive (ns)/‐ive (sig) 
‐ive (ns)/‐ive (sig) 
 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns)/‐ive (sig) 
+ive (ns)/‐ive (sig) 
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Elig 1.0 
Female 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
Male 
Aman  
boro 
aus 
 
 
 
 
-ive (ns)/-ive (sig) 
-ive (ns)/-ive (sig) 
-ive (ns)/-ive (sig) 
 
 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns)/-ive (sig) 
+ive (ns)/-ive (sig) 
 
 
K
ha
nd
ke
r, 
20
00
  LIM
L 
Log male MFborrowing 
Formal borrowing 
informal borrowing 
total savings 
prog savings 
voluntary savings 
 
Log fe m MF borrowing 
Formal borrowing 
informal borrowing 
total savings 
prog savings 
voluntary savings 
 
Log male MF borrowing 
GB prog savings 
GB vol savings 
BRAC prog savings 
BRAC vol savings 
BRDB prog savings 
BRDB vol savings 
 
Log fe m MF borrowing 
GB prog savings 
GB vol savings 
BRAC prog savings 
BRAC vol savings 
BRDB prog savings 
BRDB vol savings  
(Table 11) 
Log MF savings 
pooled  
aman 
boro 
aus 
 
 
pooled  
aman 
boro 
aus 
 
Table 9 
‐ive(ns) 
‐ive(ns 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns) 
 
 
‐ive (sig) 
+ive (ns) 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns) 
 
Table1 10 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns) 
+ive (sig) 
‐ive (sig) 
+ive (sig) 
+ive (ns) 
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